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Abstract 
The primary objective of this study was to examine the broader impact of institutional 
quality on enhancing foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) 
inflows in a sample of twelve emerging market economies for the period 2007 to 2017. We 
specifically sought to answer questions related to the key drivers of FDI and FPI inflows into 
emerging markets, with a particular emphasis on the role played by institutional quality 
factors. We further sought to interrogate the long-run and causal relationships between the 
key variables of FDI, FPI and institutional quality, in respect of the sample of emerging 
markets. The study employed the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to construct a 
composite index for institutional quality composed of the six Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. Various other econometric models were applied, including the dynamic panel 
data generalised method of moments (GMM) model, the panel autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model for dynamic heterogeneous panels, and the panel vector error correction 
model (VECM). The results revealed that FDI in the selected emerging markets was, in the 
main, attracted by economic growth and institutional quality. Institutional quality, economic 
growth and capital account openness were positive determinants of FPI inflows; however, 
stock market development stood out as the foremost determinant factor. In addition to 
finding long-run, cointegrating relationships between the key variables, it emerged that 
there was bi-directional causality between FDI and FPI, as well as between FDI and 
institutional quality in the long run. Despite the latter findings, the results further suggested 
that the long-run relationship between the two foreign capital inflows, i.e. FDI and FPI, was 
more of a substitutability or trade-off nature in our sample of emerging markets. In light of 
these findings, we recommended that it would be in the best interests of these emerging 
markets if the responsible policymakers continued to liberalise these economies. Further, it 
was shown that in order to attract inward international capital flows, financial liberalisation 
should be coupled with the strengthening of the domestic institutional environment. 
Strengthening institutions could curtail the persistence of institutional weaknesses and 
insulate emerging market economies from the adverse effects of volatile capital flows, and 
in the long-run enhance international capital inflows. 
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Ngamafuphi 
Inhloso enkulu yalolu cwaningo kwaye kuwukuhlola umthelela obanzi kwizinga leziko 
ekuqiniseni uhlelo lokutshalwa ngqo kwezimali ezweni langaphandle (foreign direct 
investment; FDI) kanye nemali engena mayelana nokuthengwa kwamagugu (shares, stocks 
and bonds) angenisa imali ezweni elingaphandle (foreign portfolio investment; FPI) 
kwizimakethe zamazwe eziyishumi nambili esikhathini esiphakathi kuka 2007 ukufika ku 
2017.  Empeleni besifuna ukuphendula imibuzo emayelana nezikhwezeleli ezisemqoka 
eziheha uhlelo lwe-FDI kanye ne-FPI ezimakethe ezifufusayo, ikakhulu kugxilwe kwindima 
edlalwa yizinto ezihlobene nezinga leziko. Siqhubekela phambili nokuphenya izinhlobo 
zobudlelwano besikhathi esinde kanye nobudlelwano obuyimbangela phakathi 
kwamavarebuli asemqoka e-FDI, i-FPI kanye nezinga leziko, mayelana nesampuli 
yezimakethe ezisafufusayo. Ucwaningo lusebenzise uhlelo lwe-Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) ukwakha imvange yezinkomba ukwenzela izinga leziko eliqukethe izinkomba 
eziyisithupha ezibizwa phecelezi nge-Worldwide Governance Indicators. Amanye amamodeli 
alinganisa ezomnotho asetshenzisiwe, kuxutshwa phakathi idatha yamaphaneli 
eguquguqukayo ebizwa nge-dynamic panel data generalised method of moments (GMM) 
model, uhlelo lwe-panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model ukwenzela amaphaneli 
ahlukahlukene futhi aguquguqukayo, kanye nohlelo lwe-panel vector error correction model 
(VECM). Imiphumela iveze ukuthi i-FDI ezimakethe ezikhethiwe ezisafufusa, esikhathini 
esiningi, iye yahehwa ukuhluma komnotho kanye nezinga leziko. Izinga leziko, ukuhluma 
komnotho kanye nokuvuleka kwe-akhawunti yemali bekuyizinto eziyizinkomba ezinhle 
zokungena kwe-FPI; yize-kunjalo, ukuthuthukiswa kwemakethe yesitoko kuvele kwagqama 
ngaphezulu njengenkomba ekhombisayo. Ukwengeza phezu kolwazi olutholakele 
esikhathini esinde, ukuhlangana kobudlelwano obuphakathi kwamavarebuli asemqoka, 
kuye kwavela ukuthi kwakunezimbangela ezikhomba izindlela ezimbili zokungena 
kwezimali ezitshalwa ngaphandle, zona yilezi i-FDI kanye nezinga leziko esikhathini esinde. 
Naphezu kolwazi olutholakele kamuva, imiphumela iqhubeka nokuphakamisa ukuthi 
ubudlelwano besikhathi eside obuphakathi kwezinhlelo zokutshalwa kwezimali ezivela 
emazweni angaphandle, lezo zinhlelo yilezi, i-FDI kanye ne-FPI, bezingendlela  ikakhulukazi 
yokushintshana/yokumisela noma yokushintshelana ngokuhweba kwisampuli yethu 
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yezimakethe ezisafufusayo. Mayelana nalolu lwazi olutholakele, sincome ukuthi 
kuzohambisana nokuthandwa yilezi zimakethe ezisafufusa uma ngabe abenzi bemigomo 
ababandakanyekayo baqhubeke nokususa izihibe zomnotho kula mazwe asafufusa. 
Ngaphezu kwalokho, kuye kwavezwa ukuthi ukuze kuhehwe izimali zamazwe angaphandle, 
uhlelo lokususwa kwezihibe zomnotho lufanele luhambisane nokuqiniswa kwesizinda 
esiyiziko lasekhaya. Ukuqiniswa kwamaziko kungaqeda isimo esintengayo seziko futhi 
kungasusa izimakethe zamazwe asafufusayo kwisimo esingagculisi sezimali ezingenayo, 
kanti esikhathini eside lokhu kungaqinisa ukutshalwa ukungena kwezimali ezivela 
emzaweni angaphandle.  
AMAGAMA ASEMQOKA: Ukungena kwezimali ezivela emazwenia ngaphandle, uhlelo 
lokutshalwa ngqo kwezimali emazweni angaphandle, Ukutshalwa kwempahla eyigugu 
emazweni angaphandle, izinga leziko, izimakethe ezisafufusayo. 
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Tshobokanyo 
Maikemisetso magolo a thutopatlisiso eno e ne e le go tlhatlhoba ditlamorago ka bophara tsa 
boleng jwa ditheo mo go tokafatseng keleloteng ya dipeeletso tsa tlhamalalo tsa kwa 
dinageng tse dingwe (FDI) le dipeeletso tsa dipotefolio tsa kwa dinageng tse dingwe (FPI) 
mo sampoleng ya diikonomi tse somepedi tsa mebaraka e e tlhagelelang mo pakeng ya 2007 
go fitlha 2017. Re ne re totile go araba dipotso tse di malebana le ditsamaisi tsa botlhokwa 
tsa keleloteng ya FDI le FPI mo mebarakeng e e tlhagelelang, go lebeletswe thata seabe sa 
dintlha tsa boleng jwa ditheo. Gape re ne re lebeletse go tlhotlhomisa go nna sebaka se se 
telele le sebako sa dikamano magareng ga dipharologantsho tsa botlhokwa tsa FDI, FPI le 
boleng jwa ditheo, malebana le sampole ya mebaraka e e tlhagelelang. Thutopatlisiso e 
dirisitse Tokololo ya Dintlha tsa Botlhokwa (PCA) go aga tshupane ya dikarolo ya boleng jwa 
ditheo e e nang le Disupi di le thataro tsa Lefatshe lotlhe tsa Bolaodi. Go dirisitswe gape dikao 
tse dingwe tse di farologaneng tsa ikonometiriki, go akarediwa sekao sa dynamic panel data 
generalised method of moments (GMM) sa data ya phanele e e farologaneng, sekao sa panel 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) sa diphanele tse di farologaneng le sekao sa panel 
vector error correction (VECM). Dipholo di senotse gore FDI mo mebarakeng e e 
tlhophilweng e e tlhagelelang e ne tota e ngokiwa ke kgolo ya ikonomi le boleng jwa ditheo. 
Boleng jwa ditheo, kgolo ya ikonomi le go bulega ga akhaonto ya kapitale e nnile diswetsi tse 
di siameng tsa keleloteng ya FPI; fela tlhabololo ya mebaraka ya setoko e tlhageletse jaaka 
ntlha e e kwa pele e e swetsang. Go tlaleletsa mo go fitlheleleng botsalano jwa pakatelele le 
jo bo kopanang jwa dipharologantsho tsa botlhokwa, go tlhageletse gore go na le go sebako 
sa dintlhapedi magareng ga FDI le FPI gammogo le magareng ga FDI le boleng jwa ditheo mo 
pakeng e e telele. Le fa go ntse go na le diphitlhelelo tse di kailweng la bofelo, dipholo gape 
di tshitshinya gore botsalano jwa paka e e telele magareng ga keleloteng ya kapitale ya kwa 
ntle k.g.r. FDI le FPI ke jwa mofuta wa go emisetsa se sengwe ka se sengwe mo sampoleng  
ya rona ya mebaraka e e tlhagelelang. Ka ntlha ya diphitlhelelo tseno, re atlenegisa gore go 
tlaa bo go le mo dikgatlhegelong tsa mebaraka eno e e tlhagelelang gore ba ba rweleng 
maikarabelo a go dira dipholisi ba ka tswelela go repisa diikonomi tseno. Mo godimo ga moo, 
go bonagetse gore go ngokela kelelo e e tsenang ya kapitale ya boditšhabatšhaba, go repisiwa 
ga merero ya ditšhelete go tshwanetse ga tsamaisiwa le maatlafatso ya tikologo ya ditheo tsa 
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selegae. Go maatlafatsa ditheo go ka fedisa go tswelela pele ga makoa a ditheo le go sireletsa 
diikonomi tsa mebaraka e e tlhagelelang mo ditlamoragong tse di maswe tsa dikelelo tse di 
maswe tsa kapitale, mme kwa bokhutlong, go tokafadiwe kelelo ya kapitale ya 
boditšhabatšhaba. 
MAFOKO A BOTLHOKWA Keleloteng ya kapitale ya boditšhabatšhaba, dipeeletso tsa 
tlhamalalo go tswa kwa dinageng tse di kwa ntle, dipeeletso tsa potefolio ya dinaga tse di 
kwa ntle, boleng jwa ditheo, mebaraka e e tlhagelelang. 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1 Background to the study 
The growth of globalisation and financial market integration is characterised by rising 
international capital flows across developed and developing countries. Global capital flows 
are composed mainly of foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign portfolio investment (FPI) 
and other private sector capital flows such as bank lending (UNCTAD, 2018). After significant 
plunges and reversals during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis period, capital flows 
recovered, although not to pre-crisis levels (Alfaro & Chauvin, 2016; UNCTAD, 2018). 
Over the past few decades, a debate has continued in scholarly papers over the impact of 
globalisation and capital inflows on the economic development and growth of host 
economies. Scepticism emanating from this debate has even resulted in some economies 
tightening their policies and regulations towards inward foreign investment (UNCTAD, 
2019). However, there are still countries that continue to strengthen their pursuit of foreign-
investment-assisted development strategies (Narula & Dunning, 2000; UNCTAD, 2019). 
Empirical studies continue to produce divergent results as to a direct relationship between 
FDI and economic growth. However, considerable empirical evidence has also shown that 
FDI can be beneficial to growth, provided that the host country has sufficient capacity in the 
form of adequate development in the financial markets, institutions and human capital to 
absorb the advantages that are embodied in FDI. These advantages include new 
technologies, skills, and foreign capital, which can all contribute to increased productivity 
and economic growth (Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee, 1998; Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan 
& Sayek, 2004; Choong, Baharumshah, Yusop & Habibullah, 2010; Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi & 
Yawson, 2014; Slesman, Baharumshah & Wohar, 2015; Agbloyor, Gyeke-Dako, Kuipo & Abor, 
2016). Empirical literature also suggests that the ambiguity in the direct relationship 
between FDI and economic growth is partly due to the type of FDI a host country would 
attract - i.e. whether resource-seeking, market-seeking or efficiency-seeking FDI - (Žarković, 
Gligorić & Žarković, 2017; Ayomitunde, Geogina, Bose & Grace, 2019).  
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Moreover, while there may still be scepticism about the essential economic effects of FPI, 
notably as a result of its volatile nature, studies continue to show that the interaction 
between FPI inflows and adequately developed capital markets and institutions has the 
potential to alleviate and, better still, to transform any negative growth effects of these flows 
into positive ones (Choong et al., 2010; Agbloyor et al., 2014). Economies beset by low 
domestic savings often rely heavily on foreign capital injected into the capital markets to 
alleviate current account deficits and provide for much needed investment in order to 
galvanise economic activity and growth. Significant inflows of FPI also have the effect of 
broadening domestic capital markets, increasing liquidity and reducing the cost of capital. 
Furthermore, foreign participation in domestic financial markets improves the efficiency of 
markets as it relates to the allocation of funds to productive investments, and provides 
information necessary for improved evaluation of investment projects (Errunza, 2001).  
Empirical evidence concerned with the determinants of international capital inflows points 
to factors such as macroeconomic fundamentals, development and policy-related factors, as 
well as global factors (for instance, see Ahmed, Arezki, & Funke, 2007; Różański & Sekuła, 
2016; Gossel & Biekpe, 2017; Makoni, 2017; Saini & Singhania, 2018; Sabir, Rafique & 
Kamran, 2019). Macroeconomic fundamentals include variables such as economic growth, 
interest rates and exchange rates, which influence foreign investors’ rates of return, and 
therefore inform their return and risk expectations (Ahmed et al., 2007). Development 
factors entail variables such as institutional quality, financial market development, and 
human capital development in respect of the host country, which are expected to facilitate 
the growth and development benefits of capital inflows to the host economy (Choong et al., 
2010; Agbloyor et al., 2014; Makoni, 2017). Policy-related variables, on the other hand, 
include those related to market liberalisation, which indicate the recipient country’s 
liberalisation with regard to international financial transactions (Ahmed et al., 2007; Makoni, 
2017; Gossel & Biekpe, 2017).  
Of particular interest to this study is the growing evidence to the effect that, in addition to 
such factors as macroeconomic fundamentals, financial market development, and market 
liberalisation - institutional quality is a critical determinant of capital inflows, both in their 
attraction and in the harnessing of their benefits in the host economy (for instance, see 
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Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych, 2007; Fratzscher, 2012; Agbloyor et al., 2016; 
Różański & Sekuła, 2016; Kurul, 2017; Makoni, 2018). 
Studies that have examined the behaviour of international capital flows, such as Fratzscher 
(2012) and Ghosh, Qureshi, Kim and Zalduendo (2014), reveal that despite global factors, 
the quality of domestic institutions accounts significantly for the heterogeneity and 
allocation of capital flows across emerging markets. Other studies have concluded that some 
developing countries fail to attract capital inflows because of the poor quality of their 
institutions (Masron & Abdullah, 2010; Kurul & Yalta, 2017; Makoni, 2018; Peres, Ameer & 
Xu, 2018). 
Institutions are the rules that structure economic, legal, political and social interactions and 
transactions such as laws, regulations, and codes of conduct, as well as the mechanisms that 
enforce these rules (North, 1991; World Bank, 2002). High quality institutions provide a 
stable and fertile environment for investment and long-term economic development. 
Investor confidence and foreign capital inflows are augmented by better quality institutions. 
Studies have shown that the mere openness of the market is not sufficient to attract sizeable 
foreign investment inflows; but good institutional quality and financial openness work hand 
in hand in enhancing foreign investment (Okada, 2013; Byrne & Fiess, 2016). Furthermore, 
it has been empirically proven that strong institutions have a direct effect in improving 
economic growth and circumventing or moderating any negative effects that may arise from 
foreign investment inflows and market openness. These negative effects include competition 
that may adversely affect domestic firms (Nawaz, Iqbal & Khan, 2014; Agbloyor et al., 2016; 
Nguyen, Su & Nguyen, 2018). 
Evidence of the existence of a relationship between FDI and institutional quality and/or the 
impact of the latter on the former in both developed and developing countries, is well 
established in the literature and corroborated by numerous empirical studies. These include 
those by Asiedu and Lien (2011), Buchanan, Le and Rishi, (2012), Różański and Sekuła 
(2016), Kurul and Yalta (2017) and Peres et al. (2018). On the other hand, there is relatively 
limited research on the impact of institutional quality on FPI inflows. Furthermore, 
international scholarly research on the relationships among the three variables (i.e. 
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institutional quality, FDI and FPI) is even scanter, although Makoni (2018) does provide 
some insights into the nexus between FDI, FPI and institutional quality from an African 
perspective. 
In light of this background, the primary objective of this study was to investigate the broader 
impact of institutions in enhancing international capital inflows, both FDI and FPI, in the 
context of emerging market economies. Emerging markets make a compelling case study 
because, on the one hand, their role and influence in the global economy has accelerated with 
the growth of globalisation. Their rapidly expanding economies, and financial market 
liberalisation have, on a large scale, lured multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
international investors seeking to expand and diversify into new markets.  
On the other hand, the characteristics of institutional development and institutional change 
in emerging markets are different from those in developed countries. Many emerging 
countries democratised and began liberalising their economies just three decades ago. They 
transitioned from colonial, military or authoritarian rule to civilian rule, while at the same 
time shifting from closed and state-controlled economies to open and market-based 
economies. This recent democratisation and market liberalisation places emerging countries 
at a different stage of institutional development relative to developed countries (Iyer, 2016: 
Puffer, McCarthy & Jaeger, 2016).  
Some emerging countries are still characterised by inadequate institutional development, 
with inefficient regulatory and property rights structures, political risk, as well as 
institutional instability in relation to the regulation of foreign investment and trade. These 
institutional voids and instabilities create uncertainty, greater risks and higher transaction 
costs for multinational companies and international investors (Rottig, 2016).  
Emerging markets also grapple with the phenomenon of institutional persistence – where 
political institutions that are characterised by concentrated political power, and economic 
institutions designed to extract resources and distribute them to a few politically connected 
groups, persist even after political and economic transition. The persistence of these 
extractive institutions can be linked to powerful elites that have a great deal to lose from 
institutional reforms, as their political and economic power is vested in the existence of these 
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institutions. As a result such elites resist institutional change (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2019). 
Inadequate institutional development hinders the ability of emerging market economies to 
attract and preserve foreign investment. Furthermore, the persistence of extractive political 
and economic institutions creates inequalities that often lead to political and social unrest, 
which in turn may have an adverse impact on the business environment (Acemoglu, 2003; 
Iyer, 2016). 
It was therefore the intention of this study to assess the key drivers of inward FDI and FPI 
flows to emerging markets, paying particular attention to the role of institutions. We further 
delved deeper by examining the interrelationships of the key variables of FDI, FPI and 
institutional quality in emerging markets. In the next subsection, we discuss our problem 
statement and outline the specific research objectives and questions that this study sought 
to address. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
A number of empirical studies have assessed the impact of institutions on foreign capital 
inflows across advanced and emerging market economies. While it is evident from empirical 
literature that a broad set of high quality institutions is crucial for emerging markets to 
enhance their foreign investment inflows, the studies are not unanimous on which are the 
most important institutional determinants for foreign investment in emerging markets. 
Moreover, while these studies continue to reveal the impact of institutional quality on FDI 
inflows, research on the role of institutions on FPI inflows remains relatively limited. These 
gaps in the literature can be noted in the following strand of empirical literature.  
Busse and Hefeker (2007) found that government stability, law and order, bureaucratic 
quality, democratic accountability, and conflicts stood out as the most important political-
institutional determinants of FDI inflows for 83 emerging countries over the years 1984 to 
2003. Similarly, in a study of 98 developed and emerging economies for the period 1970 to 
2000, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2008) found that institutional quality 
measured by a broad set of institutional factors was the most significant and most consistent 
variable that accounted for international capital flows (FDI and FPI flows) not flowing from 
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capital-rich countries to capital-constrained countries. These factors included, amongst 
others, government stability, bureaucratic quality, investment profile, conflicts, corruption, 
and law and order. On the other hand, Ali, Fiess and MacDonald (2010) identified property 
rights protection as the most relevant institutional aspect for FDI inflows for 69 emerging 
countries over the period 1981 to 2005, compared to other attributes of institutions such as 
corruption, democracy and political stability.  
Recent studies that have employed the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) as a 
measure of institutional quality include Różański and Sekuła (2016) who found positive and 
statistically significant impact on FDI inflows from voice and accountability, political stability 
and rule of law, while control of corruption was significant but negative. Their study included 
51 developed and emerging markets for the period 1996 to 2014. Kurul and Yalta (2017) 
found that government effectiveness, control of corruption, voice and accountability were 
positive and statistically significant for FDI inflows in 113 emerging countries, over the 
period 2002 to 2012.  Peres et al. (2018), on the other hand, looked particularly at the impact 
of the rule of law and control of corruption on FDI inflows in a panel of 110 developed and 
developing countries (2002-2012). These institutional indicators were found to be highly 
significant for FDI inflows only in developed countries. Correspondingly, Sabir et al. (2019), 
using an institutional quality index composed of the WGIs, only found statistical significance 
or greater impact of institutions on FDI inflows in developed economies, as opposed to 
emerging economies (1996-2016). Based on these findings, both studies concluded that 
emerging market economies failed to attract sufficient inflows of foreign investment because 
of the weak quality of their domestic institutions. In the case of sub-Saharan African 
emerging markets, Gossel and Beard (2019) found that control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality and rule of law were the most pertinent 
and significant institutions for FPI inflows between 1985 and 2015. 
It was therefore the purpose of this study to add to this strand of empirical literature by re-
examining the role of institutional quality on both FDI and FPI inflows in the context of 
emerging markets. We sought specifically to reassess the key determinants of FDI and FPI 
inflows in emerging markets, but placing particular emphasis on the role of institutional 
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factors. These included government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, and political stability.  
The interrelationships between the three key variables of FDI, FPI and institutions in 
emerging markets were explored in some depth. Several studies, including Hyun (2006), 
Shah, Ahmad and Ahmed (2016), and Kurul (2017), have revealed relationships such as 
threshold effects of institutional quality on FDI inflows, as well as long-run and causal 
relationships between institutional quality and FDI. On the other hand, empirical studies 
dealing with such relationships between institutions and FPI are very scarce.  
This study therefore builds on and extends this literature by further examining the long-run 
relationships and causal relationships between the inflows of FDI and FPI and institutional 
quality in emerging markets. In order to fill the gaps in the literature that were highlighted 
in this subsection, the study aimed to achieve and answer the research objectives and 
questions that are outlined in the following subsections. 
1.3 Research objectives  
The primary objective of the study was to examine the broader impact of institutional quality 
in enhancing foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) inflows 
in emerging markets, for the period 2007 to 2017.  
In order to achieve this primary objective, the study sought to address the following 
secondary objectives:  
i. To identify the key determinants of FDI and FPI inflows to emerging markets from 
2007 to 2017. 
ii. To assess the long-run relationships between institutional quality, FDI and FPI 
inflows to emerging markets over the period 2007 to 2017. 
iii. To determine the causal relationships between FDI, FPI and institutional quality in 
emerging markets between 2007 and 2017. 
These sub-objectives collectively aimed to achieve the primary objective of examining the 
broader impact of institutions on international capital inflows to emerging market 
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economies. These objectives were translated into definite research questions that were 
addressed and answered in the empirical study that employed various econometric models. 
1.4 Research questions 
The following research questions were posed in the study:  
i. What were the key determinants of FDI and FPI inflows into emerging markets from 
2007 to 2017? 
ii. In what way, and to what extent, were FDI inflows, FPI inflows and institutional 
quality in emerging markets related in the long run, over the period 2007 to 2017? 
iii. What causal relationships existed between FDI, FPI and institutional quality in 
emerging markets between 2007 and 2017? 
1.5 Scope of the study 
This study focused on international capital flows to emerging markets, namely, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in relation to each other, and in 
relation to institutional quality. The focus on these two capital flows was due to the fact that 
they are the primary sources of long-term external finance to emerging market economies, 
other than the volatile short-term external debt inflows. The study also examined the impact 
on foreign capital inflows into emerging markets of various economic, development and 
policy-related variables, as well as global indicator(s), which are regarded as strong 
determinants of international capital flows in the literature. The decision to place greater 
emphasis on the role of institutions was informed by the precariousness in the institutional 
environment of emerging markets, caused by factors such as political instabilities, inefficient 
legal systems, and nationalisation programmes. All these have a negative impact on the 
inflows of FDI and FPI into emerging markets. Other factors that affect the ability to attract 
inward FDI and FPI, although acknowledged in the review of previous studies, fell outside 
the scope of this particular study.  
Lastly, the study used emerging markets as a case study and employed data covering the 
period 2007 to 2017. This period was chosen on the basis that it marked the period of 
increased integration of emerging market economies into the world economy and increased 
international capital flows. and thus gave insights into whether the policies and institutions 
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adopted by emerging markets yielded desired results in so far as attracting foreign capital 
inflows to assist domestic economic development was concerned.  
1.6 Significance of the study  
While the impact of institutions on FDI inflows is corroborated by extensive literature, this 
study found that literature on the impact of institutional factors on foreign portfolio 
investment, by contrast, is relatively limited. Research examining the three variables of FDI, 
FPI and institutions together is even scarcer. Thus, this study aimed to contribute to this area 
of research by adding new perspectives that extend the empirical analysis of the impact of 
institutions on foreign capital inflows by considering institutional effects on both FDI and 
FPI. It further aimed to contribute to the scant literature that investigated the long-run and 
causality relationships between institutions and both FDI and FPI inflows into emerging 
markets. 
We further believed that the findings of this study would not only contribute to knowledge, 
given the gaps in the literature highlighted above, but will also highlight informative and 
relevant policy implications for policymakers and governments in emerging market 
economies. In particular, it will provide empirical evidence of the significance of institutions 
to foreign capital inflows into their countries, and of how institutions interact with foreign 
direct and portfolio investment inflows into the host economy. 
1.7 Limitations of the study     
The limitation of this study is that it was based on a sample of 12 emerging markets, and 
thus, its findings may not necessarily be generalisable to other countries and economies. 
However, the intention was to obtain a deeper understanding of the trend of international 
capital inflows into some of the largest emerging market economies across the regions of 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. In so doing, we sought to understand the effect of 
institutions on international capital inflows in order to make recommendations to 
policymakers on how to improve the investment profile and institutional environment in 
their countries, and attract sizeable and durable foreign capital inflows that will complement 
domestic savings, and thus enhance economic productivity and growth. Such steps could 
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then also be emulated by other developing countries across the larger spectrum of the 
emerging market economy.  
1.8 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the background to the study, presented the problem statement, and 
outlined the research objectives and questions. It also explained the scope and significance 
of the study, as well as its limitations. The remainder of this dissertation is structured as 
follows: Chapter 2 presents an overview of the key concepts, as well as the theoretical and 
empirical literature related to the three key variables of the study, namely FDI, FPI and 
institutions. Chapter 3 details the methodological aspects of the empirical study. Chapter 4 
presents the data analysis and the discussion of the results, while Chapter 5 concludes the 
study by providing a summary of the key findings, as well as recommendations regarding 
the policy implications of the study, and suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion and review of the main concepts, theoretical frameworks, 
and previous empirical evidence that are relevant to the study. Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 
discuss existing theoretical and empirical literature on the key concepts of this study, i.e. 
foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment and institutions, respectively. Section 
2.5 reviews the extant empirical evidence on the interrelationships between capital flows 
and institutions from a global perspective, while section 2.6 provides background about 
international capital inflows into some of the largest Asian, African, Latin American and 
European emerging market economies that constitute the sample of this study. Section 2.7 
concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
2.2.1 Definition and Overview of FDI 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2008) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) define foreign direct investment (FDI) as a 
category of international investment that grants 10 percent or more voting rights to an entity 
of one economy in an entity that is resident in another economy. The investment is made 
with the intent to establish a long-term strategic interest in the foreign entity to ensure 
significant influence or control in the management of the foreign entity or enterprise. The 
long-term interest and significant influence or control derives from or is evidenced in the 
acquisition of at least 10 percent of voting rights by the investing entity in the foreign 
enterprise. The foreign enterprise may be a subsidiary in which the investing entity holds 
over 50 percent of voting shares, or an associate in which between 10 and 50 percent of 
voting shares are held by the investing entity (OECD, 2008). The transactions that occur 
between enterprises of the same group are encapsulated in FDI and they include direct 
investment positions and financial flows of equity and debt, as well as direct investment 
income flows (i.e. reinvested earnings, distributed earnings and interest income) (OECD, 
2008). Put differently, these transactions include the initial investment transaction in the 
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foreign enterprise by the investing entity and all ensuing transactions between the entities 
(UNCTAD, 2007).  
FDI may occur in a number of forms. It may take the form of a green-field investment, which 
entails establishing a new enterprise (Coetzee, Bezuidenhout, Claassen & Kleynhans, 2015). 
It may also come in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), that is acquiring 
controlling equity and assets of an existing company (Correia, 2015:17-2). 
Hymer (1960) provided several reasons as to why a firm would seek control in its foreign 
operations, and therefore embark on FDI. Hymer (1960) argued that firms seek control 
because: (1) they want to ensure the prudent use and safety of their assets and investments, 
(2) they desire to remove competition or to fully exploit their abilities and skills, and (3) 
firms with advantages over other firms in the production of a particular product may find it 
more profitable to establish operations in a foreign country, rather than serving the foreign 
country through exports.  
Dunning and Dilyard (1999) also mentioned four motives for pursuing FDI. The first motive 
is resource-seeking, which seeks to secure resources such as natural resources and raw 
materials for the investing firm. The second motive of market-seeking FDI seeks to identify 
and take advantage of new markets for its final goods, while the third motive, efficiency-
seeking FDI, seeks to reorganise the structure of its existing investments to ensure an 
efficient allocation of its resources. The last motive is that of strategic-asset-seeking FDI, 
which seeks to solidify and sustain a firm’s global competitive edge by augmenting its 
existing resources or ownership advantages (Dunning & Dilyard, 1999).  
The following subsection presents a review of some of the most pertinent theories that 
explain the phenomenon of FDI. 
2.2.2 Theories of Foreign Direct Investment  
2.2.2.1 Imperfect Markets Theory 
Hymer (1960) is credited with laying the foundation of the imperfect markets theory, from 
which many other theories on international production ensued (Denisia, 2010). This theory 
states that domestic firms generally have an advantage of superior knowledge of the 
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economy, languages, laws and policies of their home country. For a foreign firm to acquire 
this knowledge may be considerably costly. Moreover, the foreign firm is faced with more 
permanent disadvantages such as capital controls, exchange-rate risk, taxation and 
discrimination by the local government, consumers and suppliers (Hymer, 1960). However, 
the foreign firm may possess firm-specific advantages that are more profitable abroad than 
at home. These advantages should outweigh the disadvantages of operating abroad and 
make international investment profitable (Nayak & Choudhury, 2014). 
Kindleberger (1969), also credited with expanding the theory, added that in the presence of 
perfect international markets for technology, management and labour skills, and inputs, the 
market abroad would be better catered for by local firms. Essentially, Hymer (1960) and 
Kindleberger (1969) were arguing that a firm establishing operations in a foreign country 
will be at a disadvantage when compared to local firms. Therefore for FDI to be pursued, the 
foreign firm should possess certain advantages over local competitors and the benefits from 
exploiting these advantages must more than compensate the foreign firm for the costs and 
disadvantages of operating in that country (Agarwal, 1980; Denisia, 2010). These benefits 
should enable the firm not only to profit more than competitors back home, but also to earn 
more than the domestic competitors in the host country (Agarwal, 1980). Furthermore, in 
order to engage in FDI, the advantages of the foreign firm must be exclusive to the firm and 
transferable to its subsidiaries (Agarwal, 1980). These advantages include superior 
technology, marketing and management skills, differentiated products, patents, access to 
capital and economies of scale (Kindleberger, 1969). 
2.2.2.2 Product Life Cycle Theory 
Vernon (1966) developed the product life cycle theory (PLC) employing the case of FDI by 
U.S manufacturing firms in Western Europe between 1950 and 1970. The theory asserts that 
firms proceed through four stages of production, namely innovation, growth, maturity and 
decline (Denisia, 2010).  
The first stage of the cycle is characterised by the invention, production and sale of a new 
product in the home market. The home market is characterised by high income levels, and 
the local production of the product facilitates efficient coordination between research and 
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development, production and marketing (Agarwal, 1980; Lall, 1976). In the second stage, 
when the product is successful in the home market, production will expand, new markets 
with the next higher level of income will be penetrated, and exports will begin with foreign 
demand (Lall, 1976; Agarwal, 1980). At this stage, the producers still possess the competitive 
advantage, as the technology is discreet even though competitors are attracted by the 
success of the product (Lall, 1976). The third stage will start when significant competition 
has developed, and the product as well as its technology – which has now become known – 
become standardised. In an attempt to resist competition and maintain profits and market 
share, the innovating firm will intensify marketing efforts and also set up production 
facilities in foreign markets, with lower input costs (Agarwal, 1980; Lall, 1976). The product 
matures as production shifts further to lower income markets or less developed countries 
(Lall, 1976). In the final stage, foreign markets may become the base at which the product is 
produced and from where it is exported back to the country of origin. At this stage, several 
firms besides the innovating firm will be producing the product (Lall, 1976). Eventually, the 
product will be phased out and new innovative products will have to be developed (Nayak & 
Choudhury, 2014). 
Vernon (1979) later criticised his own PLC theory, observing that it had, with time, lost its 
predictive and explanatory power as it related to the causes of FDI and the relations among 
advanced economies, and between developing countries and advanced countries (Nayak & 
Choudhury, 2014). He did, however, maintain that strong traces of the PLC sequence would 
remain (Vernon, 1979).  
2.2.2.3 Eclectic Paradigm Theory 
The eclectic paradigm theory brought together different hypotheses of FDI (or international 
production) related to the ownership, location and internalisation of multinational 
enterprises, to construct an O-L-I paradigm that serves as a basis for firms to engage in FDI 
(Dunning, 1980; 2001). The three aspects of the eclectic paradigm are ownership advantages 
(O), location advantages (L) and internalisation advantages (I). These elements explain the 
advantages that a firm should possess in order to pursue successful and competitive direct 
investment in foreign countries. 
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Dunning (2001) narrated that while he was studying US direct investment in Britain in the 
1950s, his conclusion was that the productivity differences between British and American 
firms could be explained by ownership- and location- specific aspects. However, later in the 
1970s, he admittedly realised that firms had additional advantages in that they could choose 
the way they utilised the resources and capabilities (ownership advantages) they owned. 
Thus, in order to fully explain multinational companies’ (MNC) foreign activities, one had to 
account for the reasons why MNCs chose to internally exploit their ownership-specific 
advantages, rather than acquire or sell these in the market. These additional advantages 
became the third aspect of the O-L-I paradigm, and Dunning (2001) referred to them as 
internalisation advantages. 
Ownership advantages include a firm’s intangible and tangible assets such as access to 
markets and capital, technology, superior management and organisational skills, economies 
of scale and trademarks (Dunning, 1980). These advantages should be exclusive and specific 
to the firm and should provide the firm with a competitive advantage over its domestic and 
foreign competitors, leading to reductions in production costs and higher incomes (Nayak & 
Choudhury, 2014; Denisia, 2010). Locational advantages are the determining factors as to 
which countries will host the MNC (Denisia, 2010). These factors include proximity to 
customers, endowment of resources by the host country, lower labour costs, local capital 
markets and favourable host country institutions and policies (Dunning, 2001). 
Internalisation advantages relate to the internalisation of the ownership advantages of the 
MNCs, which may be more profitable than to externalise through exporting, leasing, licensing 
or management contracts for other firms located in the foreign market to exploit (Dunning, 
1980). The basic motive for internalisation, according to Dunning (1980), is to circumvent 
the disadvantages of market imperfections such as high transaction costs. Advantages that 
may ensue from internalisation thus include control of markets, stability of (input) supply at 
the right price, economies of vertical integration and exploitation of technological 
advantages (Dunning, 1980). 
Having discussed the relevant theories of FDI, this chapter now considers previous empirical 
studies focusing on the relationships between FDI and several factors that are commonly 
regarded in the literature as the key determinants of FDI. 
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2.2.3 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment – empirical perspective 
2.2.3.1 Human Capital Development 
Following the study by Borensztein et al. (1998) that stressed the importance of host country 
human capital development in absorbing FDI technology transfers, a number of subsequent 
empirical studies have found supporting evidence that human capital development in the 
host country is a significant determinant of inward FDI. For instance, Kheng et al. (2017) 
proxied human capital development with secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratios 
and found a positive and statistically significant relationship between FDI inflows and 
human capital development in 55 developing countries. Similarly, Mallik and Chowdhury 
(2017) proxied human capital development with secondary school enrolment ratio and 
revealed its highly significant and positive effect on FDI inflows in 156 developing and 
developed countries. These studies respectively concluded that human capital development 
is increasingly becoming a significant determinant of FDI, and that international investors 
are not only interested in low-cost labour, but also seek a skilled labour force. While it might 
be expected that high human capital development leads to higher labour costs, evidence from 
Poole (2013) showed that MNCs are willing to pay higher incomes, which reflects their hiring 
of higher quality workers. Poole (2013), who used data from Brazil, also found evidence that 
knowledge and technology spillovers from FDI materialise through the mobility of workers 
from MNCs to domestic firms, particularly in high-skill intensive industries. 
2.2.3.2 Financial Market Development 
Alfaro and Chauvin (2016) alluded that recent empirical studies have shown that the 
development of the domestic financial sector is one critical prerequisite that determines the 
extent to which FDI translates into increases in economic growth. They argued further that 
efficient use and allocation of capital that comes with FDI, and the extent to which FDI 
generates increases in capital, depends on local financial markets.  
In an earlier study, Alfaro et al. (2004) used various banking sector and stock market 
development measures, including private credit extended by banks and stock market size, to 
evaluate the effects of FDI on economic growth in 71 countries over the period 1975–1995. 
They found that with the inclusion of an interaction term between FDI and financial 
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development variables, the growth effects of FDI become positive and significant, 
particularly at the maximum level of financial development. No significant impact of FDI on 
economic growth was found in the absence of financial market development variables.  
Furthermore, evidence of causal relationships between FDI and stock market capitalisation, 
and between FDI and bank credit to private sector in Africa (although in the case of the latter 
with less certainty) was found by Soumaré and Tchana (2015), as well as by Makoni (2016). 
2.2.3.3 Exchange Rates  
Fluctuations in the exchange rate would have an effect on FDI flows as they have a bearing 
on the payment of remittances and other international transactions within MNCs or between 
parent firms and subsidiaries (Madura & Fox, 2014). Cambazoğlu and Güneş (2016) 
analysed the relationship between the exchange rate and FDI inflows, using Turkish data for 
the period 2007–2015. The results of the study revealed that FDI inflows and the real 
exchange rate were correlated in the long run but the effect of the exchange rate on FDI was 
negative, meaning that an appreciation in the Turkish currency caused decreases in inward 
FDI flows for the period (Cambazoğlu & Güneş, 2016). Similarly, Mensah, Bokpin and Fosu-
Hene (2017) found that devaluations in the Ghanaian cedi had the effect of attracting and 
increasing FDI inflows in Ghana during the period 1990 to 2012.  
2.2.3.4 Natural Resources 
Anarfo, Agoba and Abebreseh (2017) found significant positive effects of natural resources 
(using total natural resources rents as a share of GDP) on FDI inflows in Ghana over the 
period 1975–2014. Nandialath and Rogmans (2019), on the other hand, did not find any 
significant impact of oil and gas reserves, except for oil prices, on FDI inflows in 16 MENA 
countries during the period 1988–2008. This was in contrast to earlier findings by Mohamed 
and Sidiropoulos (2010), who found that natural resources, proxied by fuel exports, were a 
positive determinant of FDI inflows in 12 MENA countries between 1975 and 2006. The 
difference in the results of these studies suggests that different proxies of natural resources 
may produce different results.  
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Moreover, it has been found that resources-led FDI crowds out FDI directed at other sectors, 
and this results in aggregate FDI in the economy being low (Anarfo et al., 2017). Further, 
resource-seeking FDI increases exports and strengthens the local currency, in which case the 
FDI in other sectors is deterred (Nandialath & Rogmans, 2019). The negative growth effects 
of this phenomenon are borne out in Hayat (2018), who investigated the impact of natural 
resources in the FDI-growth nexus for 104 countries from 1996 to 2015. The results of this 
study revealed that increases in FDI inflows significantly augmented the economic growth 
rate of the host economy. However, the inclusion of natural resources lowered the positive 
effect of FDI on economic growth. Moreover, the impact of FDI on economic growth became 
negative for countries with extensive natural resource sectors because of a high propensity 
of FDI inflows to predominantly go to the resources sector and fuel what is commonly 
referred to as a “resource curse” (Hayat, 2018). 
2.2.3.5 Agglomeration Effects 
Walsh and Yu (2010) stated that foreign firms cluster together in a host country through 
linkages in projects or as a result of foreign firms emulating existing FDI firms, which signals 
the existence of favourable business conditions in the host country. Anyawu (2012) went on 
to state that agglomeration effects may transpire in situations where foreign investors, in 
their efforts to mitigate uncertainty about a host country that is unknown to them, would 
emulate investment decisions of FDI that is already present in that host country. Both 
Anyawu (2012) and Makoni (2016) used past FDI inflows to proxy for agglomeration effects 
in their studies based on African economies. Agglomeration was found to have a positive and 
highly significant effect on FDI inflows in African countries. 
2.2.3.6 Institutional Quality  
An economic or financial crisis can expose the weak state and quality of institutions, which 
may have been concealed at times of economic boom (Buchanan, Le & Rishi, 2012). 
Institutional quality reflects the state of legal, political, economic and regulatory institutions 
in the host country, which influences its attractiveness to foreign and domestic investment 
(Makoni, 2018). 
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Agbloyor et al. (2016) found that even in the absence of a well-developed financial sector, 
good quality institutions facilitated a positive impact of FDI on GDP per capita growth in 47 
African countries for the period 1996–2010. In the same vein, Asamoah, Adjasi and Alhassan 
(2016), using data for 40 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1996–2011, found 
that institutional quality alleviated the negative effect of macroeconomic uncertainty 
(measured by exchange rate volatility) on FDI inflows. In a more recent study and using 
institutional quality data from the International Country Risk Guide, Fraser Institute 
(economic freedom) and World Bank (ease of doing business), Aziz (2018) found institutions 
to be significantly positive for FDI inflows in 16 Arab countries over the period 1984–2012. 
Based on the scholarly evidence presented, it one can conclude that institutional quality 
plays a pivotal role in the attraction and retention of inward FDI flows. 
2.2.3.7 Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Attempts have been made to investigate the possible interrelationships between FDI and FPI. 
Noman, Rahman and Naka (2015) examined the complementarity between FDI outflows and 
FPI outflows for developed, emerging and frontier markets for the period 2001 to 2009. 
Using a two-stage least squares and co-integration analysis framework, their results 
revealed that a strong positive long-run relationship between FDI and FPI existed, and the 
effect of FPI on FDI was more significant than the effect of FDI on FPI. Noman et al. (2015) 
thus concluded that portfolio investment and direct investment outflows are indeed 
strategic complements.  
Conversely, Humanicki, Kelm and Olszewski (2017) conducted a study to determine whether 
FPI inflows and FDI inflows complemented or substituted each other in Poland over the 
period 2002 to 2013. In a VECM co-integration analysis, they found a statistically significant 
relationship of a “substitutability” or trade-off nature between FDI and FPI flows, concluding 
thereby that the international capital flows are substitutes rather than complements. These 
contradictory findings suggest that different countries (and/or different methodologies) 
would reveal different interactions between the two capital flows.  
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2.2.3.8 Economic growth 
Economic growth indicators provide investors with an indication of the size of the market, 
and the potential for demand, as well as economies of scale in the host country (Walsh & Yu, 
2010; Meyer & Habanabakize, 2018). There is, however, still ambiguity in the empirical 
literature regarding the direct relationship between FDI and economic growth, and this 
ambiguous interaction may be partly due to the type of FDI a host country may attract. 
Žarković et al. (2017) compared the impact of FDI on economic growth in countries in 
Central Europe and in South-East Europe. In the case of Central European countries (CE), it 
was found that FDI inflows had a positive and significant impact on economic growth, while 
in the South-Eastern countries (SEE), the effect of FDI inflows on economic growth was 
statistically significant, although the impact was lower than in the Central European region. 
Žarković et al. (2017) argued that the reasons for the latter finding was that FDI in SEE 
countries was predominantly directed towards the service sectors rather than to the 
productive sectors of the economies. Furthermore, FDI in SEE countries often takes place in 
the form of mergers and acquisitions and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), and less often in the form of green-field investments. In this regard, Žarković et al. 
(2017) contended that FDI in the form state-owned-enterprise acquisitions increases 
government spending (therefore consumption) more than investment, and this leads to 
higher imports and higher trade deficits, which stimulate economic growth in the region 
only, rather than in the domestic economy (Žarković et al., 2017). 
Ayomitunde et al. (2019) investigated the relationship between FDI and economic growth in 
the BRICS countries, testing for long-run and causal relationships among FDI, GDP and 
economic growth rate. They found a long-run relationship among the three variables and 
concluded that these economic variables would have a propensity to converge in the future. 
In their causality tests, Ayomitunde et al. (2019) found bi-directional causality between FDI 
and GDP. Based on this evidence, they inferred that FDI inflows into BRICS countries were 
attracted by growth rates in these economies, and that FDI inflows accelerated expansion in 
the productive sectors, which consequently led to overall economic growth in the long run. 
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2.3 Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) 
2.3.1 Definition and Overview of FPI 
Wilkins (1999) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) defined foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI) as an investment in equity or debt (other than FDI). FPI includes capital 
flows, financial derivatives and other money market instruments, carried out in the financial 
markets of an economy outside that of the investor or investing entity. The IMF definition 
excludes bank credit and real estate investments, as opposed to the OECD definition, but 
includes bonds and notes under debt securities. 
Investors can engage in FPI through a number of channels that can be broadly categorised 
into direct FPI and indirect FPI (Bartram & Dufey, 2001). An investor can purchase securities 
directly in two ways: firstly directly in the foreign market, through a domestic or foreign 
intermediary, and secondly in the domestic market by purchasing securities of foreign firms 
that have listings in the domestic capital markets (Bartram & Dufey, 2001). On the other 
hand, indirect FPI entails investing in the shares of multinational companies (MNCs), 
purchasing instruments linked to foreign shares, or buying securities through international 
mutual funds (Bartram & Dufey, 2001).  
MNCs have greater access to foreign securities and firms, and their foreign acquisitions may 
add to the value of MNCs. This in turn provides domestic shareholders of the MNC with the 
benefit of international diversification. Financial instruments closely linked to foreign 
shares, such as Eurobonds and American Depository Receipts, represent hybrid instruments 
with debt and equity components. International mutual funds, on the other hand, provide 
the most cost-effective and convenient way to obtain exposure to foreign securities, 
particularly for an individual investor. The mutual fund handles all the matters related to 
information and foreign market access, as well as trading of foreign securities, while the 
individual investor benefits from low fees as a result of pooled resources (Bartram & Dufey, 
2001). 
Segmented global capital markets that result in less than perfect correlations provide 
investors with opportunities for risk diversification and increased return expectations 
through international portfolio investment. There are, however, risks and constraints to 
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foreign portfolio investment that require analysis and comprehension (Bartram & Dufey, 
2001). Solnik and McLeavey (2009:120) observed that global financial markets are 
sometimes construed as not fully integrated because of various constraints to capital 
movements. They argued further that while each national financial market may be efficient, 
there are factors that might prevent international capital flows from exploiting imperfect 
correlations. These factors include currency and country risks, as well as institutional 
constraints. Currency risk emanates from unexpected exchange rate changes (Solnik & 
McLeavey, 2009:120). The volatility of exchange rates has an impact on the correlation of 
returns in a portfolio, and on the correlation of the various currencies involved. Even though 
the currency risk can be hedged, it still makes a considerable contribution to the total 
volatility of an asset (Bartram & Dufey, 2001). Country risk includes political and/or 
economic instability, and transfer risks such as capital or foreign exchange control that 
restricts capital investment inflows or the repatriation of profits from investments. 
Institutional constraints include factors such as poor regulatory quality, excessive 
transaction costs associated with accessing information and purchasing securities in foreign 
capital markets, and discriminatory taxation (Bartram & Dufey, 2001; Solnik & McLeavey, 
2009). 
Inflows of FPI can play a crucial complementary role with other sources of external finance 
and domestic savings for the host economy. Errunza (2001) highlighted the roles of FPI in 
the host country, specifically with regard to capital markets development, market 
integration and resource mobilisation. FPI, through foreign investors, requires improved 
quality of information, institutions, market regulation and technology. Moreover, active 
participation of foreign investors reinforces local investor confidence and stimulates market 
participation. Furthermore, FPI would monitor and demand good firm performance, leading 
to improved investment decisions from firms. All these factors contribute to capital market 
development and growth (Errunza, 2001). As the capital markets develop, liquidity and 
supply of securities increases, and capital outflows are averted. In addition, removing capital 
controls and integrating the domestic market into the global market shifts local assets from 
domestic pricing to global pricing. This has the effect of reducing or eliminating the risks 
associated with the domestic market, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Another effect of 
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globalisation is that domestic firms gain access to foreign capital markets for potential 
foreign listings, which may contribute to increased mobilisation of resources (Errunza, 
2001).  
In what follows, the theoretical foundations of FPI are discussed, followed by a review of 
previous empirical studies that have investigated the determinants of FPI. 
2.3.2 Theoretical Foundations of Foreign Portfolio Investment 
2.3.2.1 International Portfolio Diversification Theory 
The portfolio diversification theory and asset pricing models developed earlier by scholars 
such as Markowitz (1952), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), were adopted 
and extended to explain international portfolio diversification.  
Branson (1970) adopted the portfolio diversification theory developed by Markowitz (1959) 
and Tobin (1958) and applied it to the context of international portfolio capital flows. His 
model became known as the “stock adjustment model of capital movements” (Branson, 
1970). The portfolio diversification hypothesis postulates that the allocation of securities in 
an investor’s portfolio is driven by expected rates of return and estimates of risk associated 
with the securities. Thus, for a given level of risk and return, there will exist a certain 
allocation of assets to an investor’s portfolio (Branson, 1970). When applied to international 
portfolio flows, the stock adjustment model postulates that the cross-border movement of 
capital or the share of total portfolio assets invested abroad is a function of the level of 
interest rates and asset-risk estimates, both domestically and abroad (Branson, 1970). 
Moreover, rising domestic interest rates will cause a once-off stock adjustment inflow of 
capital, meaning that as interest rates rise, domestic and foreign investors will (re)allocate 
more domestic assets to their portfolios. The allocation will continue until an equilibrium 
balance of portfolio assets is reached (Branson, 1970). 
Contrary to Branson’s (1970) model, Grubel (1968) had earlier developed a model that 
showed that international capital flows are not a function only of interest rate differences 
between countries, but also of an array of other factors. Using the bond markets to illustrate 
his model, Grubel (1968:1301-1302) argued that the demand for foreign assets which leads 
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to capital flows is determined by five factors, namely: 1) the size of portfolios held by 
investors; 2) the size of the differences in interest rates between countries; 3) the size of the 
risk differential between domestic and foreign assets; 4) the correlation of returns on 
domestic and foreign assets; and 5) the preferences of investors with respect to risk and 
return levels. 
Solnik (1974), on the other hand, employed the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of 
Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin to derive a theoretical model that explains international portfolio 
investment. The traditional CAPM is premised on several assumptions about investors and 
the domestic market, including that investors are risk-averse, they hold similar risk and 
return expectations, that a risk-free interest rate exists in the market, and that there are no 
transaction costs or taxes (Solnik & McLeavey, 2009:121). Extending the domestic CAPM to 
an international context would also extend these assumptions: investors across the world 
would be assumed to hold similar expectations and it would be assumed that the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) constantly holds (Solnik & McLeavey, 2009:125). 
In the real world, however, the PPP may not hold and the price levels among countries may 
differ, giving rise to foreign exchange rate risk (Solnik, 1974; Bartram & Dufey, 2001). As a 
consequence, an international investor will hold a portfolio comprising a risk-free asset 
denominated in the investor’s domestic currency and a world market portfolio consisting of 
risky securities (e.g. equities and bonds) that are appropriately hedged against foreign 
exchange rate risk (Solnik, 1974). The presence of foreign exchange rate risk gives rise to 
more risk premiums that reflect the risk dynamics between the securities in the portfolio 
and the various exchange rates (Solnik & McLeavey, 2009:126).  
In essence, capital asset pricing models postulate that asset-specific risks dissipate as a result 
of diversification, and that the resultant total risk – reflected in asset prices – is reduced to 
market risk or systematic risk. Furthermore, moving from a domestic portfolio to a global 
portfolio eliminates the risks associated with the domestic market. For this reason, a globally 
diversified portfolio is expected to have significantly reduced risks relative to a domestic 
portfolio (Solnik & McLeavey, 2009). 
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The rationales for international portfolio diversification that have since been advanced are 
that diversification should provide benefits for portfolio risk reduction and the potential for 
increased risk-adjusted expected returns when international capital markets are imperfectly 
correlated (Solnik & McLeavey, 2009:388; Adler & Dumas, 1983; Bartram & Dufey, 2001). 
Earlier studies such as those by Solnik (1974), Adler and Dumas (1983) and Solnik and 
McLeavey (2009:393-397) revealed the low correlations between national capital markets, 
and made attempts through theoretical models and empirical tests to demonstrate the 
benefits of international portfolio diversification. 
2.3.2.2 Push and Pull Factor Theory 
The 1990s saw the emergence of the view that capital flows might be driven by pull and push 
factors. Scholars such as Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996) and Taylor and Sarno (1997) 
expounded this categorisation of pull and push factors, insofar as the determinants of 
international portfolio flows were concerned. Capital inflows can be attributed to factors that 
are internal (pull factors) to recipient countries and those that are external (push factors) to 
the recipient countries (Calvo et al., 1996). 
Sarno, Tsiakas and Ulloa (2016) described push factors as those global forces that push 
capital flows from industrialised economies toward other countries. These forces include 
regimes of low interest rates, low potential growth, growing risk appetite, as well as desires 
for international portfolio diversification on the part of industrialised investing economies. 
In contrast, pull factors are country-specific factors that reflect favourable domestic 
economic conditions in host countries such as high interest rates, low inflation and high 
growth rates (Sarno et al., 2016). These factors pull capital flows into host countries, and 
reflect the host countries’ relative attractiveness in terms of investment opportunities and 
risk (Sarno et al., 2016). 
In their explanation of capital flows from industrialised economies to developing countries 
– Asia and Latin America in particular – Calvo et al. (1996) highlighted factors that were 
highly explanatory of the international capital flows between the developed and developing 
countries, particularly in the 1990s. These included global interest rates, international 
business cycles, integration of global capital markets and international diversification, as 
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well as economic policies, including monetary and fiscal policies. While countries with 
favourable domestic conditions attracted vast amounts of long-term capital flows, external 
factors were fairly dominant in accounting for portfolio flows to emerging Latin America and 
Asia during the 1990s (Calvo et al., 1996). 
2.3.2.3 Ownership – Location – Externalisation (O-L-E) Theory 
Dunning and Dilyard (1999) modified the eclectic paradigm (OLI) that was initially used as 
a theory to explain FDI, to make it applicable in an FPI context. Their intention was to explain 
the choice between FPI and FDI by MNCs, wherein FDI would be pursued to strengthen 
existing competitive advantages, while FPI would be used as a vehicle to transfer other 
financial resources (Dunning & Dilyard, 1999:42).   
In the FPI context, ownership advantages that an investing entity would possess over other 
entities would include variables such as the amount of investible capital, access to additional 
capital, expertise and knowledge of markets by portfolio managers, research capabilities and 
access to information about other markets. Moreover, portfolio managers would have a 
reasonable knowledge of the prospects of the firms in which to invest as well as other 
investment opportunities available in the foreign market (Dunning & Dilyard, 1999).  
Factors such as political stability, access to and degree of development of capital markets, 
market openness, capital controls, economic growth prospects as well as regulatory and 
institutional quality, in respect of host economies and how these factors influence the rate of 
return expectations would determine the location advantages of the FPI. In instances where 
expected returns are greater in the home market than in foreign markets, domestic 
investment would be preferred to foreign investment (Dunning & Dilyard, 1999). 
Finally, externalisation advantages replace internalisation advantages (that are associated 
with FDI). Externalisation rationalises the preference for international capital markets, 
which are external markets, over internal markets for the transfer of capital (Dunning & 
Dilyard, 1999). Externalisation advantages when using international capital markets to 
exploit ownership and location advantages include, among others, the ability to access 
superior market information in order to pursue apt investment strategies, and the ability to 
 
 
42 
 
take advantage of imperfect correlations between different markets, all of these at low 
transaction costs (Dunning & Dilyard, 1999). 
2.3.3 Determinants of Foreign Portfolio Investment – Empirical Perspective 
Brink and Viviers (2003) identified factors that influence potential foreign investment, and 
determine the risk and return expectations of long-term foreign portfolio investors. 
Perceived risks are determined by institutional aspects such as economic and political 
stability, while return expectations are informed by macroeconomic variables such as 
interest rates and growth rates, as well as the degree of financial development, which affects 
financial and transaction costs (Brink & Viviers, 2003). They also highlighted policy-related 
influences such as the host country’s degree of capital openness.  
The volatile nature of FPI flows can adversely affect an economy’s capital markets and its 
broader financial stability (Errunza, 2001; Brink & Viviers, 2003). Widely cited examples of 
the adverse effects are the crises in Latin America and Asia during the 1990s (Errunza, 2001; 
Brink & Viviers, 2003). Thus, well-developed and efficiently regulated domestic financial 
markets that improve corporate governance are essential in managing the effects of FPI 
flows into the host economy (Errunza, 2001; Choong et al., 2010; Agbloyor et al., 2014). Well-
developed domestic financial markets, both the stock market and banking sectors, were also 
found to be the conduit through which the growth effects of foreign capital flows can be 
transformed from negative to positive, through the interaction of capital flows and financial 
market development variables (Agbloyor et al., 2014; Makoni & Marozva, 2018). 
Byrne and Fiess (2016) found the quality of institutions and capital account openness to be 
positive and statistically significant determinants of portfolio flows to emerging markets. 
Similarly, Okada (2013) showed earlier that financial openness, or institutional quality, 
might not single-handedly attract international capital inflows; rather, the positive impact of 
financial openness on capital inflows increases with the level of the host country’s 
institutional quality. Okada (2013) concluded that financial openness is more beneficial for 
foreign investment in countries with higher institutional quality than in those with lower 
institutional quality. 
 
 
43 
 
Some studies have identified both global and domestic factors as drivers of portfolio capital 
flows. For instance, Ahmed and Zlate (2014) found global risk, differentials in GDP growth 
rates and interest rates between emerging markets and advanced economies to be important 
drivers of net portfolio flows for 12 emerging markets over the period 2002–2013. Similarly, 
Vo, Nguyen, Ho and Nguyen (2017) found that differentials in GDP growth, stock market 
development and governance significantly determined bilateral portfolio capital flows from 
advanced economies to emerging markets. Singhania and Saini (2017) found differentials in 
trade openness, GDP growth rate, interest rates and stock market performance to be 
significant determinants of FPI inflows in 19 developed and developing countries. Moreover, 
past FPI inflows, proxied by a lagged dependent variable of FPI, were positively significant 
for current FPI inflows in Singhania and Saini (2017).  
2.4 Institutions 
2.4.1 Definition and Overview of Institutions 
North (1991) defined institutions as formal and informal rules (and the manner in which the 
rules are enforced), tailored by human beings to structure and reduce uncertainty in their 
economic, political, legal and social exchanges and outcomes. Laws and regulations 
constitute the formal rules, while behavioural norms or codes of conduct make up the 
informal rules. Prior to this definition, Matthews (1986) highlighted some principles that 
underlie institutions that influence economic markets, including property rights rules 
stipulated by the law, norms of economic behaviour, and the types of permissible contracts.  
Institutions are understood to be critical for economic outcomes because they determine the 
magnitude of the costs and risks of transacting in an economy, and therefore the level of 
productive activity. Efficient institutions engender positive economic outcomes because they 
stimulate investment and entrepreneurship, protect property rights, enforce contracts, 
enable adoption of efficient technologies, integrate world markets, maintain political and 
macroeconomic stability, promote the rule of law and civil liberties, manage risks, including 
those taken by the financial sector, and promote long-run economic development and 
growth (Alfaro et al., 2008; Rodrik, 2008).  
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Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) made a distinction between inclusive and extractive 
institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are characterised by well-enforced property 
rights, competitive markets and the effective distribution of resources. These institutions 
create predictability, broad opportunities and incentives, thereby attracting investment and 
promoting growth-enhancing activities in the economy. Extractive economic institutions are 
by contrast designed to extract resources and allocate them disproportionately to a few elite 
and politically connected individuals or groups.  
These institutions emanate from the nature of the political institutions existing in the 
country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019). If the political institutions in charge of the country 
are inclusive, meaning that political power is widely distributed in society, and if these 
institutions are composed of a capable state and government that efficiently enforces rules 
and regulations, the economic institutions that are built will also be inclusive. However, if 
the political institutions are extractive and political power is concentrated in a few 
individuals or parties, with no constraints on their actions, economic institutions will be 
extractive and characterised by unpredictability and considerable political interference and 
high expropriation risks (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019).  
In the next subsection, the theoretical frameworks used to examine the potential impact of 
institutions in fostering an attractive and conducive environment for international 
investment are discussed. 
2.4.2 Theories of Institutions 
2.4.2.1 New Institutional Economics 
North (1992) conceded that the old institutional economics provided meaningful insights 
into the study of institutions, but criticised it for a lack of a systematic body of theory 
necessary for the development and progress of a discipline. Coase (1998:72) also argued that 
the proponents of the old institutional economics lacked a theory to bind together their 
collection of arguments and facts, and as a result had very little of value to pass on. The new 
institutional economics theory emerged to address these shortcomings. Whilst the new 
institutional economics theory builds on the fundamental principles of scarcity and 
competition that underpin microeconomics, it makes several departures from the 
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neoclassical theory of economics (North, 1992). New institutional economics abandons the 
assumptions of perfect symmetrical information, efficient markets, costless transactions and 
unlimited human rationality that are associated with neoclassical economics (Menard & 
Shirley, 2005:1; North, 1992).  
North (1990; 1991; 1992) classified institutions in terms of their degree of formality. He 
argued that institutions are made up of formal and informal institutions, and the manner in 
which these institutions are enforced. Formal institutions or formal rules can be categorised 
as political rules, economic rules and legal rules, and they emanate from laws, regulations 
and constitutions. Informal institutions or informal constraints, on the other hand, include 
codes of conduct or social norms of behaviour that stem from socially transmitted 
knowledge such as cultures and traditions. It is imperative for formal rules to be 
complementary to the informal constraints, as incompatibility between the two institutions 
will induce disaffection and political instability (North, 1993). 
Institutions are also distinguished from organisations. Institutions are the “rules of the 
game” that structure human interaction, exchanges or transactions in order to reduce 
uncertainty, while organisations are the “players of the game”, consisting of economic, 
political, societal and educational organisations (North, 1992). Organisations that emerge in 
an economy reflect the existing institutional framework and the opportunities it offers. This 
means that if the institutional structure provides incentives for productive activity, firms will 
emerge to engage in productive activities. Put differently, economic rules (e.g. property 
rights structure) determine the types of contracts or economic activities that individuals can 
engage in and, ultimately, the forms of organisations that will participate in the economy 
(North, 1990). 
The long-run performance of an economy is shaped and determined by how its institutions 
evolve. In this regard, North (1992; 1993) proposed that organisations are the agents of 
institutional and economic change. The perpetual interaction between institutions and 
organisations in an economy characterised by competition drives institutional change. 
Domestic and foreign competition induces firms to enhance their chances of survival by 
investing in knowledge and skills but also by exerting influence on the political structures 
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that make economic rules. Naturally, the political structure (e.g. the government and 
lawmakers) would determine economic rules, through property rights and contract laws, 
but economic interests (e.g. firms), through their bargaining muscle and political proximity 
would also have an influence on the political structure. This continuous interaction is what 
underpins the change in the institutional framework and the performance of the economy 
(North, 1990). 
Williamson (2000), on the other hand, classified institutions into four levels of social 
analysis. Each level taps into a particular social science theory: social theory for level 1 
institutions, economics of property rights and positive political theory for level 2 institutions, 
transaction cost economics for level 3 institutions, and neoclassical economics (and agency 
theory) for fourth level institutions (Williamson, 2000). 
The first level comprises the most socially embedded and pervasive institutions such as 
traditions, customs, norms and religion. These institutions are what North (1991) referred 
to as informal constraints. Williamson (2000) regarded these institutions as the most 
entrenched in society and take as long as centuries to millennia to evolve.  
The second level represents the institutional environment (Williamson, 2000). The 
institutional environment hosts formal institutions such as laws, regulations and property 
rights (North, 1991). This level is the domain of the legislative, judicial, executive and 
bureaucratic functions of government, where the responsibility to define and enforce 
economic rules such as property rights and contract laws is entrusted (Williamson, 2000). 
The institutional environment is constrained by and less embedded than the first level 
informal institutions (Williamson, 2000; Kunčič, 2014).  
Institutions of governance occupy the third level. Given the structure of the institutional 
environment consisting as it does of formal institutions (as explained above), governance 
structures are established to govern the contractual or economic relationships between 
economic agents (Williamson, 2000). Governance structures refer to the legal and regulatory 
framework within which transactions or contracts are negotiated, implemented and 
enforced. Williamson (1985; 2000) did, however, emphasise that much of contract 
management and enforcement is conducted privately by the parties concerned. This level 
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entails the alignment of governance structures with the types of transactions or contracts 
that might occur, given the forms of organisations that exist (Williamson, 2000).  
Finally, the fourth level represents the rules that govern the determination of prices and 
quantities of goods and services, and resource allocation, in accordance with economic 
theory and market structures – e.g. monopolies and oligopolies- (Williamson, 2000; Kunčič, 
2014).   
The new institutional economics is primarily concerned with the second and third levels 
(Williamson, 1995; 2000). The institutional environment that comprises the fundamental 
legal, political, economic and social rules. These form the basis of all forms of transacting (e.g. 
property rights, contract laws), and the institutional arrangement that consists of the 
governance structures that govern the manner in which economic organisations coexist, 
transact/contract and/or compete (Williamson, 1995).  
Williamson (1995) pursued a micro-analytical approach to the study of institutions, focusing 
mainly on the second level institutions. More specifically, he concentrated on an analysis of 
inter-organisational transactions and the institutional arrangements that govern these 
transactions. He called his approach transaction cost economics, an interdisciplinary 
approach combining law, economics and organisational theory (Williamson, 1995). In 
transaction cost economics, Williamson (1995) examines the effectiveness of various forms 
of economic organisations such as markets, firms and bureaus, in relation to the attributes 
of the transactions – particularly the transaction costs – and governance structures with 
which these different forms of organisations are associated.  
The transaction cost theory derives largely and directly from Coase (1937). Coase (1937) 
postulated that firms in an economy would emerge because of the transaction costs 
associated with carrying out transactions in the open markets. These transaction costs 
emanate from the institutional structure of the economy. For instance, an economic 
organisation such as a firm represents an organisation of transactions. But the institutional 
structure can make it excessively expensive to conduct every single transaction in the open 
market. One pertinent cost associated with the open market is that of concluding a contract 
for every exchange transaction. Thus to minimise transaction costs and become profitable, 
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an entrepreneur would organise these transactions (e.g. vertically) in a cost economising 
manner, into a single organisation, i.e. the firm (Coase, 1937).  
North (1986), on the other hand, adopted a macro-analytical perspective and was primarily 
and broadly concerned with the continuous interaction between the institutional 
environment (formal institutions) and organisations, and how this interaction drives 
institutional change and economic performance over time. North (1990) constructed his 
theory of institutions by combining theories of human behaviour (informal rules), 
production (organisations or firms) and transaction costs (formal rules) to explain the role 
of institutions in the performance of economies.  
North (1990; 1992) attributed transaction costs, on the one hand, to the costliness of 
acquiring sufficient information about a transaction, as that information would be in most 
cases asymmetrically held by the parties to the transaction. On the other hand, transaction 
costs underlie all the costs associated with a transaction, including determining what is being 
exchanged, protecting property rights and enforcing contractual agreements (North, 1990; 
1992).  
North (1986) pointed out earlier that, as a result of the complex nature of modern 
economies, characterised as they are by impersonal – distant –  transactions and third party 
enforcement, the costs of transacting rise (particularly for international investment). In this 
instance, the institutional framework must play the crucial role of enforcing contracts and 
property rights to minimise transaction costs for economic agents. Creating institutional 
structures that enable low costs of transacting and enforcement in capital and other markets 
is the key to creating productive economies (North, 1990). Incomplete markets and market 
failures in some developing countries have been attributed to excessively high costs of 
transacting and information asymmetries (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002).  
Turning to the role of legal institutions, Rubin (2005:205) observed that while it was once 
believed that the creation and/or liberalisation of economic markets would be sufficient for 
economic growth and prosperity, actual lessons from history have proved the inadequacy of 
the mere liberalisation of the economy. Rather, an economy requires an effective and 
persistent legal system in order to thrive (Rubin, 2005). Three functions of the legal system 
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are essential for the efficient operation of markets. Firstly, the law should define property 
rights precisely. Secondly, the law must allow the transfer of property rights, and lastly the 
law must provide for the protection of property rights (Rubin, 2005; Furubotn & Ritcher, 
2005:293).  
Hadfield (2005) also looked into the legal institutions and mechanisms that support 
contractual commitments, such as courts, lawyers, contract laws and enforcement services. 
His emphasis was not whether contracts can or cannot be enforced but rather on the cost 
and effectiveness of these institutional structures and mechanisms that improve the 
confidence of the contracting parties in the performance of their agreements. This is where 
the capacity of an economy to generate economic activity and growth is determined by the 
institutional environment’s enforcement mechanisms (Hadfield, 2005:180). Incidentally, 
North (1990) also attributed the past poor economic performance in underdeveloped 
countries to deficiencies in the development of an institutional framework that would enable 
effective and less costly contract enforcement. 
Enforcement mechanisms are costly because they require time, information, technology, 
investment in human capital and the services of others, and there may be errors made in the 
process (Hadfield, 2005:180). Expediency and “opportunism” is also likely to occur when 
transactions are impersonal (North, 1990:55). Thus for an enforcement mechanism to be 
effective, these underlying costs should not exceed the gains from increased commitment 
(Hadfield, 2005).  
Thus, in summary and context, the broad theory of the New Institutional Economics 
essentially postulates that institutions in an economy should be structured in a manner that 
enables low transaction costs in economic markets that will galvanise investment and 
productive activity, and promote long-run economic development. This is achieved mainly 
through well enforced property rights and contracts. Such enforcement requires the 
collective action of a broad set of institutions, including economic, legal and political 
institutions.  
Subsequent theories of institutions borrowed greatly from the New Institutional Economics 
theory to construct theoretical frameworks within which to examine the impact of the 
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institutional environment on other key elements of economic activity and development. 
Below are some theories that have emerged to explain the role of institutions in the context 
of international investments. 
2.4.2.2 Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment 
Institutional environment for multinational investment is a theory that applies the new 
institutional economics view to the multinational investment context. This theory allows for 
the analysis of the impact of host-country institutions on multinational corporations (MNCs), 
as well as of the impact of the risks associated with the contractual relations that the MNC 
would engage in with domestic firms or partners. The theory further identifies an interaction 
between the risks associated with the political-institutional environment of the host country 
and those associated with the MNC transactions, which influences the entry mode – whether 
as a wholly owned subsidiary or joint venture – of the MNC into the host country (Henisz, 
2009). 
Entering a host country that has a precarious institutional, regulatory and property rights 
structure, would pose two main political risks for the MNC. Firstly, the MNC faces 
expropriation risk from the host government, and secondly, the MNC faces the risks of 
adverse changes in regulations, taxes and other agreements. These would have the effect of 
reducing the MNC’s expected return on its investment in the host country (Henisz & 
Williamson, 1999; Henisz, 2000).  
In the presence of these risks, the MNC would consider several mitigating actions. On the one 
hand, it might seek a domestic partner or supplier that could positively or beneficially 
influence the political or regulatory system; or it might make use of illegitimate markets 
where transactions would be difficult for the government to detect (Henisz & Williamson, 
1999). On the other hand, the MNC might reduce expropriation risks by acquiring 
considerable bargaining power. Firms with strong competitive and strategic advantages, 
such as unique technologies, capital resources and human capital would possess 
considerable bargaining power in negotiations with host country governments. A 
problematic possibility in this regard, however, is that the bargaining power might dwindle 
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once the MNC has made fixed, long-term and immovable investments in the host country; 
these would be costly to dispose of prematurely (Henisz & Williamson, 1999).  
Given these prospects, the MNC may consider the feasibility of strategies that could increase 
the political costs for the government of adverse actions taken against the MNC. These 
strategies include increasing the employment of domestic partners, workers, managers and 
capital markets. The purpose of these strategies is to deter adverse government action 
against the MNC as they would shift a greater portion of the costs of political risks onto local 
stakeholders, from which the government would fear acts of political reprisal, such as lower 
political benefits and votes, and reduced tax revenues (Henisz & Williamson, 1999).  
As mentioned above, the interaction between the risks associated with the institutional 
environment and those that stem from the contractual relationships of the MNC in the host-
country have the effect of influencing the mode in which the MNC enters the host market. 
The MNC may conduct business in the host market as a wholly owned subsidiary or as a 
minority equity holder or joint venture. The argument here is that the impact of political 
risks on the form that the MNC takes is a function of both the institutional environment and 
the characteristics of the investment transaction, including the contractual relations that 
arise therefrom. Risks from the MNC’s contractual relations include expropriation by 
domestic partners, where the partners may deviate from agreements or manipulate the 
political system – to which they have better access – to their own benefit and to the detriment 
of the MNC (Henisz, 2000). 
The interaction between political risks and contractual risks would play out as follows. 
Political risks would induce the multinational investor to take the form of a minority equity 
holder or joint venture with a domestic partner as opposed to a majority equity holder or 
wholly owned subsidiary. The former lowers the impact of political risks on the 
multinational investor as the greater portion of the costs of expropriation or adverse actions 
by the government is borne by domestic partner(s). However, the benefits of minority equity 
holding or a joint venture can be greatly reduced by the risk that the domestic partners may 
themselves opportunistically expropriate the returns from the joint-venture partnership. 
For partnerships with low contractual risks, on the other hand, the choice between majority 
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and minority equity holding would be strongly influenced by the political-institutional 
environment. Therefore, the net effect of risks from the institutional environment is critically 
contingent on the severity of contractual risks (Henisz, 2000). 
This institutional theory has been empirically tested in a number of cross-national studies, 
and the impact of variations in institutional environments across countries has been found 
to significantly account for the differences in electricity and telecommunications 
infrastructure investments (Henisz & Zelner, 2001; Bergara, Henisz & Spiller, 1998; Henisz, 
2002). 
2.4.2.3 FDI-Institutional-Fitness Theory 
This is a theory developed by Wilhelms (1998), who integrated various theories of foreign 
investment. Similar to the previous theories, it allows for the analysis of the impact of host 
country institutions on the enhancement of inward foreign direct investments. The theory 
essentially foregrounds host country institutional fitness as a key determinant of FDI 
inflows, beyond other country specific and macroeconomic variables. Wilhelms (1998) 
asserts that it is not invariably the industrialised and biggest countries that receive foreign 
investment, but rather those that strive to make themselves the most institutionally 
adaptable and fit to receive it.   
The theory places emphasis on four key host country institutions, namely government, 
markets, education and socio-culture. These institutions are ranked hierarchically according 
to their degree of significance to foreign investment.   
The foremost institution is government, which rules over the other institutions because of 
the significance of the state of the host country’s political environment and institutions to 
the foreign investment decision. In the new institutional economics framework these are 
formal institutions. The investor would focus on these formal institutions as the source of 
key policies and actions (Wilhelms, 1998). Beneath government are the market institutions. 
These institutions include the capital markets and their regulatory framework. Wilhelms 
(1998) asserts that well-functioning markets are a key factor in investors’ investment 
decisions as they affect the financial and economic transactions of investment projects 
directly. Wilhelms (1998) argues further that open and competitive markets – with 
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“protective” regulation as opposed to “directive” regulation that stifles private investment – 
attract more FDI. Below the markets, comes education, which develops the host country’s 
human capital and therefore creates an environment in which foreign direct investments can 
be efficiently utilised. 
At the base of the hierarchy lies the socio-cultural institutions. These are the primitive and 
most entrenched and pervasive institutions that underpin all other institutions in the host 
country (Wilhelms, 1998). These are also informal institutions that are the most socially 
embedded and that take longer to change.     
When Wilhelms (1998) tested her hypothesis empirically for 67 developing countries (1978-
1995), she found government and market institutions to be the utmost important in 
attracting FDI. With respect to government institutions, she found low corruption, strong 
rule of law, and openness to trade and investment to be positively associated with FDI 
inflows. With regard to market institutions, it was shown that FDI inflows are enhanced by 
a balanced tax system, a strong financial sector, high trade volume and sound infrastructure. 
Having discussed the conceptual and theoretical frameworks within which to examine 
institutions and foreign investment inflows together, a review of previous empirical 
literature related to the institutional determinants of foreign investment follows. 
2.4.3 Institutional Determinants of Foreign Investment Inflows 
Well-enforced property rights and competitive markets are key to influencing economic 
outcomes as they incentivise investment and the adoption of efficient technologies, and 
further allocate resources to their most productive use (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 
2005). As such, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) focused on institutions of property rights and 
contracting to examine their determinants and their importance for economic and financial 
outcomes for 71 countries (former European colonies) during the 1990s. They found that 
property rights, which are rules and laws that protect investors from government 
expropriation, and contracting institutions – the laws that govern contracts between private 
economic agents – are heavily determined by a country’s colonial history (i.e. legal origins 
and colonial institutions). As far as the impact of these institutions on economic and financial 
outcomes was concerned, property rights had positive associations with GDP per capita and 
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the ratios of investment, private credit and stock market capitalisation to GDP. This suggests 
that property rights are crucial for attracting and galvanising productive economic activity 
and ultimately improving long-run economic growth. Contracting institutions had no 
significant impact on the outcomes, except on stock market development (Acemoglu & 
Johnson, 2005).  
Government stability, law and order, bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, and 
internal and external conflicts stood out as the most important political-institutional 
determinants of foreign direct investment inflows in Busse and Hefeker’s (2007) study of 83 
developing countries over the period 1984 to 2003. They used International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) data, and applied panel data models. Similarly, Alfaro et al. (2008) found that a 
broad set of institutional factors, including among others government stability, bureaucratic 
quality, investment profile, conflicts, corruption, and law and order, was the largest and most 
consistent variable accounting for international capital flows (FDI, portfolio equity and debt 
flows) not flowing from capital rich countries to capital constrained countries. They 
employed the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data in Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions methodology for 98 developed and emerging economies between the period 
1970 and 2000.  
On the other hand, in a panel random effects model for 69 emerging countries for the period 
1981 to 2005, Ali, Fiess and MacDonald (2010), also using ICRG data, identified property 
rights protection as the most relevant institutional factor for FDI inflows, when compared to 
other attributes of institutions such as corruption, democracy and political instability. Lim 
(2014), using the system GMM model, went on to reveal that the rule of law, property rights 
protection and control of corruption (proxied by ICRG data) displayed more consistent and 
statistical significance as structural determinants of investment activity than financial 
development, in both industrialised and pre-industrialised economies,. 
Recent studies that have employed the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) to assess 
the impact of institutions on foreign capital inflows include those by Różański and Sekuła 
(2016). They found positive and statistically significant impact on FDI inflows from voice and 
accountability, political stability and rule of law, while control of corruption was significant 
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but negative. They used a panel fixed effects model for 51 developed and emerging markets 
over the period 1996 to 2014. Kurul and Yalta (2017) found government effectiveness, 
control of corruption, and voice and accountability to be positive and statistically significant 
for FDI inflows into 113 emerging countries over the period 2002 to 2012. They used a 
dynamic system generalised method of moments (GMM) model. Peres et al. (2018), on the 
other hand, looked particularly at the role of the rule of law and control of corruption in 
direct investment inflows in a panel of 110 developed and developing countries (2002–
2012). In an instrumental variables model approach, these institutional indicators were 
found to be positive and highly significant for FDI inflows into developed countries. They 
were, however, found to be positive but statistically insignificant for developing countries. 
Based on these findings, the authors concluded that, because of the weak quality of 
institutions in developing countries compared to developing countries, developing countries 
fail to attract sufficient foreign investment inflows.  
Gossel and Beard (2019) found that control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
political stability, regulatory quality and rule of law were the most pertinent and significant 
institutions for foreign portfolio inflows for 33 emerging sub-Saharan African countries over 
the period 1985–2015. The results of a panel GMM approach also revealed that government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption had a positive impact on FPI 
inflows, while the rule of law and political stability were significant but negative for portfolio 
inflows.  
On the other hand, Sabir (2019) used an institutional quality index composed of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators to examine the impact of institutions on FDI inflows into 
148 emerging and developed economies, across the lower to higher income groups, over the 
period 1996–2016. The impact of institutional quality on FDI inflows was positive for both 
groups, but as in Peres et al (2018), statistical significance or greater impact of institutions 
was only found for developed economies.  
These empirical studies are not unanimous in their determination of the most important 
institutional determinants for foreign investment, but it could be argued that a broad set of 
institutions is crucial for host countries to enhance their foreign investment inflows. 
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Having reviewed the literature on relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical 
determinants of the three key variables of interest, the purpose of the next subsection is to 
discuss empirical evidence for the various (inter) relationships between global capital flows 
(FDI and FPI) and institutions.  
2.5 Global Capital Flows and Institutions 
Of centrality to this study are the determinants of foreign investment inflows, with a 
particular focus on the role of institutions, and the (inter)relationships between FDI, FPI and 
institutional quality. Having looked at the determinants of these key variables in the 
preceding subsections, the discussion now turns briefly to a review of empirical evidence of 
these (inter) relationships. 
Alfaro et al. (2007) investigated the determinants of capital flow volatility for 47 developed 
and developing countries for the period 1970–2000, with particular attention paid to the 
role of institutions. The volatility of FDI and portfolio equity flows per capita were treated as 
dependent variables and measured as the standard deviation of total equity inflows per 
capita, divided by the average gross flows over the period under study. Institutional quality 
was proxied by a political safety index composed of International Country Risk Guide (ICGR) 
data. An Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation revealed a significant effect of 
institutions on the volatility of total equity inflows, while this effect was also sensitive to 
capital controls and country risk. In this regard, Alfaro et al. (2007) concluded that 
institutional quality and macroeconomic policies are significant determinants of inflows and 
their volatility.  
Evidence has also been found of threshold effects associated with the relationship between 
capital flows and institutions. For instance, Kose, Prasad and Taylor (2011) found threshold 
levels of institutional quality and financial development above which host countries 
benefited significantly from foreign capital inflows and financial integration. Similarly, 
Slesman, Baharumshah and Wohar (2015) found that above a certain threshold value of 
institutional quality, host countries could derive high levels of growth benefits from direct 
and portfolio investment inflows in both developed and emerging economies. As in the study 
by Kose et al. (2011), Kurul (2017) analysed whether a threshold level of institutional quality 
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exists, which must be reached in order for significant inflows of FDI to be attracted. FDI 
inflows as share of GDP and a principal component analysis constructed institutional quality 
index consisting of the Worldwide Governance Indicators was used with data from 126 
developing and developed countries for the period 2002–2012. The results of a dynamic 
panel threshold regression model revealed that there was indeed a threshold value of 
institutional quality that divides two regimes. The first regime, which is below the threshold 
value, represents low institutional quality. No significant correlation was found between FDI 
inflows and institutional quality at this level. However, the second regime with high 
institutional quality produced a significant and positive relationship between the two 
variables, suggesting that improvements in institutional quality led to considerable 
increases in FDI inflows. Kurul (2017) went on to investigate the impact of global factors, 
that is global liquidity and global risk, in driving capital flows to emerging countries. A GMM 
estimation revealed that global liquidity had a positive and significant effect on FDI flows. In 
contrast, however, FDI flows did not show any significant sensitivity to increases in global 
risk. 
Shah, Ahmad and Ahmed (2016) investigated the causal relationships between institutional 
quality, and sectoral and total FDI inflows for Pakistan over the period 1980 to 2012, using 
a composite index of ICRG data for institutions. Employing the Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) technique, the researchers found long-run bi-directional causality between 
institutional quality and total FDI, as well as between manufacturing and services sectors 
FDI. Short-run bi-directional causality was also found between institutions and 
manufacturing sector FDI. No significant long or short run relationships could be found 
between institutional quality and FDI from the primary sectors, comprising oil, gas and 
mining resources (Shah et al., 2016). The latter finding means essentially that FDI directed 
at extracting resources is not dependent on a country’s institutional environment. In a 
somewhat similar vein, Hyun (2006) had earlier found only a long-run causal relationship, 
but no short-run causality, between FDI stock and institutional quality (ICRG) for 62 
developing countries (1984–2003) using various techniques, including ARDL, Pedroni 
cointegration, and fully modified OLS techniques. 
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In another study, Makoni (2018) used the Kunčič (2014) institutional quality dataset to 
examine the impact of institutions on FDI and FPI in nine African economies over the period 
2009–2016. Applying the ordinary least squares model on multiple regressions, Makoni 
(2018) found evidence of a positive and significant relationship between the three variables 
and concluded that institutional quality becomes very important in attracting foreign capital 
inflows in the absence of well-developed financial markets and/or sizeable natural resource 
endowment. 
2.6 International Capital Inflows in Emerging Market Economies – Background 
2.6.1 Asian economies 
2.6.1.1 China 
China was historically a staunchly communist, state-centralised economy and, like other 
Asian economies, was generally closed and highly regulated until at least the late 1970s and 
early 1980s (Knoop, 2013: Stanley, 2018). From the 1980s, the Chinese government started 
adopting market-oriented policies. The economy was opened and the country embarked on 
a gradual liberalisation of the capital account as well as the current account, thereby 
pursuing an investment and export (trade) led growth model. After years of closure as the 
result of political revolutions, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets were also re-
established in the 1990s (Hatzvi, Meredith & Nixon, 2015; Stanley, 2018).  
Capital account liberalisation in China has attracted largely FDI inflows, which have 
contributed the largest share of total capital inflows in the country. The larger share of FDI 
inflow is said to be the result of expectations of high rates of return from investors’ 
perspective because of rapid productivity growth in the economy and a huge market, but 
also because of modest regulations imposed on inward FDI by the government (Knoop, 
2013; Hatzvi et al., 2015). FPI, on the other hand, has been smaller than FDI owing to heavy 
restrictions, controls, quotas and schemes constraining portfolio flows, and intended to limit 
market volatility (Hatzvi et al., 2015; Stanley, 2018). Between 2006 and 2017, FDI averaged 
about 3 percent of GDP, compared to about 0.6 percent of GDP for FPI.  
The Chinese economy insulated itself from the 2007/2008 global financial crisis through 
various foreign exchange and capital controls, as well as other central bank measures. China 
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resumed and accelerated capital account liberalisation in the decade following the global 
crisis (Hatzvi et al., 2015; Stanley, 2018). In 2013, the Shanghai Financial Free Trade Area, 
which has since been expanded, was established with the aim of promoting trade and foreign 
investment in the country (Stanley, 2018). The Chinese government is expected to continue 
liberalising its capital account, as well as transforming the composition of its capital flows by 
giving greater scope to the liberalisation of portfolio inflows (Hatzvi et al., 2015).  
2.6.1.2 India 
After independence from British rule in the late 1940s, India established an economy that 
was relatively closed and characterised by significant government intervention and control 
over private investment (both local and foreign) in several sectors. Foreign investor 
participation was limited to 40 percent, meaning that development programmes were 
predominantly funded by domestically mobilised resources (Iyer, 2016: Stanley, 2018). As a 
result of strict government regulation, bureaucracy, high taxation and corruption, existing 
FDI (including that of Coca Cola, IBM and Mobil Oil) exited the Indian economy. This was 
followed by very moderate economic growth rates (Iyer, 2016). 
The beginning of 1990s saw the economy running short of domestic funds and export 
receipts becoming insufficient, leading to high budget deficits, recurrent current account 
deficits, and significant inflationary pressures. This was exacerbated by the fact that India 
was a net importer of oil, and commodity prices were high on the international markets. 
However, with the advent of the 2000s and after a decade or so of distress in a closed 
economy, India began gradually liberalising its capital account. Restrictions on foreign 
investment inflows were lifted, (although initially FDI remained considerably regulated, 
resulting in higher FPI inflows) (Iyer, 2016; Stanley, 2018). Investment subsequently 
increased, with FDI inflows averaging about US$65 billion between 2000 and 2008. In turn, 
economic growth was accelerated (Iyer, 2016).  
Like many other emerging market economies, India suffered from low global investor 
confidence during the 2008 global financial crisis. Significant drops in the Bombay Stock 
Exchange index were witnessed between January 2008 and March 2009, as portfolio 
investors repatriated their investments from the Indian economy (Stanley, 2018). 
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Nevertheless, India continued its deregulatory and liberalisation measures during and after 
the global financial crisis to enhance foreign investors’ benefits in the domestic market and 
implemented several central bank measures to limit the effects of the crisis on the economy. 
As a consequence of these measures, the Indian economy recovered from the financial crisis 
and led by institutional investors, foreign participation has been dominating the Indian 
equity markets ever since (Stanley, 2018).  
2.6.1.3 Indonesia 
Along with Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea, Indonesia was hard hit by the East Asian 
financial crisis that took place between 1997 and 1999. Among other explanations that have 
been advanced is the fact that this crisis was largely influenced by a currency crisis that 
resulted from these Asian economies pegging their currencies to the US dollar with the 
objective of attracting foreign capital inflows. This despite the fact that their major trading 
partners were neighbouring Asian countries (Knoop, 2013). The US dollar significantly 
appreciated in the 1990s, so much so that these Asian currencies were considered 
overvalued, and this caused panic among international investors and creditors. 
Subsequently, rapid withdrawals of capital flows by international investors and creditors 
ensued (Wie, 2003; Knoop, 2013). Indonesia had already attracted significant foreign capital 
flows, including considerable short-term and volatile debt flows (as well as high corporate 
debt guaranteed by government) from advanced economies because of its rapid 
industrialisation and positive macroeconomic fundamentals in the preceding decades (Wie, 
2003). For Indonesia, the crisis was coupled with internal institutional and political 
weaknesses. In the 1990s the country was associated with pervasive corruption, crony 
capitalism and political instability, compounded by weak regulatory, financial and economic 
systems. Transparency International’s corruption index ranked Indonesia 110 out of 182 
countries in 2010. These factors hindered a speedy recovery by the economy. Since 1998 
Indonesia has recorded continuous net outflows of FDI. Polled investors also emphasised the 
institutional environment, including the capability and integrity of government and the legal 
system, as their main concern (Lindblad, 2003; Wie, 2003; Knoop, 2013).   
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Notable economic and political stability was achieved around mid-2002 (Wie, 2003). FDI 
inflows began to grow, though sluggishly, but accelerated from 2005 onwards. In 2007, the 
Jakarta and Surabaya stock markets were merged to form the Indonesia Stock Exchange, and 
this merger was a boost for the country’s capital market development and FPI attraction 
(Broszkiewicz, 2017). Despite a sharp shrinkage in FPI volumes in 2008 resulting from the 
global financial crisis, FPI inflows increased considerably for a decade up to 2017, and even 
surpassed 50% of asset holdings in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (Broszkiewicz, 2017).  
2.6.2 African economies 
2.6.2.1 Egypt 
Egypt began adopting liberalisation policies from 1991. This direction was taken mainly 
because of structural adjustment (economic reform) programmes that the country had 
entered into with international lending institutions. Thus, between 1991 and the mid-2000s, 
the country embarked on a lengthy series of economic reforms that included  reducing the 
dominance of the state in the economy by undertaking privatisations, and liberalising trade 
and investment. Many sectors in the economy, including nearly the entire financial sector 
had, up to that point, been under the control of the state. By the mid-2000s, a number of 
sectors fell under the ownership of private domestic and foreign capital, and the state played 
a mainly regulatory role (Louis, Mahdy & Handoussa, 2004; Alissa, 2007; Dahi, 2012). 
An open economy triggered significant inflows of FDI, notably between 2005 and 2010. The 
performance of FPI, on the other hand, was relatively poor and very volatile, recording 
periodic negative net inflows as percent of GDP for half the period between 2006 and 2017. 
According to the World Development Indicators, FPI inflows averaged about 0.2% of GDP 
relative to about 3.5% of GDP for FDI inflows, over the period 2006–2017. Apart from the 
sensitivity of portfolio flows to external economic factors, Helmy (2015) attributed the poor 
and volatile performance of FPI inflows to macroeconomic instability, indicated by high 
inflation rates, low degree of market openness, as well as the economy’s vulnerability 
indicated by a high public budget deficit in the Egyptian economy.  
Despite efforts to stabilise the economy, Egypt has had a persistent problem of political 
instability and a poor institutional framework that has limited the ability of the economy 
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attract considerable inflows of foreign investment (Louis et al., 2004; Alissa, 2007). Over the 
past few decades, Egyptian political regimes   have been mostly authoritarian and lacking in 
government accountability, judicial independence, democratic assumption of political power 
and civil liberties (Alissa, 2007; Adly, 2009; Dahi, 2012). These characteristics have 
precipitated sporadic political unrest within the country. Concerns have also been raised 
regarding the inadequacies in the rule of law, protection of property rights, regulatory 
framework, and control of corruption between state and business (Adly, 2009). Egypt has 
consistently ranked low in these institutional factors, according to the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators and the Transparency International’s Corruption Index, along with 
countries like Mexico, Nigeria and Russia.  
2.6.2.2 Nigeria 
Although structural economic reforms had already started about a decade earlier under the 
auspices of structural adjustment programmes with the IMF and the World Bank, Nigeria 
augmented its capital account liberalisation in 1995. In that year, a new law was passed that 
permitted foreign investors to participate in any sector of the economy, and to any extent, 
except for the oil and gas sectors. This law replaced previous legislation that had required 
majority Nigerian ownership of foreign enterprises operating in the country (IMF, 1998; 
Ikhide & Alawode, 2002). On the other hand, a financial sector reform programme was 
already underway. Capital markets were deregulated in 1992, but owing to restrictions on 
FDI and rudimentary capital market development, foreign direct and portfolio equity inflows 
were much smaller. Foreign debt and oil export receipts were the main forms of inflow (IMF, 
1998; Ikhide & Alawode, 2002; IMF, 2008; AfDB, 2009). 
Since 2000, rapid increases were observed in all forms of capital inflows. A large potential 
market and oil sector attracted considerable FDI inflows. Also, major improvements to the 
functionality of capital markets attracted substantial inflows of FPI. However, the 2008 
global financial crisis reversed the substantial gains in FPI. The Nigerian Stock Exchange All 
Share Index recorded a loss of about 55% between mid-2008 and early 2009 (AfDB, 2009). 
Its durability and resilience, however, meant that FDI was not significantly reversed, unlike 
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FPI, and thus maintained a degree of stability. A recovery in FPI inflows was seen from 2010 
to 2013, but these dropped significantly again between 2014 and 2016. 
Nigeria is known to be one of the most industrialised countries and one of the richest in 
terms of natural resources in Africa, and one which foreign investors use as a gateway to 
regional markets (World Bank, 2015). For these reasons, the Nigerian economy receives a 
large share of the FDI inflows to the continent. However, in comparison to the broader global 
emerging market economy, Nigeria is among those countries that receive the lowest foreign 
investment. This relatively low foreign investment has been attributed largely to concerns 
about institutional weaknesses, including perceptions of high corruption, political 
instability, and regulatory inefficiency, all of which are evident in the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. These concerns limit efforts to attract foreign investment into Nigeria, such as the 
establishment of the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission in 2004 (World Bank, 
2015).   
2.6.2.3 South Africa 
The political transition and capital account liberalisation in South Africa during the 1990s 
facilitated a surge in capital flows (both equity and debt-related) into the country. This surge 
was precipitated by several external and internal reforms in the South African economy. 
Externally, there was the lifting of economic sanctions imposed on the previous South 
African government by the international community, the debt rescheduling agreement on 
foreign debt, and the reintegration of South African government bonds into international 
capital markets. Several internal economic reforms included the 1995 removal of the dual 
exchange rate regime, and the relaxation of restrictions on cross-border capital movements 
by non-residents and residents (Gidlow, 2009; Leape & Thomas, 2009; Aron, Leape & 
Thomas, 2010). These reforms continued on an incremental basis with the prioritisation of 
cautionary measures and regulatory frameworks, including macroeconomic stabilisation 
and financial sector development to insulate the small open emerging economy from global 
risk exposure (Leape & Thomas, 2009; Aron et al., 2010). 
International capital inflows to South Africa in the past two decades have, however, been 
biased towards portfolio investment, which has become the main source of long-term 
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external finance (Ahmed et al., 2007; Leape & Thomas, 2009). In addition to economic 
reforms and developed domestic capital markets, the larger share of FPI can be partly 
attributed to the inclusion of South African equities in global emerging market indices such 
as the Standard & Poor and Morgan Stanley Capital International emerging market indices 
in 1995. This increased interest in the South African market from international investors 
(Leape & Thomas, 2009). The country also broadened its domestic financial markets and 
improved their liquidity by using more of its domestic (rand denominated) bond market for 
sovereign debt issues and for maintaining low levels of external debt. This also limited 
exposure to external shocks associated with global credit markets (Leape & Thomas, 2009; 
Aron et al., 2010).  
The South African stock market, i.e. Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), is the largest stock 
market in Africa and substantially larger and more liquid than those of comparable middle-
income countries. (Aron et al., 2010). Significant increases in portfolio inflows, particularly 
equity inflows, were experienced during 1997 to 2001 because of exchange reforms that 
enabled foreign listings of South African companies and attracted international investors to 
the South African capital market. Further reforms enabled domestic institutional investors 
to swap local assets for foreign assets with foreign investors, up to a limit (Gidlow, 2009; 
Aron et al., 2010). Drops in portfolio equity inflows followed in the period 2002–2003, owing 
partly to domestic factors such as the black economic empowerment laws (Gidlow, 2009; 
Aron et al., 2010; Adeola & Aziakpono, 2017). Thereafter, attracted by a positive 
macroeconomic environment and promising commodity prices, portfolio inflows increased 
erratically yet steadfastly, accounting for over 50 percent of total net inflows, and only 
dropping significantly during the 2008 global financial crisis (Leape & Thomas, 2009; De 
Beer, 2015). After this crisis, portfolio inflows recovered to pre-crisis levels, averaging 
approximately 50% of inflows on the financial account between 2009 and 2014 (De Beer, 
2015).  
Apart from intermittent increases in FDI inflows resulting from corporate acquisitions and 
restructurings in South African companies and MNCs over the first decade after 1994 (e.g. 
Telkom’s partial privatisation in 1997, Anglo American-De Beers’ restructuring in 2001, and 
ABSA’s partial acquisition by Barclays Bank in 2005), considerable FDI inflows were seen 
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during the global financial crisis in 2008. These FDI inflows were helpful in offsetting 
portfolio outflows of over 100 percent on the financial account during the crisis period. 
However, FDI inflows declined again as portfolio investment inflows and other investment 
inflows regained strength after the global financial crisis (De Beer, 2015). Macroeconomic 
and political uncertainties partly precipitated these declines in FDI inflows up to 2017. The 
country recorded considerable FDI outflows between 2014 and 2017. Green shoots were, 
however, seen in 2018 when the country’s FDI flows reached 5.3 billion USD (UNCTAD, 2015; 
2018; 2019).  
Also significant for South Africa’s position for foreign investment was its induction into the 
BRICS economic bloc alongside Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2010. It thus became a 
leading African emerging market, and served as a base country for multinational companies 
and international investors from which to expand regionally into the African continent 
(UNCTAD, 2015).  
The 2020 World Investment Report noted that FDI flows to Africa declined (by 10%) in 2019 
owing to moderate economic growth and lower global demand for commodities. These 
reduced inflows were particularly noticeable in diversified economies and commodity-
exporting countries such as South Africa and Nigeria (UNCTAD, 2020). Prospects for FDI 
inflows in Africa remain negative for 2020 because of the COVID-19 global pandemic and its 
anticipated eroding effect on economic growth. 
2.6.3 Latin American economies 
2.6.3.1 Argentina 
Argentina is historically an open economy, mainly engaged in agricultural exports, and 
attracting predominantly natural resource seeking FDI concentrated in export related 
activities. However, this open economy approach was uneven because of disruptions caused 
by global economic crises, as well as by intermittent internal economic and institutional 
instability (López, 2011). Until 1983, the country alternated between democratic and 
military rule for many decades, after which full democracy was established. Earlier 
depressions in the global economy forced the country to pursue import substitution 
industrialisation and inward oriented development. However, years later (from the 1990s to 
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the 2000s), owing the generally low domestic savings rate and the need for MNCs’ assistance 
in expediting industrialisation through technology and capital, the country readopted 
liberalisation and investor friendly policies (López, 2011).  
Since the 1990s, the country has restructured and industrialised its economy, embarking on 
a series of privatisations as well as widespread deregulation, thereby attracting diverse 
foreign direct investment inflows, including market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI 
(López, 2011; Stanley, 2018). Resource-seeking foreign investment inflows remain 
significant owing to the country’s abundant natural resources and trade liberalisation 
(López, 2011). Argentina is also a full member of the Mercosur trade bloc, alongside Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. 
FPI, on the other hand, has been more volatile than FDI, and very sensitive to external 
conditions such as global financial volatility and global interest rates. Internally, portfolio 
flows are largely determined by growth and stability in the domestic economy, and 
fluctuations in commodity prices. As such, portfolio flows in Argentina suffered during the 
global financial crisis of 2007/8. A post-crisis recovery in the flows was seen from 2011, only 
to decline in 2013 when the commodity price boom came to an end. Significant increases in 
foreign portfolio inflows were seen again on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange between 2016 
and 2017, amid positive economic growth and stability prospects (Gonclaves, David & 
Pienknagura, 2019).  
2.6.3.2 Brazil 
Since World War II, FDI has made an important contribution in shaping the Brazilian 
economy. Brazil, however, began taking the role of foreign investment in domestic economic 
development seriously in the mid-1990s. Two notable periods have been highlighted: the 
1996–2002 period of economic stabilisation and privatisation, and the abolition of 
discriminatory regulations on foreign capital from 2005 (Silber, 2011).  
After more than a decade of low economic growth, macroeconomic instability, state 
monopoly, and narrow market openness, the country expanded its market liberalisation 
process, beginning with trade reform (Silber, 2011). Trade liberalisation was the first reform 
to stimulate foreign investment and integrate Brazil into the world economy. By 1994, most 
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high tariffs and non-tariff barriers had been reduced or discontinued. This was followed by 
aggressive privatisation, which involved abolishing state monopoly in sectors such as oil and 
gas, and infrastructure development. In 2005, legislation that had prohibited foreign capital 
from participating in the infrastructural sectors was abolished. These reforms attracted 
considerable FDI to the imports and exports sector of the Brazilian economy. In 2008, Brazil 
was ranked third behind China and Russia in terms of FDI inflows to developing countries, 
and by 2010 the country held about 3% of world’s FDI (Silber, 2011; Stanley, 2018).  
The mid-1990s also saw the country rediscovering the role of domestic capital markets. The 
BF&M-Bovespa stock market was resuscitated. This was followed by the opening of the 
domestic securities market to foreign portfolio investors. With this, portfolio flows from 
developed countries entered the Brazilian capital markets, holding about one third to half of 
the market (Stanley, 2018). Foreign investment inflows dropped during the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Portfolio investors repatriated large capital flows out of the domestic market, 
while subsidiaries of MNCs diverted their remittances and earnings abroad. With the 
objective of attracting and preserving foreign investors after the global crisis, the Brazilian 
authorities introduced new legislation in 2014, aimed at increasing the legal status of foreign 
investors. Since then, foreign investment inflows have been relatively stable, except for 
portfolio flows, which are very sensitive to global economic conditions (Stanley, 2018).  
2.6.3.3 Mexico 
By the time the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 occurred, Mexico had already begun 
economic and liberalisation reforms a decade earlier. The reforms entailed, among others, 
extensive privatisation, liberalisation of foreign trade and investment, deregulation of 
financial markets, and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Ros & 
Lustig, 2001; Máttar, Moreno-Brid & Peres, 2002). As a consequence of these reforms, 
foreign investment inflows accelerated in the early 1990s. Increased FDI inflows accounted 
for most of the trade sectors. Outstanding growth, exceeding that of FDI, was also recorded 
for FPI inflows. In addition to domestic economic reforms, the considerable increase in 
foreign portfolio inflows was also the result of declining interest rates and growth in 
developed economies, which precipitated large international capital flows to emerging 
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markets in Latin America and Asia in the early 1990s. However, by late 1994, the substantial 
gains in capital flows had been reversed (notably FPI) by the Mexican currency crisis and the 
recurrent political uncertainties in the country (Calvo et al., 1996; Carstens & Schwartz, 
1998; Ros & Lustig, 2001; Máttar, Moreno-Brid & Peres, 2002). 
Capital inflows rebounded from 1996, but the composition of capital flows in Mexico 
changed after the crisis. FDI became the dominant and stable form of foreign capital instead 
of FPI. The three periods of 1996–2001, 2001–2000, and 2002–2007 represent notable 
surges in capital flows in Mexico in the period between the 1994 crisis and the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Capital inflows contracted sharply again during the 2008–9 global financial 
crisis, but regained strength significantly from 2010 (Ibarra, 2013; IMF, 2014). In 2010, 
Mexico became the first Latin American country to be included in Citigroup’s World 
Government Bond Index, thereby attracting flocks of new foreign investors. Furthermore, 
Mexico had by this time improved its macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as the depth and 
liquidity of its financial markets. This attracted significant foreign portfolio inflows. By 2014, 
36% of domestic sovereign debt was held by non-resident portfolio investors. The strength 
of market integration with the North American economic bloc was a further boost for Mexico, 
as evidenced by its strong investment and trade links with the United States (IMF, 2014).  
2.6.4 European economies 
2.6.4.1 Hungary 
Like many countries in Central and Eastern Europe that had formerly been communist 
states, Hungary embarked on external liberalisation with the advent of the 1990s. Trade 
liberalisation was the first to commence, and was implemented more aggressively than the 
liberalisation of capital flows. The liberalisation of foreign investment began in a very 
gradual and closely guarded manner: FDI inflows accelerated from 1995, attracted by large-
scale privatisation of previously state-controlled entities (Oblath, 2006; Kiss, 2007). On the 
other hand, prevailing high interest rates instigated by monetary authorities precipitated a 
surge in FPI and other short-term capital inflows. The increase in foreign capital inflows not 
only improved the balance of payments, but also had a positive impact on the productive 
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capacity of the Hungarian economy, particularly on FDI, and this led to growth in exports 
and the economy (Oblath, 2006; Kiss, 2007).  
In 2001, the country fully liberalised the capital account. This was to some extent motivated 
by Hungary’s intention to accede to the European Union (EU), which eventually took place 
in 2004 (Oblath, 2006). After the accession in 2004, FDI inflows into Hungary reached 
unprecedented heights, averaging about 35% of GDP over the next four years.  
The emergence of a new government in 2010 was the turning point in the Hungarian 
economy. In an attempt to reverse the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on 
the Hungarian economy, the new government embarked on a nationalisation programme 
that involved sectors such as energy, banking and public utilities (Isaacs & Molnar, 2017; 
Voszka, 2018). These sectors had sizeable foreign capital investment, but the foreign 
investors were bought out by the state, and excessive state regulation was introduced in the 
affected sectors. What followed was massive outflows of foreign investment, which resulted 
in the recording of negative net inflows of FDI and FPI in some years between 2010 and 2017 
(Voszka, 2018). 
2.6.4.2 Poland 
Poland had transitioned from a state-centralised economy into a market-based economy by 
the dawn of the 1990s. From then on, the country embarked on persistent pro-market 
institutional reforms such as privatisation and economic liberalisation. Foreign investment 
inflows were liberalised from 1991, beginning with FDI. The Warsaw Stock Exchange was 
also relaunched, and by 1992 foreign portfolio investors had started participating in equity 
and debt securities. The Polish economy became a leading destination for foreign investment 
in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region during the 1990s, and this was boosted by 
the sovereign credit ratings upgrade in 1995. Foreign portfolio investment inflows suffered 
through contagion effects from financial crises in other emerging markets, including the 
1997 Asian crisis and the 1998 Russian financial crisis, but FDI grew resiliently (Wagner, 
2001; Kowalski, 2013; Jasiniak, 2015).  
In 2004, Poland became part of the EU. This compelled the country to further liberalise the 
economy, especially in the case of trade and the movement of capital flows between EU 
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countries. Several laws were passed that ensured freedom and equality for foreign and 
domestic businesses (Jasiniak, 2015). The accession to the EU also placed the Polish 
economy in an improved position to attract foreign investment, and hence FDI inflows 
accelerated between 2004 and 2011, averaging about 4.3% of GDP. Among the key 
determinants of FDI in Poland are a low-cost and skilled labour, a large market, and a stable 
and growing economy (Kuzel, 2017).  
With regards to FPI inflows, over 90% of foreign portfolio flows in Poland are invested in 
government debt securities. Since 2004, FPI has not been as stable as FDI. The period of the 
2007/8 global financial crisis saw a significant drop in FPI inflows owing to low investor 
confidence in global financial markets (Humanicki et al., 2017; Broszkiewicz, 2018). 
Between 2009 and 2015, FPI inflows recovered, almost reaching FDI levels. Despite boasting 
the most developed and largest banking sector in CEE, the Polish capital markets have not 
developed sufficiently to attract significant levels of FPI inflow. There are still concerns about 
issues such as inadequate investor protection, low transparency, concentration of share 
ownership, an inefficient legal framework, high transaction costs, and low liquidity 
(Broszkiewicz, 2018).   
2.6.4.3 Russia 
After the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Russia struggled 
to attract foreign investment. Between 1991 and 2000, FDI in Russia averaged only 1% of 
GDP, despite its being the largest economy among European transitional economies at that 
time, with abundant oil and gas resources and an educated labour force. Fellow European 
emerging markets such as Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland held over 50% of total FDI 
in the region and were the fastest growing and developing economies because of FDI (Fabry 
& Zeghni, 2002). Concerns were raised over the absence of a stable legal framework, 
inadequate protection of property rights, and persistence of old rent-seeking tendencies and 
poor corporate governance in newly privatised entities during the privatisation period in the 
early 1990s (Fabry & Zeghni, 2002; Ketenci, 2015).   
Market liberalisation began in the late 1990s and attracted significant inflows of foreign 
investment. These inflows were disrupted, however, by the 1998 Russian financial crisis as 
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well as by the political instability that resulted from the dissolution of the government 
cabinet in the same year. Investor confidence and market access improved from 2001, 
following an upgrade in the Russian sovereign credit rating (Fabry & Zeghni, 2002; IMF, 
2004; Ketenci, 2015). Capital inflows increased consistently from 2004 onwards, with an 
average of about 3% of GDP for FDI between 2004 and 2013. Portfolio inflows also increased 
after 2000, notably bond inflows to the private sector (IMF, 2004). As in many other 
emerging markets, portfolio flows took a dive during the 2008 global financial crisis.  
As the economy was recovering from the impact of the global crisis, and after the country 
was ranked the third most attractive for foreign investors behind the US and China in 2013, 
financial sanctions were imposed on Russia during the first half of 2014 as a result of the 
Russian military intervention in Ukraine (Gurvich & Prilepskiy, 2015; Ketenci, 2015). These 
sanctions were initiated by developed countries, including the European Union (EU) 
countries and the US, and were initially directed at certain Russian individuals and 
companies but were later expanded to include some sectors, including the energy sector. In 
late 2014, Russia retaliated by imposing embargos on food imports from countries such as 
the US and the EU (Gurvich & Prilepskiy, 2015). 
The effects of these sanctions were severe for the Russian economy. Foreign borrowings 
were directly affected and foreign investment inflows (FDI and FPI) were indirectly but 
heavily impacted. A sovereign credit rating downgrade in 2015 as a result of low oil prices, 
sanctions and negative growth prospects, exacerbated the situation by further tainting the 
investment attractiveness of the Russian economy. FPI inflows were negative during 2014 
and 2015, while FDI also took a dip in 2015, owing to geopolitical and economic uncertainty 
(Gurvich & Prilepskiy, 2015; Korhonen, 2019). At present, foreign capital inflows remain 
relatively low while sanctions, on the other hand, remain in place, although several EU 
leaders have expressed their intentions to lift them.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an overview of the conceptual, theoretical and empirical literature 
relevant to this study, from both global and emerging market contexts. The chapter further 
provided a background on each of the sampled countries’ experiences with international 
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capital inflows. The next chapter comprises a discussion of the research methodology that 
was applied in the empirical study in pursuit of the research objectives and to answer the 
research questions posed, as stated in the introductory chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
The research objectives of this study, as stated in the introductory chapter, entail identifying 
the key drivers of FDI and FPI inflows with particular emphasis on the role of institutional 
quality factors, as well as interrogating the interrelationships between FDI, FPI and 
institutions in emerging markets for the period 2007 to 2017. The current chapter presents 
the research methodology that was applied to address these objectives. Details are provided 
in respect of the population and sampling strategy adopted, the data and variables used, as 
well as the econometric methods and models followed in pursuit of the objectives of the 
study. Discussions on reliability and validity, as well as ethical considerations, as they relate 
to this study are also provided. A summary concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Population and sample 
A population is a group of potential participants to whom the researcher generalises the 
results of the study (Van Zyl, 2014). Since it may not be feasible to conduct the study on the 
whole population, a researcher selects a subgroup or sample of that population, and 
generalises his/her results based on that sample to the rest of the population.  
The process of selecting a sample is known as sampling. There are two broad categories of 
sampling techniques: probability sampling (or random sampling) techniques and non-
probability sampling (or nonrandom sampling) techniques. In probability sampling, the 
probability of any one member of the population being selected is known, while in non-
probability sampling the likelihood of selecting any single member is not known (Van Zyl, 
2014). Under non-probability sampling, one finds, among others, a technique called 
purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is suitable for focused and in-depth research such 
as case studies and grounded theory. It begins with the purpose and/or focus of the study 
and then a sample is subjectively selected to suit the purpose and research objectives and 
questions of the study (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). 
The major limitation of purposive sampling is that it is non-random and is subjective in the 
selection of the subjects or cases for study, and may thus not be representative of the 
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population, limiting the generalisability of the results. On the other hand, purposive sampling 
can be a very useful technique when random selection is not possible, but also when the 
researcher does not intend to produce results that are aimed particularly at creating 
generalisations (Saunders et al., 2009; Etikan, Musa & Alkassim, 2016).  
In addition, there are other techniques such as stratified sampling under probability 
sampling techniques. Stratified sampling involves selecting a sample from a population that 
is stratified according to one or more factors (e.g. emerging markets, as in this case) (Van 
Zyl, 2014). A hybrid of purposive sampling and stratified sampling was deemed the most 
appropriate sampling strategy for this study as its purpose was to conduct a case study on 
selected emerging markets, making them the sample. This sample of emerging markets was 
based on the IMF (2018) World Economic Outlook. There are 155 emerging market 
economies in the IMF (2018) World Economic Outlook. Thus, the total population of 
emerging markets was 155. Of these, three economies from each of the Asian, African, Latin 
American and European clusters were identified. The resultant sample size was 12 emerging 
market economies, which was regarded as adequate for the purposes of this study. 
The sample of emerging markets included China, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. According to the IMF’s (2018) 
World Economic Outlook, these emerging market economies are some of the largest, in terms 
of GDP and population size, across the four regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. 
Moreover, these emerging markets receive the largest flows of foreign investment in their 
respective regions. The choice of these markets was also determined by the availability of 
data. 
3.3 Data and Variables  
The study applied annual data pertaining to the selected sample of 12 emerging markets in 
various econometric models in an attempt to answer the research questions. The data and 
study covered the period 2007 to 2017. 
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As identified in the literature review, the main dependent variables were FDI net inflows (as 
a share of GDP, in USD) and FPI net inflows (as a share of GDP, in USD). The data for these 
variables were sourced from the World Development Indicators. Institutional quality 
(INSTQ) was the main independent variable. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
served as the measure of INSTQ. The WGI ranks countries on six aspects of governance: Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability/Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption (World Bank, Governance Matters, 
2008; Thomas, 2010; Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2011).  
Various explanatory and control variables, including macroeconomic variables, that are 
regarded in the literature as strong drivers of foreign capital inflows were also included in 
this empirical study. The data for these control and explanatory variables were also mainly 
sourced from the World Development Indicators.  
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 below provide a summary of the details of the variables and 
data sources that were used in this study.  
Table 1: Dependent variables 
VARIABLE INDICATOR SOURCE SIMILAR STUDIES 
FDI net inflows Ratio of net FDI 
inflows to GDP 
World 
Development 
Indicators – World 
Bank 
Jensen (2003); 
Choong et al. 
(2010); Saini & 
Singhania (2018) 
FPI net inflows Ratio of net FPI 
inflows to GDP 
World 
Development 
Indicators – World 
Bank 
Choong et al. 
(2010); Singhania 
& Saini (2017) 
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Table 2: Independent variables 
VARIABLE INDICATOR SOURCE EXPECTED 
OUTCOME/IMPACT 
ON DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
SIMILAR 
STUDIES 
Institutional 
quality 
indicator 
Rule of law Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI 
Ali, Fiess & 
MacDonald 
(2010); 
Różański & 
Sekuła (2016); 
Peres et al. 
(2018), Gossel 
& Beard 
(2019) 
Institutional 
quality 
indicator 
Regulatory 
quality 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI 
Gossel & Beard 
(2019) 
Institutional 
quality 
indicator 
Political 
stability 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI 
Busse & 
Hefeker 
(2007); 
Różański & 
Sekuła (2016); 
Aziz (2018); 
Meyer & 
Habanabakize 
(2018); Gossel 
& Beard 
(2019) 
Institutional 
quality 
indicator 
Government 
effectiveness 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI 
Kurul & Yalta 
(2017); Gossel 
& Beard 
(2019) 
Institutional 
Quality 
indicator 
Voice and 
accountability 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Positive or 
insignificant 
determinant of FDI 
and FPI 
Różański & 
Sekuła (2016); 
Kurul & Yalta 
(2017); Gossel 
& Beard 
(2019) 
Institutional 
Quality 
indicator 
Control of 
corruption 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI 
Kurul & Yalta 
(2017); Peres 
et al. (2018); 
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Gossel & Beard 
(2019) 
 
Table 3: Explanatory and control variables 
VARIABLE  INDICATOR SOURCE EXPECTED 
OUTCOME/IMPACT 
ON DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
SIMILAR 
STUDIES 
Economic 
growth 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
% 
World 
Development 
Indicators – 
World Bank 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI  
Ahmed & Zlate 
(2014); 
Žarković, 
Gligorić & 
Žarković 
(2017); 
Akalpler & Adil 
(2017); 
Singhania & 
Saini (2017); 
Owusu-Nantwi 
& Erickson 
(2019) 
Exchange 
rate 
Real effective 
exchange 
rate 
Bank for 
International 
Settlements 
Negative determinant 
of FDI   
Cambazoğlu & 
Güneş (2016); 
Mensah, 
Bokpin & 
Fosu-Hene, 
(2017); Gossel 
& Biekpe 
(2017) 
Financial 
openness  
Degree of 
capital 
account 
openness 
Chinn-Ito 
capital 
account 
openness 
index – 
Chinn & Ito 
(2006; 2008) 
Positive determinant 
of FPI  
Okada (2013); 
Byrne & Fiess 
(2016); Kurul 
& Yalta (2017) 
Financial 
market 
development 
Stock market 
capitalisation 
(% of GDP); 
World 
Development 
Indicators – 
World Bank 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI  
Alfaro et al. 
(2004); Ahmed 
et al. (2007); 
Agbloyor et al. 
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(2014); 
Soumaré & 
Tchana 
(2015); 
Makoni (2016) 
Financial 
market 
development 
Domestic 
credit to 
private 
sector by 
banks (% 
GDP) 
World 
Development 
Indicators – 
World Bank 
Positive determinant 
of FDI and FPI 
Alfaro et al. 
(2004); Ahmed 
et al. (2007); 
Agbloyor et al. 
(2014); 
Soumaré & 
Tchana 
(2015); 
Makoni (2016) 
Human 
capital 
development 
Education 
index 
(expected & 
mean years 
of schooling) 
Human 
Development 
Index – 
United 
Nations 
Development 
Reports 
Positive determinant 
of FDI 
Kheng et al. 
(2017); Mallik 
& Chowdhury 
(2017) 
Total natural 
resource 
rent 
Total natural 
resources 
rents (% of 
GDP) 
World 
Development 
Indicators – 
World Bank 
Positive determinant 
of FDI 
Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos, 
(2010); 
Anyawu 
(2012); Anarfo 
et al. (2017) 
Global 
interest 
rates 
US real 
interest 
rates, 
measured as 
the lending 
interest rate, 
adjusted for 
inflation by 
the GDP 
deflator. 
World 
Development 
Indicators – 
World Bank 
Negative determinant 
FPI 
Ahmed et al. 
(2007); Gossel 
& Biekpe 
(2017) 
 
The variables that were used in the study are discuss in more detail below. 
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3.3.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in the study were FDI and FPI net inflows in emerging markets over 
the period 2007 to 2017. The data for these inflows was sourced from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. As in empirical studies such as Jensen (2003), 
Choong et al. (2010), Singhania and Saini (2017) and Saini and Singhania (2018), these 
variables are measured as FDI and FPI net inflows  as a ratio of GDP, and they represent the 
net changes (i.e. inflows minus outflows) in the investment position of foreign investors in 
the country. They do not include cross-border movements of capital by domestic investors. 
This approach to the measurement of foreign capital inflows is preferable to others because 
it provides the best measure or indication of a country’s ability to attract, preserve and 
enhance foreign investment inflows. A country with positive net foreign investment inflows 
is attracting new foreign investment, while a country with negative net foreign investment 
inflows is experiencing outflows of foreign investment (Jensen, 2003). 
FDI inflows, as adopted in this study and in line with the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2008) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2009) can be defined as inflows of investment that grant 10 percent or more voting rights in 
an entity of one economy into an entity that is resident in another economy. The investment 
is made with the intent to establish a long-term strategic interest in the foreign entity to 
ensure significant influence or control of the management of the foreign entity or enterprise. 
It encompasses equity capital, reinvested earnings, other long-term capital and short-term 
capital as reflected in the balance of payments. 
FPI inflows, on the other hand, and in line with Wilkins (1999) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) are net inflows of investment in equity and debt securities (other 
than FDI). These include long and short-term portfolio capital flows (equity and debt flows), 
financial derivatives and other money market instruments, carried out in the financial 
markets of an economy outside that of the investor or investing entity. These inflows exclude 
bank credit and real estate investments but include bonds and notes as debt securities. In 
contrast to FDI, FPI inflows are not made with the intent to establish significant influence or 
control in the management of a foreign entity. 
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3.3.2 Independent variables 
The main independent variable and key constructs were institutional quality factors, used 
interchangeably with institutions in this study. Adopting North’s (1991) widely used 
definition, institutions can be defined as formal and informal rules (and the manner in which 
these rules are enforced), tailored by human beings to structure and reduce uncertainty in 
their economic, political, legal and social exchanges and outcomes. Laws and regulations 
constitute formal rules, while behavioural norms or codes of conduct make up the informal 
rules. Institutions determine the costs and risks of transacting in an economy and therefore 
the level of productive and economic activity. The types of economic activities that take place 
in an economy reflect the existing institutional framework, and the incentives and 
opportunities it offers (North, 1990).  
Empirically, institutional quality has been shown to be one of the most consistent and 
statistically significant structural determinants of investment and productive activity in an 
economy, and the most consistent explanatory variable for capital flows not coming from 
wealthier countries to poorer countries (Alfaro et al., 2008; Lim, 2014). Empirical literature 
has further shown that institutions have a direct, positive impact on economic growth. They 
also have the effect of circumventing or moderating any negative effects that may arise from 
foreign investment inflows and market openness such as competition that adversely affects 
domestic firms (Nawaz, Iqbal & Khan, 2014; Agbloyor et al., 2016; Nguyen, Su & Nguyen, 
2018). An extensive strand of literature has also revealed the significance of institutional 
quality in addition to, inter alia, financial market development, financial openness and 
macroeconomic fundamentals, in attracting and enhancing foreign capital inflows (Agbloyor 
et al., 2016; Byrne & Fiess, 2016; Aziz, 2018; Gossel & Beard, 2019). 
3.3.2.1 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
The primary measure of institutional quality in this study was the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, et al., 2011). The WGI is a research project that develops cross-
country indicators measuring or representing institutional quality and governance, covering 
over 200 countries from the year 1996. The WGI reports six composite indicators of 
governance that are updated annually and compiled using subjective assessment based (or 
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perceptions based) data from various commercial and non-commercial sources with 
extensive knowledge and experience of the countries rated (Kaufmann, et al., 2011). 
These indicators are based on variables acquired from over 30 different sources. These 
variables capture subjective assessments and perceptions of institutional quality and 
governance for each country in the sample, from firm and household survey reports (such as 
the Global Competitiveness Report, Afro-barometer surveys, Gallup World Polls), 
commercial business information providers (such as the Political Risk Services-ICRG, 
Economic Intelligence Unit, and Global Insight Risk Service), non-governmental 
organisations (such as Freedom House and Global Integrity) and public sector organisations 
(such as the World Bank, and African and Asian Development Banks).  
The data, or variables, that are obtained from these sources are assigned correspondingly 
under each of the six aggregate indicators. A statistical method called an Unobserved 
Components Model is applied to construct a weighted average of the data from each source 
for each indicator and for each country in the sample. An individual country will have a score 
of between -2.5 (lowest score) and 2.5 (highest score) for each of the indicators (Kaufmann, 
et al., 2011). 
Kaufmann et al. (2011) argued that institutional quality and governance are essentially 
concerned with the institutions and methods through which authority in a country is 
exercised. Institutional quality and governance is underpinned by three key themes: (a) the 
processes of government selection and monitoring; (b) government capacity in effective and 
sound policy formulation and implementation; and (c) due regard for the institutions that 
govern the economy and society, by the state and citizens. From these three key themes, 
Kaufmann et al. (2011) developed six measures of governance, named and described as 
follows:  
(1) Voice and accountability – measuring the extent of civil liberties, including citizens’ 
ability to participate in the selection of their government, and the freedoms of association, 
expression and media.  
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(2) Political stability and absence of violence – capturing the probability of political or 
government instability caused by violent or unconstitutional means such as political violence 
and terrorism. 
(3) Government effectiveness – measuring the independence of government from political 
interference, and the quality of government services, policy formulation and execution, and 
the credibility of government’s commitment to such policies. 
(4) Regulatory quality – capturing government capability to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulatory frameworks that promote private sector development.  
(5) Rule of law – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents, economic and others, 
have confidence in and abide by the laws of the country, and in particular the quality of 
property rights, contract enforcement, the courts, and the police, as well as the likelihood of 
violence and crime.  
(6) Control of corruption – capturing the extent of corruption, i.e. the exercise of public 
power for private gain, including petty and significant forms of corruption, as well as state 
capture by elites and private interests.  
These governance indicators have been used extensively in empirical studies of both 
developed and developing countries to examine the impact of host-country institutional 
quality, and of the individual indicators, on inward capital investments, including FDI and 
FPI (see Kurul & Yalta, 2017; Kurul, 2017; Peres et al., 2018; Gossel & Beard, 2019). This 
study follows these previous studies by adopting the same measures of institutional quality 
to conduct in-depth assessments of the impact of these measures on foreign capital flows to 
the sample of emerging market economies. 
3.3.3 Explanatory and control variables 
Although the emphasis in this study was on the role of institutions in international capital 
inflows, we also sought to assess the impact of a broader set of determinants on inward 
investment, in order to answer the first research question. In line with the reviewed 
empirical studies and the theoretical frameworks, a number of explanatory and control 
variables were included that also play a key role in attracting investment inflows. This 
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included a set of macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as policy-related and development 
factors. 
Macroeconomic variables entailed indicators of economic growth and exchange rates. These 
indicators provide potential foreign investors with insight into the economic environment, 
including the stability and/or uncertainty of the host country and thus feed into their return 
and risks expectations. Economic growth was proxied as the annual growth rate (%) of GDP. 
A fast growing rate of GDP indicates an expanding and growing economy, with a higher 
market demand, and is likely to offer increased future earnings and higher rates of return for 
investors (Ahmed et al., 2007). A positive relationship between the GDP growth rate and FDI, 
and between GDP and FPI was thus expected. 
In line with Cambazoğlu and Güneş (2016) and Mensah et al. (2017), exchange rates were 
expected to be negatively associated with FDI inflows. A depreciation in the exchange rate 
would enhance foreign capital inflows, while an appreciation would discourage the inflows. 
The proxy for exchange rates was the real effective exchange rate (Cambazoğlu & Güneş, 
2016). 
The policy-related variable included in the study was capital account openness, measuring 
the host country’s extent of liberalisation to international financial/capital transactions. The 
Chinn-Ito (2006; 2008) capital account openness index was used to measure the country’ 
extent of financial openness. This index measures the extent of capital controls, as opposed 
to the stringency of capital account restrictions, by considering the existence of multiple 
exchange rates, restrictions on capital account and current account transactions, as well as 
the requirement to surrender export receipts (Chinn & Ito, 2008). Using the Chinn-Ito capital 
account openness index, Okada (2013) and Byrne and Fiess (2016) found that financial 
openness together with institutional quality were positive and significant determinants of 
foreign capital inflows. A positive relationship between capital openness and international 
capital inflows was also anticipated in this study. 
The development variables were financial market development and human capital 
development. Studies have provided empirical evidence for the central role played by the 
development of domestic financial markets, both banking sector and stock markets, in 
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facilitating the growth benefits of capital inflows. There is also evidence of causal and 
positive long-run relationships between financial development indicators and foreign 
capital inflows (Alfaro et al., 2004; Choong et al., 2010; Agbloyor et al., 2014; Soumaré and 
Tchana, 2015; Makoni, 2016). This evidence corroborates the significance of host country 
financial markets in enhancing foreign capital inflows. In the present study, we proxied 
domestic financial market development using stock market capitalisation, and domestic 
credit to the private sector by banks, both as a ratio of GDP. Although these two indicators 
may provide a narrow measure of broad financial development, they are still good proxies 
as they indicate to foreign investors the size of the domestic capital markets and the amount 
of financial resources directed at private sector investment activities (Levine & Zervos, 1998; 
Sghaier & Abida, 2013).  
Following the study by Borensztein et al. (1998), subsequent empirical studies have found 
supporting evidence that human capital development in the host country is a significant 
determinant of inward FDI. For instance, Kheng et al. (2017) proxied human capital 
development with secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratios, finding that a positive and 
statistically significant relationship existed between FDI inflows and human capital 
development. Similarly, Mallik and Chowdhury (2017) proxied human capital development 
with secondary school enrolment ratio, and noted its highly significant and positive effect on 
FDI inflows. These studies concluded that human capital development is increasingly 
becoming a significant determinant of FDI, and that international investors are interested 
not only in low-cost labour, but in a skilled labour force. In the present study, human capital 
development was proxied by the education index, measuring the mean and expected years 
schooling, which is a component of the Human Development Index published in the United 
Nations Development Reports.  
According to the United Nations Human Development Reports, citizens and their capabilities 
should be the paramount criterion for assessing the development of a country. Moreover, 
high educational attainment levels in a country mean large numbers of skilled workers, 
greater labour productivity, and a greater ability to absorb advanced technology from 
developed countries. Educational attainment levels also influence a country’s economic and 
social outcomes, such as the distribution of income (Barro & Lee, 2013). 
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There is growing evidence that natural resource endowment can increase FDI inflows, 
particularly resource-seeking FDI (Asiedu, 2006; Mohamed & Sidiropoulos, 2010; Anyawu, 
2012; Anarfo et al. 2017). As a result, this study included an indicator of natural resource 
endowment to assess its impact on FDI inflows to the sample of emerging markets. In doing 
so, we followed Anarfo et al. (2017) and used as proxy the total natural resources rents as a 
percentage of GDP, which measures the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral and forest rents 
as a proportion of GDP. 
Lastly, in line with the pull and push factor theory that international capital flows to 
emerging markets are pushed partly by global interest rates (Calvo et al., 1996; Taylor & 
Sarno, 1997; Carstens & Schwartz, 1998), US real interest rates were included in the study. 
These were measured as the lending rate adjusted for inflation (GDP deflator) to assess the 
impact of international interest rates on foreign capital inflows to emerging markets.  
As indicated in the tables above, sources for the dependent, explanatory and control 
variables included the World Development Indicators, the Chinn-Ito capital account index 
database, the Bank for International Settlements and United Nations Development Reports. 
3.4 Econometric methodology 
The research methodology used in this study was quantitative in approach, and a panel data 
methodological framework was adopted. Baltagi (2008) defined panel data as pooled 
observations on a cross-section of countries over a period of time. Similarly, Wooldridge 
(2002) described a panel data set as comprising a time series for each cross-sectional unit 
(e.g. a country) in the data set. 
There are several advantages to using panel data. Baltagi (2008) highlighted the point that 
panel data are preferable over pure time series and cross-section structures in that they 
allow for the control of heterogeneity among cross-sectional units or countries, and they 
allow for more variability among variables. Wooldridge (2013) alluded to the notion that 
panel data, because of multiple observations, allow for the control of unobserved 
characteristics of a cross-sectional unit and allow one to study the significance of lags in the 
behaviour of certain variables. This is particularly relevant to foreign investment inflows, 
where the current level of FDI is somewhat affected by its past levels.   
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The scope of this empirical study encompassed panel data regression analyses, co-
integration tests, as well as causality analyses. The researcher sought to answer questions 
related to the key drivers of FDI and FPI net inflows, as well as to long-run and causal 
relationships among the key variables of FDI, FPI and institutional quality in the sample of 
emerging markets. The researcher used the principal components analysis (PCA) method to 
construct a composite index for institutional quality. Prior to conducting the main 
econometric estimations, the researcher conducted preliminary diagnostic tests, i.e. unit 
root tests, to examine the properties of the data. The main econometric models that were 
employed in the study included a dynamic panel data generalised method of moments 
(GMM) regression model, a panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model approach to 
co-integration, and a panel vector error correction model (VECM).  
3.4.1 Principal Components Analysis 
As in Kurul (2017) and Sabir et al. (2019), this study made use of the Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) method to construct a single composite index for institutional quality 
(INSTDEX). This was made necessary by the high correlations observed between the 
individual institutional quality factors, measured by the WGIs, and the absence of a 
consensus in previous empirical literature as to which of the individual indicators were most 
important for foreign investment inflows in emerging markets.  
The PCA is a statistical method that transforms a dataset into orthogonal (statistically 
independent) variables called principal components. The principal components are 
independent linear combinations of the original variables that contain the maximum 
variance from a dataset of correlated variables (Kurul, 2017; Aït-Sahalia & Xiu, 2019). The 
PCA method reduces the dimensionality of the original dataset and retains the most 
important information by considering the maximum variation in the dataset. Thus, instead 
of using many interrelated variables, the PCA method produces fewer components from the 
dataset that contain the principals or the most important information about the original data 
(Brooks, 2008; Kurul, 2017; Aït-Sahalia & Xiu, 2019).  
The PCA method is performed by estimating eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of the 
original dataset. In most cases, the generated principal components associated with the 
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highest eigenvalues (usually the first few) are selected as they account for the largest part of 
the variance and are therefore considered to contain the most important information about 
the original variables (Brooks, 2008; Kurul, 2017; Aït-Sahalia & Xiu, 2019).  
3.4.2 Unit root tests 
Prior to conducting an analysis of time series data, it is necessary to determine the properties 
of the time series. More specifically, and most commonly, the time series must be tested to 
determine whether it is stationary or non-stationary (i.e. whether or not it contains a unit 
root). A time series is stationary when its mean, variance and covariance remain stable over 
time (Wooldridge, 2013). In other words, the value of this time series tends to revert to its 
average value or mean, while its variance also remains broadly constant (Gujarati, 2004). 
Non-stationary time series, on the other hand, have a mean that changes over time (time-
varying) and are said to contain a unit root (Shrestha & Bhatta, 2018). Testing data for 
stationarity, unit roots or orders of integration is essential when analysing data and 
relationships between variables, because it aids or informs the selection of an appropriate 
methodological framework within which to conduct such analyses and draw inferences 
(Shrestha & Bhatta, 2018). 
In this empirical study, it was important to conduct prior unit root tests on the data collected 
in order to determine whether the orders of integration of the variables of interest were 
compatible with the selected econometric methodological framework. The ultimate purpose 
of this process was to circumvent estimation inaccuracies and spurious results in the 
regression analyses, co-integration and causality tests. Although the preferred econometric 
model for co-integration tests (i.e. ARDL) does not require prior unit root tests, it was 
necessary in this case to carry out these tests to ensure that the variables of interest were 
integrated of the order zero [I (0)], order one [I (1)] or a combination of both. They could not 
be integrated of the order two [I (2)], as strictly required by the model (Nkoro & Uko, 2016).  
Shrestha and Bhatta (2018) highlight another property of time series, namely the 
autoregressive nature of time series, which should also be considered in the selection of 
appropriate econometric methodology. A time series is autoregressive when its current 
value is determined or has a relationship with its past values. 
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The Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillip-Perron (PP) tests make up the list of the 
most widely employed unit root tests in empirical financial and economic research. The ADF 
is an enhancement of the earlier Dickey-Fuller test. The objective of the ADF test is to 
examine the null hypothesis (H0), that the series contains a unit root, versus the alternative 
hypothesis (H1), that the series is stationary (Brooks, 2008:327). A time series will be 
stationary when the ADF value is greater than its critical value, and it is considered to be 
non-stationary when the ADF value is less than its critical value (Nkoro & Uko, 2016). 
The advantage of the ADF test is that it addresses the problem of serial correlation by using 
the differenced lags of the dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2013). A problem arises in this regard, however, when choosing the optimal 
number of lags, because as Wooldridge (2013:642) warns, too many lags stifle the (small 
sample) power of the test, while too few lags may render the size of the test incorrect. Two 
considerations are suggested when deciding on the optimal lag length: the frequency of the 
data, where in the case of annual data, one or two lags are sufficient, and an information 
criterion, such as the Schwartz Information Criterion, wherein the number of lags that 
produces the minimal value of the information criterion would be selected (Brooks, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2013). 
The Phillip-Perron (PP) test, on the other hand, is similar to the ADF test in terms of 
hypotheses and tests, except that it does not include the lags of the dependent variable in the 
model. It also automatically corrects for autocorrelations and heteroskedasticity in the error 
terms by directly altering the test statistics, without the use of lags (Brooks, 2008; Sunde, 
2017:438).  
As this study adopted a panel data methodological framework, two further panel unit root 
tests were conducted, viz. Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) (2002), and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) 
(2003). Both these unit root tests derive from the ADF approach. The main difference 
between them is that the LLC test assumes that all cross-sectional units are homogeneous 
and follow a common unit root process, whereas the IPS test allows for heterogeneity in the 
panel and therefore assumes that the cross-sectional units follow individual unit root 
processes, and is similar to ADF and PP tests. Under both LLC and IPS tests, the null 
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hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root versus the alternative hypothesis that the 
series is stationary (Baltagi, 2008; Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2019). In the following section, 
the specifications of the main econometric models used in the study are provided.  
3.4.3 Econometric model specification 
3.4.3.1 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
The first objective of the study sought to identify the key determinants of FDI inflows and 
FPI inflows into our sample of emerging markets for the period 2007 to 2017. In addressing 
this objective, the researcher adopted the dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) 
model.  
Empirical studies indicating that foreign capital inflows are affected by their past values 
(lagged values) provide evidence of the dynamic nature of capital inflows. As such, analysing 
foreign capital inflows in a static model produces an incorrect assessment of the factors that 
affect them (Hossian, 2015). Moreover, capital inflow regressions are susceptible to the 
problem of endogeneity. Endogeneity refers to any correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error terms in the regression model (Baltagi, 2008; Ullah, Akhtar, 
Zaefarian, 2018). Endogeneity would arise in instances such as where a lagged dependent 
variable is included; where a pertinent variable is omitted; or where there is a measurement 
error in the regression model (Baltagi, 2008; Ullah et al. 2018). Thus, estimations based on 
models that do not account for endogeneity in panel data, such as the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), might be biased and inconsistent, leading to incorrect inferences (Baltagi, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2012; Ullah et al,. 2018). In such circumstances, an alternative model would 
have to be sought, such as the dynamic GMM estimator (Verbeek, 2004; Ullah et al. 2018). 
To circumvent issues that often give spurious regression results such as endogeneity – as a 
result of lagged dependent variables, unobserved country-specific effects and omitted 
variable biases – the study made use of a dynamic panel data model to identify and assess 
the determinants of foreign investment inflows (FDI and FPI) into this sample of emerging 
markets. The estimation was conducted using the dynamic GMM with the following general 
form: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the dependent variable (FDI and FPI inflows) for country i in time t; 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1  represents the lagged value of the dependent variable into country i for time t-1; 
𝛼 denotes a constant term and the slope of the lagged dependent variable; 
Xit is the vector of independent variables for country i in time t – that explain the dependent 
variable; 
β is the slope of the independent variables; 
𝑖𝑡 is an error term, which is decomposed into 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡, wherein 𝜇𝑖 represents the time 
invariant country-specific effect, while 𝜈𝑖𝑡 represents the remainder of the disturbance in the 
estimated regressions. 
The panel data regression model requires one to decide between a fixed effects (FE) model 
approach and a random effects (RE) model approach. In the FE model approach, the 
heterogeneous country-specific effects (unobserved effects or error term 𝑖𝑡) are allowed to 
correlate with the explanatory variables. Thus, the FE approach accounts for heterogeneity 
among countries. In the RE model, on the other hand, the country-specific effects are treated 
as random effects and assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (Gujarati, 
2004; Wooldridge, 2013). In other words, the heterogeneity across countries is treated as 
random on the assumption that the sample was randomly selected from a large population 
(Gujarati, 2004; Greene, 2012).  
In line with previous empirical studies that investigated the determinants of foreign capital 
inflows using panel data methodology, such as Różański and Sekuła (2016) and Singhania 
and Saini (2017), this study applied the Hausman (1978) test to decide on whether the fixed 
effects model (FE) or the random effects (RE) model was most suitable. The null hypothesis 
under the Hausman test is that the appropriate approach is the RE model, while the 
alternative hypothesis is that the FE model is more appropriate (Gujarati, 2004).  
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In addition to assessing the impact of the main independent variables and the other 
explanatory variables on FDI and FPI inflows, the dynamic GMM model also enabled the 
researcher to observe the impact of past inflows on current inflows. 
The GMM model was therefore specified as follows; 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝛸𝑖𝑡
𝑖
𝑛=1
+ 𝑖𝑡 
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑏1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝛸𝑖𝑡
𝑖
𝑛=1
+ 𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 represent the dependent variables measured by the inflows of foreign 
direct investment and foreign portfolio investment in US$, as a share of GDP at time t. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1  and 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 represent, respectively, the lagged value of the dependent variable, FDI 
and FPI. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the measure of institutional quality and is proxied by the PCA-
constructed index composed of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators. 𝛼0 and 𝑏0 denote 
a constant term, while 𝑖𝑡 is a random error term.  𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector that indicates all other 
variables that explain the FDI inflows and FPI inflows into the sample of countries, such as 
capital openness, financial market development, economic growth, and exchange rate.  
In order to address the problems of endogeneity and country-specific effects, the GMM model 
takes an instrumental variables-approach. Instrumental variables (IV) are variables that can 
be assumed to have no correlation with the error term, but are correlated with the 
explanatory variables (Verbeek, 2004:133). However, IV based estimations can be 
inadequate when (weak) instruments that have insignificant correlation with the 
explanatory variables are used, resulting in potential estimation biases (Verbeek, 2004). In 
order to deal effectively with the issue of weak instruments and endogeneity problems, as 
well as with small sample biases, and to also enhance estimation accuracy and efficiency, this 
study adopted the method followed by Ullah et al. (2018a) and Sabir et al. (2019) of 
conducting regressions in levels and first-differences. In the regressions in levels, lagged 
differences of the dependent variables serve as instruments, while in the regressions in first 
differences, the instruments used are the lagged levels of the dependent variables (Baltagi, 
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2008; Hossain, 2015; Ullah et al. 2018). This method is known as the system generalised 
method of moments, and it is attributed to Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). 
There are two post-estimation tests that need to be conducted when applying the GMM 
model, viz. the over-identification test and the Arellano-Bond first-order and second-order 
autocorrelation test (Ullah et al. 2018). Saini and Singhania (2018) point out that the GMM 
model uses a number of instrumental variables that might lead to the model being over-
identified, thus necessitating an over-identification test under the null hypothesis that all the 
instruments in the model are valid. In this study, estimation models used several instruments 
and were therefore subjected to over-identification tests such as the Sargan and Hansen tests 
to gauge the validity of these instruments (Acheampong, 2019). In addition, the Arellano-
Bond test for first-order and second-order autocorrelation was performed as a post-
estimation test to examine potential correlation between the error terms, or potential 
correlation between the lagged variables/instruments and the error terms. The null 
hypothesis under the latter test is that the error terms are uncorrelated (Ullah et al. 2018). 
In the next section, the model applied to address the second objective of the study, i.e. 
assessing the long-run relationships among our three key variables of FDI, FPI and INSTQ in 
emerging markets is discussed. 
3.4.3.2 Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)  
The second objective of this study was to assess empirically the long-run relationships 
among the three key variables of FDI inflows, FPI inflows and institutional quality in 
emerging markets for the period 2007–2017. Shrestha and Bhatta (2018) state that if two or 
more variables converge to form an equilibrium relationship over the long-run, or if one 
variable drags the other, and both of them eventually share the same movement, over a long-
run period, they are said to be co-integrated. The second objective was addressed with the 
aid of the panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model for dynamic heterogeneous 
panels, instead of the traditional ARDL approach that is appropriate for single time series 
studies, where N=1 (Pesaran & Smith, 1995; Pesaran, Shin & Smith, 1999).  
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The primary advantage of the ARDL model, which has led to its popularity over other co-
integration tests such as the Engle-Granger and Johansen tests, is that it breaks the 
restriction of co-integration tests that requires that the variables to be tested must be non-
stationary and of the same order of integration (Sam, McNown & Goh, 2019). The ARDL can 
be applicable when the variables to be tested are integrated of order zero [I (0)], order one 
[I (1)] or a combination of both, and is suitable even when dealing with small samples 
(Pesaran & Shin, 1999; Odhiambo, 2011; Magweva & Sibanda, 2020). Another advantage of 
the ARDL approach is that it is able to estimate both long-run and short-run effects through 
the estimation of an error correction model (ECM) - (Raza & Hussain, 2016). This dynamic 
ECM combines the short-run dynamics with the long-run equilibrium, without long-run 
information being removed (Shrestha & Bhatta, 2018). In addition, the problem of 
endogeneity is dealt with or minimised through the use of lags of the dependent and 
independent variables and appropriate modification of the orders of the ARDL model 
(Pesaran & Shin, 1999; Sankaran, Kumar, Arjun & Das, 2019). 
Thus, given the optimal lag orders/lengths of the variables and the estimation of an ECM, 
both long-run and short-run coefficients are estimated. The short-run effects are captured 
by the coefficients of the first-differenced variables of the correction model (Owusu & 
Odhiambo 2015:186). 
The panel ARDL approach would require that an appropriate estimator be selected from the 
Mean Group (MG), Pooled Mean Group (PMG), and Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimators 
(Pesaran et al., 1999). In this regard, the Hausman test can be employed to determine the 
most suitable of the three estimators. This process is necessary because homogeneity or 
heterogeneity across individual countries, in both short-run and long-run parameters, 
cannot be presumed.  
The MG approach takes account of the heterogeneity of the cross-sectional units in the 
estimation of both short -and long run coefficients. It estimates separate equations for each 
cross-section unit and examines the mean of the estimated coefficients across units. 
Although the averaged coefficient estimates are consistent, this approach neglects the 
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possible homogeneity of certain parameters across cross-sectional units (Pesaran & Smith, 
1995; Pesaran et al., 1999; Magweva & Sibanda, 2020).  
The PMG, on the other hand, has some similarity to the MG in that it also allows short-run 
parameters, including the speed of adjustment, intercept terms, and error variances to vary 
across countries. Furthermore, it also generates consistent estimates of the mean of short-
run coefficients across cross-sectional units by taking the average of individual country 
coefficients (i.e. pooling and averaging the means). However, contrary to the MG, the PMG 
method maintains homogeneity in long-run parameters (Pesaran et al., 1999).  
Lastly, the DFE estimator lies at the other extreme end. This approach imposes homogeneity 
in the estimation of both short and long run coefficients across the entire cross-section, and 
only allows the individual country intercepts uncontrolled variation (Pesaran et al., 1999; 
Magweva & Sibanda, 2020). 
Although the PMG and MG estimators provide consistent coefficient estimates through 
averaging, a Hausman test or a likelihood ratio test would provide a better indication of the 
consistency and efficiency of each of the estimators MG, PMG and DFE (Simões, 2011).  
In order to investigate the relationships between the key variables, the panel ARDL model – 
with FDI, FPI and INSTDEX alternating as the dependent variable – was specified as follows: 
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿1𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛿2𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿3𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡 
∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛿2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛿1𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1
+  ∑ 𝛿2𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿3𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝑖𝑡 
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∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛿2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛿1𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛿2𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛿3𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +   𝑖𝑡  
 
where Δ was the differenced operator, and all other variables remained as described earlier. 
To select appropriate lag lengths for the variables, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) were applied.  
Upon concluding the cointegration tests, the researcher proceeded to the third objective, 
concerned with the causal relationships between the key variables. It is often stated in 
empirical studies that the presence of a long-run relationship hints at a possible causal 
association between variables. In relation to cointegration and causality among variables, 
Granger (1988:203) argued that for a pair of series to have an equilibrium, there must be 
some causality between them to provide the necessary dynamics. As such, this study sought 
to investigate this argument empirically by conducting causality analyses. 
3.4.3.3 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)  
With respect to the third objective, which aimed to determine empirically the causal 
relationships among FDI, FPI and INSTQ in emerging markets between 2007 and 2017, a 
dynamic panel VECM based causality analysis was conducted. This methodology helped to 
determine the existence and direction of causality among the key variables.  
In the presence of cointegration, the panel VECM is efficient because it can capture both 
short-run and long run dynamics among variables. The error correction term derived from 
the long run, cointegration relationship captures short-run deviation of a series from its 
long-run equilibrium. The comparable panel vector autoregressive (VAR) does not work in 
the presence of cointegration, and only short-run coefficients can be estimated, and only 
short-run causality can be inferred (Engle & Granger, 1987; Belloumi, 2009; Shahbaz, Zeshan 
& Afza, 2012; Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2019). 
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The panel VECM is also called a restricted panel VAR as it contains the error correction 
component that, as stated above, corrects short-run deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium path (Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2019). Furthermore, while the VECM can test 
nonstationary and order one integrated series, the VAR requires all variables to be stationary 
and of the same order of integration. Moreover, differencing nonstationary variables in order 
for them to achieve stationarity removes their long-run information contained in their 
original form. On the other hand, the lagged error correction term derived from the long-run 
relationship and included in the VECM maintains the long-run information that may be 
eliminated through differencing (Engle & Granger, 1987; Li, 2001; Odhiambo, 2009). 
Although the ARDL framework, which was applied in the preceding objective, estimates the 
error correction model (ECM) when there is evidence of co-integrating relationships among 
variables, the specification of the panel VECM for our key variables took the following form: 
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝛿1𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿2𝑖∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛿3𝑖∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=0
+ 𝛿4𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡 
 
∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝜙0 + ∑ 𝜙1i
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +   ∑ 𝜙2i
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜙3i
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 +   𝜙4𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+  𝑖𝑡 
 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆0 + ∑ 𝜆1i
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 +   ∑ 𝜆2i
𝑚
𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜆3i
𝑚
𝑡𝑖=0
∆𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 +   𝜆4𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
+  𝑖𝑡 
where, Δ is the differenced operator. The 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 represents the lagged error correction 
terms derived from the cointegration relationships. The coefficients (δ, ϕ, and λ) represent 
the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium path. The 𝑖𝑡 is the white noise error 
term, and all the other variables remain as previously described. 
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Causal effects are inferred from the statistical significance of the long run and short-run 
coefficients, as well as the statistical significance of the error correction terms (ECT). The 
categories of causality results that can be drawn from the panel VECM fall into three groups, 
i.e. short-run causality, long-run causality, and strong causality: (a) short-run causality is 
inferred when the coefficients of the differenced short-run explanatory variables are 
statistically significant, while (b) long-run causal effects are deduced from the statistical 
significance of the long-run coefficients. On the other hand, (c) strong causality can be 
inferred when, in addition to statistically significant coefficients, the ECT is negative and 
significant. Furthermore, three directional outcomes can be inferred from this panel VECM: 
(a) uni-directional causal effects, implying a one-way causal relationship between variables, 
(b) bi-directional causality, indicating the incidence of feedback in the relationship between 
variables, and (c) no causality, which implies neutrality between variables (Mahembe & 
Odhiambo, 2019). 
Mahembe and Odhiambo (2019) argued that the above causality analysis approach leads to 
similar causal inferences as those of the Wald tests based Granger causality method, as well 
as the pairwise Granger causality test that is used specifically to test the direction of 
causality.  
In the remainder of this chapter, reliability and validity are briefly discussed, as well as how 
they were ensured in this study. This is followed by a brief discussion of the ethical 
considerations taken while conducting this study. A summary concludes this chapter.  
3.5 Reliability and validity  
In order to ensure the credibility of the outcomes of a study, i.e. the results and conclusions, 
the researcher must strive for two key qualities pertaining to the research design: reliability 
and validity (Saunders et al., 2009). Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of the 
measurement instrument employed, including the methods and procedures followed, while 
validity is concerned with the accuracy, dependability and soundness of the results and 
conclusions thus derived (Van Zyl, 2014).  
This study applied secondary data, the credibility of which could not be guaranteed. 
However, the researcher made certain that he sourced the data from reputable and reliable 
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global data sources that are widely used in empirical studies. He further made every effort 
to design the research study in a manner that would ensure compatibility of the data with 
the chosen research methods and techniques used to analyse the data, in order to effectively 
address the research questions and objectives of the study and derive credible results 
(Saunders et al., 2009).  
3.6 Ethical considerations 
Although the study used secondary data from credible global sources such as the World 
Bank, the researcher still exercised caution and applied for ethical clearance from the ethics 
committee of the University of South Africa (UNISA). This was done to ensure that any 
potentially identifying information was protected, and to comply with the university policies 
for conducting research. While the secondary data is widely accessible from online 
databases, the researcher committed to acknowledging all the sources and/or owners of the 
data, in addition to citing references to acknowledge the work of other scholars. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a thorough discussion of the research 
methodology that was applied in this study to address its objectives. The chapter began by 
detailing the population and sampling techniques adopted, as well as the data and the 
variables used. This was followed by a discussion of preliminary tests, i.e. unit root tests. The 
main empirical econometric models that were run to provide answers to the research 
questions posed in this study were dissected and specified. Issues of reliability and validity, 
and ethical considerations concerning this study were also addressed. In the next chapter, 
the results of the empirical study and the analysis and discussion of the findings are 
provided. 
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Chapter Four: Data analysis and discussion of findings 
4.1 Introduction 
The core purpose of this chapter is to present, analyse and discuss the results of the empirical 
study conducted with the aid of the various econometric models, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 briefly discusses the data (and 
variables) and summarises their descriptive statistics, in addition to presenting in more 
detail the process of constructing the institutional quality index. The presentation, analysis 
and discussion of the results of the GMM model estimation are provided in Section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, respectively, provide the cointegration and causality analyses 
and discussions thereof. Lastly, the chapter is summarised and concluded in Section 4.6. To 
recap, the research objectives of this study were:  
i. To identify the key determinants of FDI and FPI inflows to emerging markets from 
2007 to 2017. 
ii. To assess the long-run relationships between institutional quality, FDI and FPI 
inflows to emerging markets over the period 2007 to 2017. 
iii. To determine the causal relationships between FDI, FPI and institutional quality in 
emerging markets between 2007 and 2017. 
4.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
The study applied annual, short (N>T) and balanced panel data covering the period 2007 to 
2017 and pertaining to a sample of 12 emerging market countries. The study further made 
use of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) method to construct a single composite 
index for institutional quality (INSTDEX). This was because of the high correlations observed 
between the individual institutional quality factors, measured by the WGIs, and the absence 
of a consensus in previous empirical literature as to which of the individual indicators are 
the most important for foreign investment inflows in the emerging market context (Kurul, 
2017; Sabir et al., 2019). 
4.2.1 Principal Components Analysis 
4.2.1.1 Institutional quality index  
 
 
100 
 
Table 4 below provides the estimated eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of the six 
indicators of institutional quality from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The PCA 
method was used to construct a single composite index of institutional quality (INSTDEX).  
Table 4: Principal Components Analysis: Eigenvalues 
Principal 
Component Eigenvalue 
Proportion                             
(% of variance) 
Cumulative 
Proportion % 
1 4.815042 80.25 80.25 
2 0.543506 9.06 89.31 
3 0.261205 4.35 93.66 
4 0.187673 3.13 96.79 
5 0.118046 1.97 98.76 
6 0.074528 1.24 100 
 
As indicated in Table 4 above, the largest variance of 80.25% and highest eigenvalue of 
4.815042 implied that the first principal component relatively explained the maximum 
variation in the original variable set. Table 5 below reflects the eigenvector loadings from 
the PCA.  
Table 5: Eigenvector loadings 
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   PC 5   PC 6   
GOV 0.416966 -0.343479 0.183175 0.389906 0.718888 0.076041 
LAW 0.427533 -0.031312 -0.351237 -0.55864 0.064638 0.613688 
REG 0.411872 -0.224626 -0.588488 0.468413 -0.433061 -0.16320 
POL 0.413578 -0.147292 0.703302 0.029402 -0.525398 0.188991 
VOA 0.336937 0.899237 0.025236 0.260282 0.080907 0.054006 
COR 0.434906 0.016218 0.038619 -0.49787 0.0943 -0.74319 
Note: GOV-Government Effectiveness; LAW-Rule of law; REG-Regulatory quality; POL-Political stability; VOA-Voice and accountability; and 
COR-Control of corruption.  
Moreover, as can be seen in the eigenvector loadings displayed in Table 5 above, the first 
principal component (PC1) contained positive coefficients across the six individual variables 
of institutional quality. This meant that, in PC1, all the individual variables played a positive 
and virtually equal role in explaining the overall measure of institutional quality. Based on 
these observations, it could be concluded that the first principal component was the most 
pertinent measure of institutional quality, as it arguably contained the most important 
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information about the original variables (Brooks, 2008; Kurul, 2017; Aït-Sahalia & Xiu, 
2019). 
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 6 below presents a summary of descriptive statistics, including maximum and 
minimum values, means and standard deviations pertaining to the variables, as well as the 
number of observations for each variable.  
The key variables in this study were FDI and FPI net inflows as a percentage of GDP, and 
institutional quality (INSTQ), measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators. In Table 
6 below, INSTQ is presented both as an index (INSTDEX) and as individual indicators, 
prefixed by the acronym INSTQ. Other variables served as control and explanatory variables.  
Table 6: Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable            Mean    Maximum  
  
Minimum    Std. Dev.  
  
Observations  
FDI 3.305024 54.648730 -15.83879 7.720751 132 
FPI 0.975746 7.422868 -3.550829 1.615821 132 
INSTDEX -0.00000000239 4.464162 -4.046694 2.202680 132 
SMC 57.352820 352.15640 6.273966 66.70389 132 
CRED 47.148540 157.55620 11.82277 31.59183 132 
HUMC 0.665924 0.866000 0.407000 0.126726 132 
NATR 6.070066 19.272050 0.255659 4.826112 132 
EXCH 95.880480 129.485000 70.02250 11.46875 132 
GDP 3.784099 14.231390 -7.799994 3.565593 132 
GINTR 2.254217 5.223406 1.137338 1.100919 132 
CAOP -0.042336 2.346708 -1.916551 1.215903 132 
INSTQ -GOV -0.032438 0.827384 -1.214644 0.487776 132 
INSTQ-LAW -0.258794 0.964174 -1.18154 0.533806 132 
INSTQ-REG -0.061918 1.195643 -1.074257 0.583292 132 
INSTQ-POL -0.481324 1.072063 -2.211123 0.802598 132 
INSTQ-VOA -0.053287 1.105113 -1.72125 0.813960 132 
INSTQ-COR -0.356984 0.739105 -1.274705 0.493429 132                       
Note: FDI (Foreign direct investment); FPI (Foreign portfolio investment); INSTDEX (INSTQ index); SMC (Stock market capitalisation); 
CRED (Bank credit to private sector); HUMC (Human capital development); NATR(Natural resources); EXCH (Exchange rate); GDP (GDP 
growth rate); CAOP (Capital account openness). Individual INSTQ indicators: INSTQ-GOV (Government effectiveness); INSTQ-LAW (Rule 
of law); INSTQ-REG (Regulatory quality); INSTQ-POL (Political stability); INSTQ-VOA (Voice and accountability); INSTQ-COR (Control of 
corruption). 
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The mean value of FDI inflows was a mere 3.305024% during the period 2007–2017, which 
is not a significant value. The FDI maximum and minimum values of 54.648730% and -
15.83879% respectively relate to one country in our sample, Hungary. Hungary boasted the 
highest average of FDI inflows (13% of GDP) in the sample over the period under study. 
Hungary has attracted significant inflows of FDI over the years, but the inflows have been 
characterised by high volatility as a result of erratic institutional instabilities (and policy 
inconsistencies) in the country. The minimum FDI value of -15.83879%, which indicates 
more outflows than inflows, occurred in 2010, when the Hungarian government embarked 
on a sudden nationalisation programme that involved several sectors, including the banking 
and energy sectors (Isaacs & Molnar, 2017; Voszka, 2018). This nationalisation programme 
was intended to shield the domestic economy from the lasting effects of the 2008/9 global 
financial crisis, but it was clearly not welcomed by foreign direct investors, as indicated by 
the significant outflow in that particular year. FDI inflows to Hungary have recovered since 
2010 and peaked at 54.648730% of GDP in 2016, but they remain very volatile.  
The mean value of FPI net inflows is even lower than that of FDI, at 0.975746% of GDP. Most 
emerging market economies have not adequately deregulated and/or developed their 
capital markets and this results in negligible levels of FPI inflow. Even the largest emerging 
economies such as China have been restrictive on FPI, even though they have liberalised 
substantially towards FDI (Hatzvi et al., 2015). The minimum value of FPI, -3.550829%, 
relates to Hungary and occurred in 2007, when high volatility in international capital 
markets and low global investor confidence preceded the 2008 global financial crisis. The 
maximum FPI value of 7.422868% could be attributed to South Africa and occurred in 2017. 
South Africa boasted the largest average of FPI inflows in the sample. These relatively higher 
FPI values for South Africa can be ascribed to the country’s large and developed capital 
market. This is also evidenced by South Africa’s having the largest stock market 
capitalisation (SMC) in the sample, at 352% of GDP in 2017. The minimum value of SMC, at 
6.273966% of GDP, was shown by Argentina in 2012, and coincided with the beginning of 
the end of the commodity price boom, which was one of the factors that attracted portfolio 
flows to Argentina (Gonclaves, David & Pienknagura, 2019). 
 
 
103 
 
According to the World Development Indicators, domestic credit to private sector by banks 
as a percentage of GDP (CRED) refers to the financial resources provided by the banking 
system to the productive activities of the private sector. CRED had a lower mean value 
(47.148540%) than that of SMC (57.352820%), and this was owing to South Africa’s outlying 
SMC. However, when removing South Africa’s SMC from the data, it was noted that in most 
of these emerging markets, financing provided by the banking system (CRED) was greater 
than the financing provided by the capital markets. The minimum value of CRED at 
11.822770% of GDP occurred in Argentina in 2008, while the maximum value of 
157.556200% of CRED was shown by China in the year 2017. China is reported to have the 
largest banking system, by total assets, in the world (see Ye, Zhang & Dong, 2019), hence the 
highest value of CRED as a percentage of GDP. 
Human capital development (HUMC) was proxied by an education index, a component of the 
Human Development Index published by the UN Development Reports, which measures 
educational attainment levels by combining mean years of schooling for adults and expected 
years of schooling for children (Barro & Lee, 2013). A value of 0.9 or higher reflects very high 
educational attainment levels. The mean value of HUMC in our statistics was 0.665924, while 
0.866000 and 0.407000 were the maximum and minimum values for Poland and Nigeria 
respectively.  
The highest (maximum) value of natural resources as a percentage of GDP (NATR), at 
19.272050%, belonged to Russia, while the lowest (minimum) value of 0.255659% was 
found in the data from Hungary. The average value of NATR was 6.070066% of GDP. It will 
be noted later in the estimation results that NATR played a rather negative role in foreign 
capital inflows in this sample of emerging markets, as opposed to economic growth.  
Annual fluctuations in the real effective exchange rate (EXCH) were noted across this sample 
of emerging markets over the period under study. Volatility in exchange rates could be 
expected to have an adverse effect on international transactions conducted by multinational 
investors (see Madura & Fox, 2014), and would thus be a deterrent to foreign capital inflows. 
The mean value of EXCH in our statistics was 95.880480 (2010 = 100 base year index), with 
a standard deviation of 11.468750.  
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Economic growth measured by the real GDP growth rate had a mean value of 3.784099%, 
while the maximum and minimum values were 14.231390% (China–2007) and -7.799994% 
(Russia–2009) respectively. A fast growing rate of GDP indicates an expanding and growing 
economy that is likely to offer increased future earnings and higher rates of return for 
investors (Ahmed et al., 2007). 
Global interest rates (GINTR), proxied by US interest rates (lending rates adjusted for 
inflation) had an average value of 2.254217%. According to the push and pull factor theory 
of international capital flows, lower global interest rates (in advanced economies) will push 
international capital flows towards emerging markets that offer higher interest rates for 
investors (Calvo et al., 1996).  
Capital account openness (CAOP) measures the extent of an economy’s openness or 
liberalisation to capital account transactions. This variable was proxied by the Chinn-Ito 
capital account openness index, which measures the extent of financial openness by 
considering the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on capital account and 
current account transactions, as well as the requirement to surrender export receipts (Chinn 
& Ito, 2008). The index ranges between 2.35 (most open) and -1.92 (least open). The average 
CAOP value in our statistics was -0.042336, while maximum and minimum values were 
2.346708 (Hungary) and -1.916551 (Argentina) respectively. 
The mean values of all indicators of institutional quality were negative, including the 
institutional quality index. Worldwide Governance Indicators suggest that negative values 
indicate weaknesses in governance and institutional structures (Kaufmann, et al. 2011). The 
negative mean values across institutional indicators in this sample paint a grim picture of 
institutional development in this sample of emerging markets, particularly in the areas of 
government and regulatory effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, civil liberties, 
and political stability.  
It was therefore the primary objective of this study to examine the broader impact of 
institutions on foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) 
inflows into emerging markets, for the period 2007 to 2017. In the next section, the results 
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of the empirical estimations are presented and analysed in order to address the research 
questions, in pursuit of the objectives of the study.  
4.3 Dynamic panel GMM estimation results 
In order to tackle the first research objective of assessing the key determinants of FDI and 
FPI inflows into this sample of emerging market economies, a dynamic panel data system 
generalised method of moments model was adopted.  
As indicated in the previous chapter, a panel regression model requires the selection of a 
suitable estimation approach from fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). To that end, 
the Hausman test was applied with a null hypothesis that the appropriate approach was the 
RE model, as opposed to the alternative hypothesis that the FE model was appropriate 
(Gujarati, 2004). 
4.3.1 FDI determinants based on the system GMM 
A p-value of 0.0000 necessitated the rejection of the null hypothesis under the Hausman test, 
thus rendering the fixed effects more appropriate for the FDI regression model. Guided by 
theoretical frameworks and empirical literature reviewed earlier, the researcher specified a 
dynamic GMM FDI regression model using fixed effects as follows:  
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐻𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where i denotes cross-section, t denotes time, α represents the constant term and 
coefficients of explanatory variables (indicating the mean change in the value of the 
dependent variable from changes in the independent variable), and 𝑖𝑡 is an error term. The 
rest of the variables are defined as follows: 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = FDI net inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i at time t; 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 = first lag of FDI net inflows, measured as the previous period’s FDI net inflows as 
percentage of GDP into country i at time t-1; 
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = FPI net inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i at time t; 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇DEX𝑖𝑡 = institutional quality index, composed of the Worldwide Governance Indicators; 
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𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP; 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 = domestic credit by banks to the private sector as a percentage of GDP; 
𝐻𝑈𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = education index, measured as the number of expected and mean years of 
schooling; 
𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = total natural resources rent as a percentage of GDP; 
EXCH𝑖𝑡 = real effective exchange rate; and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = real GDP growth rate. 
 
The FDI regression results based on the fixed effects (FE) dynamic system GMM model are 
provided in Table 7 below. The analysis of results is based solely on the output of the system 
GMM model as it was the preferred model. Other results provided in Table 7 were merely 
robustness tests.  
Table 7 shows the regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The 
regression coefficient indicates the size of the impact that an individual explanatory 
(independent) variable (e.g. INSTDEX) has on the dependent variable (FDI). In other words, 
the coefficient represents the mean change in the dependent variable per unit change in a 
particular explanatory variable, holding constant the impact of other explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable. The standard error, on the other hand, indicates the standard 
deviation of the coefficient (Levine, Szabat & Stephan, 2016).   
The most important statistic for the purpose of the analysis in this study was the regression 
coefficient, in particular its sign (+/-, indicating the direction of the impact) and the statistical 
significance (indicated by asterisks). A similar approach to analysis was followed for the FPI 
estimation results.  
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Table 7: FDI System GMM regression results 
  
Pooled 
effects 
Fixed 
Effects  
Random 
effects  
System 
GMM GLS 
  FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
L.FDI 0.625*** 0.0991*** 0.625*** 0.702*** 0.625*** 
  (0.118) (0.0919) (0.118) (0.597) (0.0783) 
FPI 0.00743* -0.00736 0.00743* -0.149* 0.00743* 
  (0.0219) (0.0168) (0.0219) (0.0862) (0.0231) 
INSTDEX 0.0375* -0.0306 0.0375 0.636* 0.0375* 
  (0.0587) (0.0802) (0.0587) (0.211) (0.0557) 
SMC -0.00155* -0.000729 -0.00155* 0.00361 -0.00155* 
  (0.000649) (0.000866) (0.000649) (0.00316) (0.000724) 
CRED 0.00371* 0.00575 0.00371* -0.0208* 0.00371* 
  (0.00179) (0.0033) (0.00179) (0.0101) (0.00165) 
HUMC 0.0065 0.336 0.0065 -2.291 0.0065 
  (0.482) (1.148) (0.482) (5.120) (0.374) 
NATR 0.0037 0.011 0.0037 -0.0643* 0.0037 
  (0.00957) (0.0162) (0.00957) (0.0288) (0.00874) 
EXCH -0.00114 0.00271 -0.00114 -0.0275 -0.00114 
  (0.0027) (0.00236) (0.0027) (0.0179) (0.00309) 
GDP 0.0231** 0.024 0.0231** 0.0531* 0.0231* 
  (0.00821) (0.0135) (0.00821) (0.0208) (0.0104) 
_cons 3.751** 8.377*** 3.751**   3.751*** 
  (1.356) (1.269) (1.356)   (0.938) 
N 120 120 120 108 120 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% 
respectively. Dependent variable: FDI (Foreign direct investment). Independent/Explanatory variables: L.FDI (lag of the dependent 
variable, FDI); FPI (Foreign portfolio investment); INSTDEX (Institutional quality index); SMC (Stock market capitalisation); CRED (Bank 
credit to private sector); HUMC (Human capital development); NATR (Natural resource rent); EXCH (Exchange rate); GDP (GDP growth 
rate). 
As a point of departure, it appears from the system GMM output reflected in Table 7 that 
institutional quality (INSTDEX), previous inflows of foreign direct investment (L.FDI), 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI), domestic credit to private sector by banks (CRED), 
natural resources (NATR) and GDP growth rate (GPD) were statistically significant 
determinants of FDI inflows into this sample of emerging markets over the period under 
study.    
The key independent variable in the study was institutional quality, measured by an index 
(INSTDEX) composed of the six World Governance Indicators. The GMM output revealed a 
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positive and statistically significant relationship between INSTDEX and FDI in emerging 
markets. Emerging markets are often associated with inadequate regulatory and property 
rights structures, inefficient legal systems, pervasive corruption, political instability and 
suppression of civil liberties. These results suggest that the optimism of foreign investors 
about emerging markets is significantly enhanced by improvements in these areas of 
institutional development. These results are consistent with those of Kurul (2017), who 
found a positive and significant relationship between institutional quality and FDI inflows 
into developing countries. 
Indicating the persistence of FDI inflows was the finding of a positive and highly significant 
impact of past FDI inflows on current inflows. This finding is in line with that of Kurul and 
Yalta (2017) and Saini and Singhania (2018). The finding is also consistent with the external 
economies of scale and clustering effects hypotheses. In choosing where to invest, new 
investors emulate existing FDI and by clustering with other firms, new investors benefit from 
the lower long-run costs of operating in larger industries (Walsh & Yu, 2010).   
These GMM results further indicated a negative but statistically significant relationship 
between foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI). This result 
is in contrast to Noman et al.’s (2015) finding of a strongly positive and complementary 
relationship between FDI and FPI. However, the results of this study are supported by the 
finding of Humanicki et al. (2017) of a VECM-based substitutability or trade-off relationship 
between the two forms of capital flows. The finding in the present study also confirms the 
skepticism and restrictiveness of emerging markets towards FPI. Given the high liquidity and 
volatility of FPI relative to FDI, and the subsequent emerging markets’ experience of 
substantial reversals of FPI at times of financial crisis, these markets have resorted to a very 
gradual and cautious approach to the deregulation and liberalisation of their capital markets. 
This is in contrast to the much liberalised policies that emerging markets have adopted in 
order to maximise FDI inflows.  
The development of domestic financial markets is one of the key absorptive capacities for 
FDI in the host economy (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff & Wei, 2009; Alfaro & Chauvin, 2016). To 
capture the impact of banking sector financial intermediation on FDI inflows, this study used 
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domestic credit to the private sector by banks (CRED), which indicates the extent of financial 
resources directed at private sector investment activities (Sghaier & Abida, 2013). The 
results indicated a negative but significant relationship between bank credit and FDI inflows 
in emerging markets. This result suggests that increased liquidity in the domestic market for 
private sector investment lowers the need for foreign capital in the form of FDI (Makoni, 
2016). The researcher also estimated the impact of stock market development on FDI 
inflows in emerging markets. The proxy in this regard was stock market capitalisation as 
percentage of GDP (SMC), which measures the breadth of the domestic stock market. 
Although not statically significant, the impact of stock market capitalisation on FDI was 
positive. Results on the impact of financial market development, considering both CRED and 
SMC, on FDI inflows suggests that equity markets play a more positive role in FDI than the 
banking sector. These findings correspond with those of Soumaré and Tchana, (2015), who 
found a positive relationship between FDI and stock market capitalisation, and an 
inconclusive relationship between FDI and bank credit to the private sector in emerging 
markets.  
Despite existing evidence (see Mohamed & Sidiropoulos, 2010; Anarfo et al., 2017) to the 
effect that significant endowment of natural resources attracts resource-seeking and export-
oriented FDI, this study found a negative and significant association between FDI inflows and 
natural resources. The natural resources variable was proxied by the total natural resources 
rent, which measures the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral and forest rents, as a 
proportion of GDP. The result can be attributed to the poor performance of commodity prices 
in global markets, and the dominant role adopted by governments in the resources and 
energy sectors, that deters resource-seeking FDI inflows into emerging markets (Nandialath 
& Rogmans, 2019). This can be seen in many countries including Russia, Hungary and the 
MENA countries. Other explanations that have been advanced for the negative impact of 
natural resources on FDI inflows include the argument that countries with large 
endowments of resources raise sufficient domestic capital to finance their inward oriented 
development (Eissa & Elgammal, 2019). A further argument pertains to what is commonly 
referred to as a resource curse. Resource rich countries tend to attract extractive and export-
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oriented FDI that crowds out other FDI and waters down FDI induced economic growth 
(Hayat, 2018; Nandialath & Rogmans, 2019).  
Lastly, it was found that economic growth exerted a positive and significant impact on FDI 
inflows into emerging markets. This finding, in part, suggests that FDI in emerging markets 
is attracted by their rapidly expanding economies, rather than by their natural resources. An 
accelerating rate of GDP indicates an expanding and growing economy with a higher market 
demand and is likely to offer increased future earnings and higher rates of return for 
investors (Ahmed et al., 2007; Meyer & Habanabakize, 2018). The findings in this study are 
in line with those of Žarković et al. (2017) and Ayomitunde et al. (2019).  
The other explanatory variables had a weakly significant deterministic relationship with 
foreign direct investment. Human capital development had a negative and insignificant effect 
on FDI inflows. The proxy for human capital development (HUMC) was an education index, 
which measures educational attainment levels in a population in terms of the mean and 
expected years of schooling. A positive impact of HUMC as measured by educational 
attainment levels was anticipated. Higher educational attainment levels in a country mean 
large numbers of skilled workers, greater labour productivity and greater ability to absorb 
advanced technology from developed countries (Barro & Lee, 2013). However, the results 
were inconsistent with those of Mallik and Chowdhury (2017) and of Kheng et al. (2017), 
who measured HUMC by secondary and tertiary school enrollments and found a positive 
relationship. While it might be expected that high human capital development leads to higher 
labour costs that may deter FDI inflows, evidence from Poole (2013) shows that MNCs are 
willing to pay higher incomes, which reflects their hiring of better quality workers. There is, 
however, also a concern about human capital flight in some emerging markets, which might 
be the reason behind the insignificant impact of HUMC in attracting FDI inflows (Esew & 
Yaroson, 2014). A scarcity of skilled labour in the host country would result in MNCs bringing 
in their own human capital.  
The impact of exchange rates on FDI inflows was negative but statistically insignificant. This 
negative relationship between the two variables was expected. Exchange rate risk, on the 
one hand, affects the payment of remittances and other international transactions within 
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MNCs or between parent firms and subsidiaries (Madura & Fox, 2014). On the other hand, 
emerging market economies are predominantly export and trade oriented, which makes 
fluctuations and volatility in the currency a matter of concern for FDI involved in the trade 
sectors of these economies. All the emerging markets in this sample are member states of 
the World Trade Organisation. Moreover, a good number of these emerging markets are part 
of regional and trans-regional trade and economic blocs. Lastly and incidentally, recessions 
and subsequent capital flight that have historically occurred in some of these economies 
emanated from currency crises that involved currency pegging systems and currency 
overvaluations (e.g. the late 1990s East Asian, Mexican and Russian financial crises). The 
results in this study are consistent with those of Cambazoğlu and Güneş (2016) and Mensah 
et al. (2017), who found an inverse relationship between exchange rates and FDI, where 
currency appreciations (depreciations) deterred (attracted) FDI. Furthermore, the 
insignificant impact revealed by the results in the present study might be caused by various 
exchange rate hedging strategies that are common in foreign exchange markets and 
employed by MNCs to hedge against exchange rate risk for their international transactions 
(Madura & Fox, 2014). 
To conclude the analysis of the GMM based FDI results, these findings imply that FDI inflows 
into emerging markets, particularly those that constitute our sample, are in the main 
attracted by their large and rapidly expanding economies. This is demonstrated by the 
significant positive relationship with economic growth, as well as the clustering effects, 
proxied by previous FDI inflows. On the other hand, efforts by these emerging markets to 
improve the institutional environment raise the optimism and confidence of foreign 
investors, which in turn leads to significant inflows of FDI into their economies.  
4.3.2 FPI determinants based on the system GMM 
With respect to the FPI regression model, the null hypothesis under the Hausman test was 
not rejected, and therefore the random effects (RE) estimation approach was considered 
valid (p-value = 0.9889). The FPI random effects dynamic GMM regression model was 
expressed as follows: 
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𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑏1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑏6𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏7𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
where i denotes cross-section, t denotes time, b represents a constant term and coefficients 
of explanatory variables, 𝑖𝑡 is a random error term. The rest of the variables are defined as 
follows: 
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = FPI net inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i at time t; 
𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 = first lag of the FPI net inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i at time t-1; 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = FDI net inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i at time t; 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇DEX𝑖𝑡 = institutional quality index, composed of the Worldwide Governance Indicators; 
GINTR𝑖𝑡 = global interest rates, proxied by US interest rates;  
𝑆𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP;  
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 = domestic credit by banks to the private sector as a percentage of GDP; 
C𝐴𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 = measure of capital account openness based on Chinn and Ito capital account index; 
NATR𝑖𝑡 = total natural resources rent as a percentage of GDP; and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = real GDP growth rate. 
The results of the FPI regression are presented in Table 8 below. The focus of the analysis is 
solely on the system GMM output, while the other results are merely for robustness checks.  
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Table 8: FPI System GMM regression results 
  
Pooled 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects  
Random 
Effects 
System 
GMM GLS 
  FPI FPI FPI FPI FPI 
L.FPI 0.178 0.0491 0.178 -0.247* 0.178* 
  (0.188) (0.136) (0.1880 (0.102) (0.0844) 
FDI -0.00728 0.00549* -0.00728 -0.00013 -0.00728 
  (0.00946) (0.00372) (0.00946) (0.0061) (0.0177) 
INSTDEX -0.351 1.274* -0.351 2.609 -0.351 
  (0.226) (0.950) (0.226) (3.324) (0.213) 
GINTR -0.32 -0.514** -0.32 -0.853** -0.32 
  (0.199) (0.164) (0.199) (0.259 (0.196) 
SMC 0.0129*** 0.0325*** 0.0129*** 0.0264** 0.0129*** 
  (0.00242) (0.00536) (0.00242) (0.00772) (0.00231) 
CRED -0.011 -0.0510* -0.011 -0.113** -0.0110* 
  (0.00641) (0.0219) (0.00641) (0.0319) (0.00476) 
CAOP 0.186 0.117 0.186 0.858 0.186 
  (0.176) (0.210) (0.176) (0.923) (0.131) 
NATR -0.124* -0.112 -0.124* -0.136* -0.124*** 
  (0.0514) (0.0617) (0.0514) (0.0531) (0.0356) 
GDP 0.0166 -0.0315 0.0166 0.0074 0.0166 
  (0.04030) (0.0558) (0.0403) (0.0281) (0.0371) 
_cons 1.967** 3.368* 1.967**   1.967*** 
  (0.683) (1.492) (0.683)   (0.486) 
N 120 120 120 108 120 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% 
respectively. Dependent variable: FPI (Foreign portfolio investment). Independent/Explanatory variables: L.FPI (Lag of the dependent 
variable, FPI); FDI (Foreign direct investment); INSTDEX (Institutional quality index); GINTR (Global interest rates); SMC (Stock market 
capitalisation); CRED (Bank credit to private sector); CAOP (Capital account openness); NATR (Natural resource rent); GDP (GDP growth 
rate). 
With regard to FPI, the system GMM output revealed that amongst the explanatory variables, 
global interest rates (GINTR), lagged FPI, stock market capitalisation (SMC), bank credit to 
private sector (CRED) and natural resources (NATR) were statistically significant 
determinants of FPI.  
An inverse and highly significant relationship was found between FPI inflows and global 
interest rates, proxied by US interest rates. This result is in line with the push and pull factor 
theory of international capital flows and, to a certain extent, the international portfolio 
diversification theory. According to these theories, declining global interest rates (as a push 
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factor), particularly in advanced economies, bring about reallocations of international 
capital flows in favour of emerging market economies. Emerging markets generally provide 
better returns because of higher interest rates and growth rates (which are pull factors) 
(Calvo et al., 1996; Taylor & Sarno, 1997; Carstens & Schwartz, 1998). The significant effect 
of advanced economies’ interest rates of driving portfolio capital flows to emerging markets 
was also revealed by Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Vo et al. (2017) and Singhania and Saini 
(2017).  
Clustering effects were not confirmed in the case of foreign portfolio investment in emerging 
markets. The impact of past inflows of FPI (proxied by the first lag of FPI, i.e. L.FPI) on current 
inflows was negative and statistically significant. This finding may confirm the volatility of 
FPI flows in response to institutional instabilities in emerging markets, as well as to the 
restrictive approach to portfolio flows taken by emerging market economies. This result was 
in contrast to the positive relationship between past and current FPI inflows found by 
Singhania and Saini (2017). Nevertheless, the finding of a significant positive impact of 
previous FDI inflows on current inflows, and the significant negative effect of previous FPI 
inflows on current FPI was significantly similar those of Al-Khouri (2015), based on 16 
MENA countries.  
The financial market development variables also had a statistically significant impact on 
portfolio investment inflows. Stock market capitalisation (SMC) was positive and significant, 
indicating the significant impact of equity markets on the allocation of global capital flows, 
particularly portfolio inflows, into emerging markets. This finding of a positive and 
significant impact of SMC in enhancing FPI inflows in emerging markets corresponds to 
recent findings by Bayar (2017) and Qamruzzaman and Wei (2019). Bank credit to private 
sector (CRED), on the other hand, was significant but negative. This variable measures the 
amount of financial resources directed at private sector investment activities by the banking 
system. The negative impact of this variable on FPI inflows in emerging markets may indicate 
that when there are sufficient financial resources in the domestic banking system to fund 
private sector investment projects, private firms prefer to raise funds through bank loans 
rather than capital markets. Underlying this preference for bank loans may be the cost of 
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capital and/or the access to acquiring funds between the banking system and the capital 
markets and the speed with which this can be done.   
Lastly, natural resources (NATR) had a negative and significant effect on FPI. Although the 
emerging markets in this sample are well endowed with natural resources, notably oil and 
mineral resources, in most cases these resources are strictly state and government 
controlled. Since these resources are seldom owned or traded through capital markets, 
portfolio investors only have exposure to them through commodity markets, or no exposure 
at all. Moreover, this negative and significant effect of NATR on FPI suggests that the more 
natural resources based the economy (taking account of state control over such resources 
and domestic institutional weaknesses), the more FPI flows avoid such a country.  
The individual effects of the remaining determinant variables were not of strong statistical 
significance. The impact of FDI on FPI was negative but of negligible significance. This result 
sustains the argument that the two forms of capital inflows are substitutes or trade-offs 
rather than complements in emerging markets, substantiated by Humanicki et al.’s (2017) 
evidence. Wu, Li and Selover (2012) earlier provided evidence that placed the institutional 
and governance environment at the centre of the trade-off between FDI and FPI. In a sample 
of 45 developed and developing countries, these authors found that countries in which there 
was prevalence of formal institutions, such as rule of law, corporate governance, and political 
stability, tended to have a larger proportion of FPI in total foreign investment. This occurs 
because portfolio investors rely on public information (e.g. financial statements) and public 
enforcement to monitor the performance of their investments and to minimise their 
transaction costs, as they do not physically manage their investments. These countries are 
contrasted with those characterised by ineffective rule of law and the prevalent use of 
informal institutions and networks in the enforcement of contracts. Such countries would 
have a larger share of FDI in total foreign investment, as direct investors prefer to participate 
in the management of their assets in order to reduce expropriation risks and to protect their 
investments privately (Wu et al., 2012). This institutional environment based rationale may 
also be the explanation behind the relationship between the two forms of capital inflows in 
our emerging markets.  
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Institutional quality (INSTDEX), which was the key independent variable, had a positive and 
insignificant impact on foreign portfolio investment into emerging markets. The insignificant 
effect of INSTDEX indicates the low level of institutional quality in emerging markets. 
Similarly, capital account openness (CAOP), measured by the Chinn-Ito capital openness 
index, was insignificant but positive as expected. It has been stated that the coefficient of the 
Chinn-Ito capital account openness is never statistically significant (but is often correctly 
signed), possibly reflecting weak implementation or low effectiveness of capital account 
liberalisation policies (IMF, 2008). The positive impact of CAOP indicated by these results 
suggests that capital account liberalisation and deregulation pursued by emerging markets 
is yielding positive results in attracting FPI, although not significantly. Furthermore, the 
insignificance of both INSTDEX and CAOP in these results may also be linked to the evidence 
provide by Okada (2013) and by Byrne and Fiess (2016), that institutional quality, or 
financial openness, might not single-handedly attract foreign capital inflows. However, the 
positive impact of financial openness on capital inflows becomes significant with increases 
in the level of host country institutional quality. In other words, CAOP favours countries with 
higher (significant) institutional quality (INSTDEX).   
Although not significant, the impact of the economic growth rate, as a pull factor, was positive 
as expected (Ahmed & Zlate, 2014; Vo et al., 2017; Singhania & Saini, 2017). The positive 
relationship between capital flows and economic growth, as measured by GDP, becomes 
significant in the host economy when there are sufficient levels of financial market 
development and institutional quality (Agbloyor et al., 2014; Slesman et al., 2015). 
Therefore, in order for these emerging markets to experience not only the economic growth 
and development effects of international capital inflows, but also to enhance the inflows, 
these emerging markets would have to prioritise and augment the development of financial 
markets and institutions (Kose et al., 2009).  
In conclusion, stock market development stood out as the most important variable for 
foreign portfolio investors, as borne out in the significant positive relationship between FPI 
inflows and stock market capitalisation. Emerging markets should prioritise stock market 
development, not only to enhance FPI flows, but also to insulate their economies from the 
volatility of portfolio flows. Moreover, the development of financial markets to more 
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adequate levels is crucial if the growth effects of FPI are to be realised, as they play a critical 
role in the channeling of capital inflows to productive investment endeavours (Choong et al., 
2010; Agbloyor et al., 2014; Gök & Güvercin, 2020). It is also important for emerging markets 
to couple their financial liberalisation (capital openness) with the development of 
institutions in order to enhance FPI inflows and their growth benefits for the economy 
(Slesman et al., 2015; Byrne & Fiess, 2016).  
4.4 Cointegration analysis 
The second research objective was concerned with assessing the long-run relationships 
between our key variables, i.e. FDI, FPI and institutions. If two or more variables converge to 
form an equilibrium relationship over the long term, or if one variable drags the other and 
both eventually share the same movement, in the  long run , they are said to be co-integrated 
(Shrestha & Bhatta, 2018). This objective was addressed in this study with the aid of the 
panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model for dynamic heterogeneous panels, 
developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). This model is 
a variation of the traditional ARDL model that is most suitable for single time series studies, 
where N=1.  
Although the preferred econometric model for cointegration tests (i.e. panel ARDL) does not 
require prior unit root tests, it was necessary to carry out these tests to ensure that the 
variables of interest were integrated of order zero [I (0)], order one [I (1)] or a combination 
of both, and not order two [I (2)], as required by the model (Nkoro & Uko, 2016). 
4.4.1 Unit root test results 
Several unit root tests were conducted, including the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the 
Phillip-Perron (PP), Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) tests. The 
results of these tests are presented in Table 9 below. As can be noted from the table all key 
variables were integrated of order zero [I (0)] and order one [I (1)]. Based on this diagnosis, 
the panel ARDL approach was deemed suitable to investigate the long-run, co-integrating 
relationships between the key variables of FDI, FPI and institutions, as per the second 
objective.  
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Table 9: ADF, PP, LLC and IPS unit root test results 
Variable Intercept 
Intercept 
and trend No trend  
Diagnosis 
(Order of 
integration) 
  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test - Fisher Chi-square 
FDI @ level  49.4240** 44.5059** 50.7280** I(0) 
FPI @ level 66.7077** 58.8080** 68.4192** I(0) 
INSTDEX 59.2244** 52.4853** 81.5170** I(1) 
  Phillips-Perron (PP) test - Fisher Chi-square 
FDI @ level 53.0314** 50.7159** 58.2996** I(0) 
FPI @ level 93.8936** 99.2092** 77.4248** I(0) 
INSTDEX  70.5051** 94.5040**  92.1458** I(1) 
  Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test 
FDI @ level -6.68065** -7.12176** -4.11807** I(0) 
FPI @ level -5.03464** -9.39288** -4.74618** I(0) 
INSTDEX -5.89295** -8.08932** -7.00795** I(1) 
  Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test 
FDI @ level -3.33792** -2.35756** ** I(0) 
FPI @ level -4.84450** -2.67173** ** I(0) 
INSTDEX  -3.88751** -1.90733** ** I(1) 
Note: All tests are at first difference, except where otherwise indicated. ***; **; * indicate that the null hypothesis of unit root tests is rejected 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All test probabilities assume asymptotic normality, except for Fisher tests which are estimated using the 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. Variables remain as previously described. The lag length selection is based on the Schwartz 
Information Criterion (0 to 1).  
4.4.2 Panel ARDL cointegration estimation results 
The panel ARDL model requires the selection of an appropriate estimator from the Mean 
Group (MG), Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimators 
(Pesaran et al. 1999). We applied the Hausman test to determine the most efficient of these 
three estimators. This process was necessary because homogeneity or heterogeneity across 
individual countries, in both short-run and long-run parameters, could not be presumed. 
Table 10 below presents the summary of the panel ARDL cointegration estimation results, 
as well as outputs from the error correction models (ECM). The table comprises two panels. 
One panel shows the estimated long-run coefficients, whilst the other panel reflects the 
estimated short-run coefficients. ECT denotes the estimated error correction term. The error 
correction term implies the speed of adjustment from short-run deviations back to the long-
run equilibrium path (Brooks, 2008:339). 
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Table 10: Cointegration and ECM results: Mean Group; Dynamic Fixed Effects; Pooled 
Mean Group 
  Mean Group 
Dynamic Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled Mean 
Group 
  ΔFDI ΔFPI ΔINSTDEX 
       
LONG RUN      
FDI -- -0.0136* -0.279*** 
    (-0.53) (-5.83) 
       
FPI -0.00757** -- 0.0631** 
  (-0.08)   (2.67) 
       
INSTDEX 0.447** 0.884 -- 
  (1.39) (1.61)   
       
ECT -0.913*** -1.024*** -0.472*** 
  (-7.63) (-9.89) (-4.38) 
       
SHORT RUN      
ΔFDI -- 0.00590 0.0733*** 
    (0.33) (4.01) 
       
ΔFPI -0.0118 -- -0.0282 
  (-0.31)   (-1.51) 
       
ΔINSTDEX 0.145 0.287* -- 
  (0.42) (0.41)   
       
_cons 9.551*** 1.032*** 0.192 
  (7.75) (5.61) (1.19) 
N 120 120 120 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Δ 
denotes the difference operator. ECT – error correction term. Other variables remain as previously described. 
4.4.2.1 Cointegration and ECM results with FDI as the dependent variable – Mean Group 
According to the Hausman test, the mean group (MG) estimator was consistent and efficient 
for the model with FDI as the dependent variable. Recall that the MG estimator allows both 
short-run and long-run coefficients to vary or to be heterogeneous across cross-sectional 
units. In addition, the MG provides consistent estimates of coefficients because it runs 
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separate equations for each cross-section unit and averages the coefficients across units 
(Pesaran & Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1999; Magweva & Sibanda, 2020). The FDI results 
based on the MG estimation are displayed in Table 11 below. The PMG and DFE outputs in 
Table 11 are merely robustness tests.  
Table 11: FDI - Mean Group (MG) output 
  PMG MG DFE 
  ΔFDI ΔFDI ΔFDI 
Long run     
FPI 0.0689** -0.00757** -0.0307 
 (2.58) (-0.08) (-0.90) 
INSTDEX -0.289** 0.447** -0.0212 
 (-2.89) (1.39) (-0.15) 
ECT -0.643*** -0.913*** -0.880*** 
  (-5.93) (-7.63) (-8.84) 
Short run     
ΔFDI -0.0252 -0.0118 -0.00127 
 (-0.72) (-0.31) (-0.06) 
ΔINSTDEX 0.415 0.145 0.148 
  (1.54) (0.42) (1.02) 
_cons 6.633*** 9.551*** 9.046*** 
 (5.85) (7.75) (8.82) 
N 120 120 120 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Δ 
denotes the difference operator. ECT – error correction term. Other variables remain as previously described.  
When FDI served as the dependent variable, the MG estimation revealed statistically 
significant long-run relationships among FDI inflows, FPI inflows and institutions 
(INSTDEX). The impact of FPI on FDI in the long run was negative and significant at the 1% 
significance level. These long run results are comparable to those of Humanicki et al. (2017), 
who investigated the cointegrating relationship between FDI and FPI in a VECM framework, 
using Poland as a case study. They found that these two capital flows were significantly 
cointegrated in the long run. However, this long-run relationship was of a substitutability or 
trade-off nature, where both capital flows were influenced by economic growth, but portfolio 
flows were strongly related to interest rates, whereas FDI showed a long-term dependence 
on unit labour costs (Humanicki et al., 2017). Thus, in the case of this study, the finding meant 
that foreign investors in emerging markets substituted FDI for FPI or vice versa depending 
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on the dynamics of the institutional environment in the host economy. Therefore, 
improvements in institutional quality led foreign investors to pursue relatively more FDI. 
This was also corroborated by the statistically significant and positive long-run relationship 
found between institutions (INSTDEX) and FDI. This particular aspect of these findings 
supports the initial GMM-based result of the INSTDEX-FDI relationship. It also corresponds 
with the findings of Hyun (2006) of a positive cointegrating relationship between the two 
variables in developing countries. Shah et al. (2016) also found a positive long-run 
relationship between institutions and FDI inflows in the case of Pakistan. The researcher 
may also, in relation to these findings, invoke the suggestion of Wu et al. (2012) that, 
depending on the prevalence of informal institutions over formal institutions, foreign 
investors would pursue more FDI than FPI in emerging markets.  
The short-run coefficients, on the other hand, were statistically insignificant, indicating no 
significant impact in the short term. Pfeffer (2008) argued that, owing to the high investment 
costs entailed, it is not possible to adjust FDI in the short term or even regularly in response 
to environmental changes. For this reason, the significant (and positive) effect of institutions 
on FDI inflows may, in certain cases, only be apparent over the long term, and may not be 
noticeable immediately (Hyun, 2006). 
The negative and statistically significant error correction term (ECT) of -0.913 meant that 
91.3 % of the past period’s equilibrium error was corrected within a year.  
4.4.2.2 Cointegration and ECM results with FPI as the dependent variable – Dynamic Fixed 
Effects 
Based on the Hausman test, the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator was considered 
efficient when estimating the FPI cointegration equation. The DFE approach is poles apart 
from the MG estimator. The DFE approach imposes homogeneity in the estimation of both 
short- and long-run coefficients across the entire cross-section, and only allows the 
individual country intercepts to vary (Pesaran et al. 1999). The DFE-based FPI results are 
reflected in Table 12 below. MG and PMG are there only for comparison and robustness 
purposes.  
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Table 12: FPI – Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) output 
  PMG MG DFE 
  ΔFPI ΔFPI ΔFPI 
Long Run     
FDI -0.00364 -0.599* -0.0136* 
 (-0.45) (-2.12) (-0.53) 
INSTDEX -0.11 0.85 0.884 
 (-0.87) (0.84) (1.61) 
ECT -1.026*** -1.130*** -1.024*** 
  (-7.01) (-13.73) (-9.89) 
Short Run     
ΔFDI -0.176 0.276 0.0059 
 (-1.06) (1.28) (0.33) 
ΔINSTDEX 1.131* -0.443 0.287* 
  (2.19) (-0.39) (0.41) 
_cons 0.915** 3.703** 1.032*** 
 (2.93) (3.17) (5.61) 
N 120 120 120 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Δ 
denotes the difference operator. ECT – error correction term. Other variables remain as previously described.  
We found a significant cointegrating relationship between FPI and FDI, where FDI exerted a 
negative and significant impact on foreign portfolio inflows in the long run. This suggested 
that increases in FDI inflows were crowding out FPI inflows. This finding was also in line 
with previous results from the FDI mean group output, and the subsequent conclusion that, 
given the state of institutional quality, the two investment inflows could have been 
substitutes in this sample of emerging markets. These results contradict those of Noman et 
al. (2015), who found a positive and significant link between FDI and FPI, with FPI having a 
greater impact on FDI in a sample of 45 developed and developing countries. Noman et al. 
(2015) did not take into account the effect of institutions, however, but only that of variables 
such as differentials in market openness, exchange rates and inflation rates.  
The impact of institutions on foreign portfolio inflows was insignificant in the long run, but 
demonstrated significant positive influence in the short run. This outcome was in line with 
Pfeffer’s (2008) postulation regarding the high flexibility of FPI flows. Owing to its lower 
investment and/or transaction costs relative to FDI, foreign portfolio investment would 
react immediately to short-term changes in the environment (Pfeffer, 2008).  
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The error correction term (ECT) under the MG estimation was -1.204 and significant at 0.1 
percent. This meant that the variability of FPI inflows as a result of changes in FDI and 
INSTDEX was corrected to its long-run equilibrium at a speed of adjustment of 120.4% 
annually. An ECT greater than -1 (or between -1 and -2) also indicates that the error 
correction process does not directly converge to the equilibrium path but fluctuates, in an 
oscillatory manner, before rapidly converging to long-run equilibrium (Narayan & Smyth, 
2006).  
4.4.2.3 Cointegration and ECM results with INSTDEX as the dependent variable – Pooled Mean 
Group 
The pooled mean group (PMG) estimator was consistent and efficient for the model 
estimating cointegration with INSTDEX as the dependent variable, in terms of the Hausman 
test. The PMG estimator is known for imposing homogeneity on the long-run parameters, 
but as with the MG, it allows short-run parameters (including the speed of adjustment, 
intercept terms, and error variances) to vary across countries. In addition, it generates 
consistent estimates of the mean of short-run coefficients across cross-sectional units by 
taking the average of individual country coefficients, i.e. pooling and averaging the means 
(Pesaran et al., 1999).  
Table 13 below shows the PMG output. MG and DFE outputs are merely robustness checks. 
  
 
 
124 
 
Table 13: INSTDEX – Pooled Mean Group (PMG) output 
  PMG MG DFE 
  ΔINSTDEX ΔINSTDEX ΔINSTDEX 
Long Run     
FPI 0.0631** -0.601 0.135* 
 (2.67) (-0.75) (2.11) 
FDI -0.279*** -0.0402 0.00466 
 (-5.83) (-0.28) (0.41) 
ECT -0.472*** -0.548** -0.338*** 
  (-4.38) (-3.17) (-4.36) 
Short Run     
ΔFPI -0.0282 -0.0929 -0.02 
 (-1.51) (-1.85) (-1.33) 
ΔFDI 0.0733*** 0.0738* -0.00191 
 (4.01) -2.29 (-0.73) 
_cons 0.192 -0.0628 -0.0437 
 (1.19) (-0.19) (-1.43) 
N 120 120 120 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Δ 
denotes the difference operator. ECT – error correction term. Other variables remain as previously described.  
The PMG estimation between institutions, FDI and FPI revealed evidence of significant long 
run, cointegrating relationships. In contrast to the previous finding of a positive and 
significant long-run impact of institutions on FDI, it appeared that FDI in turn exerted a 
negative significant effect on INSTDEX in the long run. In the short run, the impact of FDI on 
INSTDEX was otherwise positive and statistically significant. These results were inconsistent 
with those of Shah et al. (2016), who revealed that the positive relationship between the two 
variables persists from the short run to the long run. Earlier, Hyun (2006) also concluded 
that the presence of FDI might lead to lasting changes in institutional quality. In contrast, the 
findings of this study suggested that institutional quality improvements induced by the 
presence of FDI were merely temporary in this sample of emerging markets. The findings in 
this regard can also be linked to the phenomenon of institutional persistence, where certain 
institutional weaknesses would persist even after reforms such as market liberalisation, 
which permits the inflow of foreign capital (Acemoglu, 2003).  
Foreign portfolio investment, on the other hand, had a significant positive impact on 
institutions in emerging markets. This result was expected to hold for FDI as well. However, 
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the results suggested that it was FPI that would precipitate institutional improvements in 
the long run. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2007) found earlier that institutional 
quality was a significant determinant of capital flow volatility, subject to the state of existing 
capital controls. Over the past three decades, many emerging markets have pursued financial 
liberalisation, and have as a result received huge capital inflows. However, the liberalisation 
of capital markets in these emerging markets has led to severe financial crises and 
subsequent abrupt capital reversals when not coupled with efficient institutional and 
regulatory frameworks. The finding in this study of a positive long-run impact of FPI on 
institutions would suggest that emerging markets have learnt the lesson that effective 
institutional measures must be established in order to insulate their economies from 
potential adverse ramifications of volatile capital flows. Fratzscher (2012) found that 
emerging market economies with high institutional quality (and strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals) were able to insulate their capital markets and economies from adverse 
effects of portfolio capital flow reversals even amidst the 2008/9 global financial crisis.  
The error correction term was significant and negative, i.e. -0.472, indicating that the speed 
of adjustment to long-run equilibrium from previous disequilibrium was 47.2% annually.  
4.5 Panel VECM causality analysis 
The third and final research objective in this study pertained to the causal relationships 
between our key variables, viz. FDI, FPI and institutions, in emerging markets. The causality 
analyses were based on outputs from the error correction models (ECM) derived from the 
panel ARDL framework that was applied to the second research objective, which was 
concerned with cointegration relationships.  
It should be kept in mind that the panel vector error correction model (VECM) is efficient in 
a cointegration setting as it integrates short-run dynamics with the long-run equilibrium 
without losing long-run information. It also circumvents spurious estimations resulting from 
non-stationary time series data (Shrestha & Bhatta, 2018). The error correction term derived 
from the long-run, cointegrating relationships captures the short-term equilibrium errors of 
series and restores them to their long-run equilibrium (Brooks, 2008).  
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Table 14 below summarises the outputs of the error correction models extracted from the 
ARDL framework applied in the earlier cointegration estimations. Causal effects are inferred 
from the statistical significance of the long-run and short-run coefficients, as well as the 
statistical significance of the error correction terms (ECT).  
Table 14: VECM outputs 
Dependent 
variables 
Independent variables – Source of causation 
  Long-run coefficients Short-run coefficients    
  FDI FPI INSTDEX ΔFDI ΔFPI ΔINSTDEX ECT 
           
ΔFDI -- -0.00757** 0.447** -- -0.0118 0.145 -0.913*** 
    (-0.08) (1.39)   (-0.31) (0.42) (-7.63) 
           
ΔFPI -0.0136* -- 0.884 0.0059 -- 0.287* -1.024*** 
  (-0.53)   (1.61) (0.33)   (0.41) (-9.89) 
           
ΔINSTDEX -0.279*** 0.0631** -- 0.0733*** -0.0282 -- -0.472*** 
  (-5.83) (2.67)   (4.01) (-1.51)   (-4.38) 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Δ 
denotes the difference operator. ECT – error correction term. Other variables remain as previously described.  
The categories of causality results drawn from the panel VECM fell into three groups, viz. 
short-run causality, long-run causality, and strong causality. Short-run causality was 
inferred when the coefficients of the differenced (Δ) short-run explanatory variables were 
statistically significant, while the long-run causal effects were deduced from the statistical 
significance of the long-run coefficients. On the other hand, strong causality was inferred 
when, in addition to statistically significant coefficients, the ECT was negative and 
statistically significant. Three directional outcomes were further inferred from the panel 
VECM output: uni-directional causal effects, bi-directional causality, and no causality. 
Table 15 below summarises the causality incidences identified from the significant 
coefficients and ECTs.  
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Table 15: VECM causality analyses 
Dependent 
variables 
Independent variables – Source of causation 
  Long-run causality Short-run causality   
  FDI FPI INSTDEX ΔFDI ΔFPI ΔINSTDEX ECT 
           
ΔFDI -- Causality** Causality** -- 
No 
Causality No Causality Causality*** 
    (-0.08) (1.39)   (-0.31) (0.42) (-7.63) 
           
ΔFPI Causality* -- 
No 
Causality No Causality -- Causality* Causality*** 
  (-0.53)   (1.61) (0.33)   (0.41) (-9.89) 
           
ΔINSTDEX Causality*** Causality** -- Causality*** 
No 
Causality -- Causality*** 
  (-5.83) (2.67)   (4.01) (-1.51)   (-4.38) 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. Δ 
denotes the difference operator. ECT – error correction term. Other variables remain as previously described. 
A bi-directional causal relationship between FDI and FPI was found in the long-run, implying 
feedback effects between the two variables in the long run. This was demonstrated by the 
significant long-run FPI coefficient in the ΔFDI equation (FDI – dependent variable variable), 
and the significant long-run coefficient of FDI in the ΔFPI equation (FPI - dependent variable 
variable). The researcher did not, however, observe a causal relationship between the two 
variables in the short run and this was the only neutrality/no-causality incident we found. 
This result was contrary to the complementarity postulation between the two capital flows 
suggested by Pfeffer (2008) and Noman et al. (2015). It was also in contrast to the finding of 
Gök and Güvercin (2020), who found short-run bi-directional Granger causality between FDI 
and FPI in sub-Saharan African countries. The present findings were nevertheless somewhat 
vindicated by Khan and Banerji (2015) who, based on their analysis of FDI and FPI in India, 
concluded that the two capital flows would initially move in opposite directions but 
eventually cause each other in the long run (i.e. within a time lag of eleven quarters or three 
years).  
In addition, bi-directional causality was discovered between FDI and institutions (INSTDEX) 
in the long run. However, in the short run, the researcher found a uni-directional causal 
relationship from FDI to institutions, which was significant at 0.1 percent. FDI inflows caused 
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institutions in the short run and in turn, these two variables caused each other in the long 
term. These results are comparable to those of Shah et al. (2016), who found a long-run bi-
directional causality between institutions (INSTQ) and total FDI, as well as manufacturing 
and services sector FDI in Pakistan. While this study found a uni-directional causality from 
FDI to INSTDEX in the short run, Shah et al. (2016) found in addition a bi-directional causal 
link between institutions and manufacturing sector FDI in the short run. Based on these 
findings, they concluded that the manufacturing and services sectors attract more market 
and efficiency seeking FDI. FDI inflows in these sectors penetrate deeper into the host 
economy through backward and forward linkages. As a result, the spillover effects of 
increased FDI inflows through these linkages encourage governments to improve their 
policy and institutional environment over the long term. Moreover, Shah et al. (2016) did not 
find any significant relationship between INSTQ and FDI in the primary sectors, consisting 
of oil, gas and mining resources. The latter finding means essentially that FDI directed at 
extracting resources is not dependent on the country’s institutional environment. In this 
regard, Shah et al. (2016) concluded that resource seeking and extractive FDI inflows are 
limited to areas in the host country where resources are situated, and therefore the spillover 
effects may be limited to those areas, and may not have an impact on the INSTQ in the rest 
of the economy.  
A uni-directional causal link was also observed from FPI to institutions in the long run. In 
contrast, this study found that, in the short term, INSTDEX caused FPI with a 5 percent level 
of significance. A stable institutional environment attracts portfolio flows in the short term, 
and in the long run portfolio flows, because of the ease with which they can be withdrawn, 
compel governments to maintain institutional stability to prevent capital flight. This result 
was indicative of the positive spillovers of FPI on the institutional quality of emerging 
markets. This outcome also pointed to the lessons emerging markets have learned from their 
previous experiences with financial crises and capital flights.  
The researcher also observed that over the long run, FDI and FPI exerted joint causal effects 
on institutions, whilst FPI and INSTDEX jointly caused FDI. Amplifying the causal 
relationships suggested by this analysis was the fact that the long-run and short-run 
coefficients were accompanied by negative and statistically significant error correction 
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terms (ECTs) in the overall panel VECM framework. On the one hand, the negative and 
significant ECTs signify strong causality among the variables, and imply convergence of the 
system to long-run equilibrium. On the other hand, the generated ECTs imply correction of 
short-run disequilibria at 91.3%, 120.4%, and 47.2% speed of adjustment for FDI, FPI and 
INSTDEX, respectively. The causal relationships uncovered in the panel VECM framework 
are summarised in Table 16 below.   
Table 16: Summary of panel VECM-based causal relationships 
Long-run causal effects 
 
FDI ↔ FPI 
 
FDI ↔ INSTDEX 
 
FPI → INSTDEX 
 
Short-run causal effects  
 
INSTDEX → FPI 
 
FDI → INSTDEX 
Note: ↔ bi-directional causality; → uni-directional causality.  
4.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
This chapter focused on the outcomes of empirical estimations that were conducted to 
address the study’s research objectives. It began by briefly providing the characteristics of 
the variables in a summary of descriptive statistics, and followed by constructing a single 
composite index for institutional quality indicators. Thereafter, the results from the main 
empirical estimations were presented, analysed and discussed. The researcher applied a 
dynamic panel data system generalised method of moments regression model to identify and 
confirm the key determinants of FDI and FPI in emerging markets. The panel ARDL model 
was used to assess the long-run cointegrating relationships between the key variables of FDI, 
FPI and institutions. Finally, the panel vector error correction model was adopted to examine 
the causal relationships that existed between the three key variables in emerging markets 
over the period 2007–2017.  
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The next chapter comprises the overall conclusion of the study. The researcher summarises 
the key findings of the study, highlights the policy implications of the study’s findings, and 
makes suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter Five: Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overall conclusion to the study. It begins with a 
summary of the key empirical findings in relation to the objectives of the study. This is 
followed this by a section that highlights the contribution of the study and discusses the 
policy implications that may be derived from the findings. Finally, the researcher makes 
suggestions for future related research.   
5.2 Summary of key findings and research objectives 
5.2.1 FDI and FPI determinants in emerging markets 
The first objective of the study was to identify the key drivers or determinants of FDI inflows 
and FPI inflows in emerging markets for the period 2007 to 2017. In order to address this 
objective, the dynamic panel data system GMM model was applied. The researcher began by 
estimating the model to identify FDI determinants, and followed this by estimating the model 
to identify the determinants of FPI.  
The fixed effects estimation of FDI determinants revealed that past FDI inflows, FPI inflows, 
institutional quality, domestic credit to private sector by banks, natural resources and GDP 
growth were statistically significant determinants of FDI inflows into emerging markets over 
the period 2007–2017. Of these significant determinants, previous FDI inflows (measured 
by one lag of FDI inflows), institutional quality (INSTDEX), proxied by an index composed of 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the economic growth rate were found to be 
positive determinants of FDI, implying that they were the key factors in attracting foreign 
direct investment inflows into emerging markets. Based on the latter finding, the researcher 
concluded that FDI inflows to the emerging markets that constituted this sample were in the 
main attracted by their large and rapidly expanding economies, as demonstrated by the 
significant positive relationship with GDP growth, as well as the cumulative or clustering 
effects of existing FDI. It was further concluded that the efforts of these emerging markets to 
improve the institutional environment raised the optimism and confidence of foreign 
investors, which in turn led to significant inflows of FDI into their economies. These findings 
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conformed to the location advantages of the eclectic paradigm theory of FDI (Dunning, 1980; 
2001).  
With respect to FPI, the random effects based estimation showed that previous FPI inflows, 
global interest rates, stock market development, domestic credit to private sector by banks 
and natural resources had a significant impact on FPI inflows to emerging markets. Stock 
market development, as proxied by stock market capitalisation, stood out as the most 
important factor for foreign portfolio investors investing in emerging markets. In this regard, 
it was concluded that emerging markets should prioritise stock market development, not 
only to enhance FPI flows. This would also insulate their capital markets and economies from 
the volatility of portfolio flows, and enable emerging markets to realise the growth effects of 
FPI, as the capital markets play a critical role in the channeling of capital inflows to 
productive investment. The finding regarding the significance of host country stock market 
development was in line with the location advantages of the Ownership-Location-
Externalisation theory of FPI advanced by Dunning and Dilyard (1999). This study also found 
a significant inverse relationship between FPI and global interest rates, measured by US 
interest rates. The latter finding was squarely in line with the push and pull factor theory, as 
well as with the international portfolio diversification hypothesis, which highlights the role 
of global interest rates in driving international portfolio capital flows between advanced and 
emerging market economies.  
The key variable of institutional quality was found to be insignificant for FPI inflows to 
emerging markets, as was capital account openness. In relation to these results, it was 
concluded that it would be important for emerging markets to couple their financial 
liberalisation (capital openness) with the development of institutions in order to enhance 
FPI inflows and their growth benefits for the economy, as previous empirical evidence has 
suggested.  
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5.2.2 Long-run relationships between FDI, FPI and institutional quality in emerging 
markets 
The second objective of this study was concerned with long-run relationships among FDI, 
FPI and institutions in emerging markets over the period 2007 to 2017. This objective was 
addressed using the ARDL model for dynamic heterogeneous panels.  
Estimation results revealed that when FDI was the dependent variable, significant 
cointegrating, long-run relationships occurred among the three variables of FDI, FPI and 
institutions. The relationship between FPI and FDI was negative and significant in the long 
run, while institutions had a positive and significant effect on FDI inflows in the long run. On 
the one hand, these findings meant that the relationship between FDI and FPI in emerging 
markets was of a substitutability or trade-off nature, dependent upon the dynamics of the 
institutional environment in the host economy. On the other hand, it was concluded that 
improvements in institutional quality led foreign investors to pursue more FDI relative to 
FPI. Furthermore, the trade-off between FDI and FPI suggested that one form of capital 
inflow would dominate the other, conditional upon the prevalence of informal institutions 
or formal institutions in a particular emerging market (Wu et al., 2012).  
When FPI served as the dependent variable, the study found a significant and negative 
relationship between FDI and FPI, suggesting that increases in FDI were crowding out FPI. 
This finding also supported the suggestion of a trade-off between the two capital inflows.  
In the institutional quality equation, on the other hand, it emerged that there were significant 
cointegrating relationships among institutions, FDI and FPI. FPI inflows had a positive and 
significant influence on institutions in the long run. FDI, however, had a negative and 
significant impact on institutions in the long term.  
5.2.3 Causal relationships between FDI, FPI and institutional quality in emerging 
markets 
In order to address the third research objective, the researcher employed the panel vector 
error correction model (VECM) to examine causality among the three key variables in 
emerging markets.  
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In the long run, bi-directional causality was found between FDI and FPI, and between FDI 
and institutions. A uni-directional causal relationship from FPI to institutions was also found 
in the long run. The researcher also observed that over the long run, FDI and FPI jointly 
caused institutions, whilst FPI and INSTDEX jointly caused FDI. In the short run, no bi-
directional causality was observed, but uni-directional causal effects from institutions to FPI, 
as well as from FDI to institutions were found.  
Finally, the error correction terms (ECTs) were negative and statistically significant. These 
negative and significant ECTs indicated that there was strong causality among the variables. 
They also implied the correction of short-run disequilibria and convergence of the models to 
long-run equilibrium.  
5.2.4 Primary objective – Impact of institutions on FDI and FPI in emerging markets  
The primary objective of the study was to examine the broader impact of institutional quality 
on the enhancement of foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment 
(FPI) inflows in selected emerging markets, for the period 2007 to 2017.  
Collectively, the results and findings suggested that institutions did indeed have an impact 
on the enhancement of FDI and FPI into the sample of emerging markets over the period 
2007 to 2017, particularly insofar as deterministic, cointegrating and causal relationships 
were concerned.  
5.3 Contribution and policy implications of the study 
This study contributes to knowledge in that it adds to the scarce empirical literature that 
extends the empirical analysis of the impact of institutions on foreign capital inflows by 
studying institutional effects on both foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio 
investment. It further contributes to the scant literature that investigates the long-run and 
causality relationships between institutions and both FDI and FPI inflows into emerging 
markets.  
For policymakers and governments in emerging markets, the study provides empirical 
evidence of the significance of the impact of institutions on foreign capital inflows into their 
countries, and of how institutions interact with foreign direct and portfolio investment 
inflows in the host economy. The policy implication for governments is that, as they continue 
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to liberalise and deregulate their economies and capital markets, it is very important to 
couple financial liberalisation with the strengthening of formal institutions and the general 
institutional environment. Strengthening the qualitative characteristics of institutions, such 
as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, voice and 
accountability, and political stability, could curtail the persistence of institutional 
weaknesses and insulate their economies from the adverse effects of volatile capital flows, 
and over the long run enhance and preserve foreign capital inflows.  
5.4 Suggestions for future research  
In order to further the understanding of the relationship between institutions and 
international capital inflows beyond what existing literature and this study has investigated, 
future research studies might examine empirically the threshold levels of institutional 
quality at or above which significant inflows of foreign investment can be attracted by 
emerging markets. Kurul (2017) determined the threshold level of institutional quality that 
must be exceeded if developing countries are to attract more FDI inflows. Thus, future 
research could add to this literature by extending the analysis to include FPI inflows.  
As far as the estimation of the determinants of FDI and FPI inflows is concerned, as this study 
used a short panel encompassing a sample of only 12 emerging markets, the researcher was 
unable to include many explanatory variables (or potential determinants). Thus, future 
studies might enlarge their samples in order to study the effects of more explanatory 
variables. Moreover, in terms of the generalisability of the GMM findings, only the FPI GMM 
estimation results can be generalised to other emerging markets that were not part of this 
sample, as thereon a random effects estimation approach was adopted. Thus, enlarging the 
sample in future research studies to include more countries would determine whether 
similar or different results would occur, and would also make the findings more 
generalisable to other economies.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Correlation matrices 
Correlation matrix: All variables used in the estimations  
Note: CAOP-Capital openness; CRED-Domestic credit to private sector by banks; EXCH-Exchange rate; FDI-Foreign direct investment net 
inflows, % of GDP; FPI-Foreign portfolio investment net inflows, % of GDP; GDP-Annual GDP growth rate; GINTR-Global interest rates; 
HUMC-Human capital development; INSTDEX-Institutional quality index; NATR-Natural resources rent; SMC-Stock market capitalisation.  
Correlation matrix: Worldwide Governance Indicators 
       
    
Note: CORR-Control of corruption; GOV-Government effectiveness; LAW-Rule of law; POL-Political stability; REG-Regulatory quality; VOA-
Voice and accountability.  
 
CAOP CRED EXCH FDI FPI GDP GINTR HUMC INSTDEX NATR SMC 
CAOP 1.0000
CRED -0.2448 1.0000
EXCH -0.1048 0.1842 1.0000
FDI 0.2666 0.0265 0.0133 1.0000
FPI -0.1564 -0.0815 -0.2187 -0.2224 1.0000
GDP -0.2198 0.2418 0.2859 -0.0493 -0.0113 1.0000
GINTR 0.0809 -0.0388 -0.0871 0.2136 -0.0500 0.1994 1.0000
HUMC 0.2966 0.0389 -0.2007 0.1351 -0.0969 -0.4212 -0.0894 1.0000
INSTDEX 0.3143 0.2242 -0.1870 0.2195 0.0484 -0.2159 0.0169 0.6139 1.0000
NATR -0.0207 -0.2027 0.0309 -0.1206 -0.1426 0.1441 0.1010 -0.3849 -0.6668 1.0000
SMC -0.3250 0.3518 -0.3083 -0.0829 0.4152 0.0186 0.1446 -0.0481 0.2231 0.0364 1.0000
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Appendix 2: FDI determinants and diagnostic statistics 
FDI determinants estimation results 
 Pooled effects Fixed Effects  Random 
effects  
System GMM GLS 
 FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
L.FDI 0.625*** 0.0991*** 0.625*** 0.702*** 0.625*** 
 (0.118) (0.0919) (0.118) (0.597) (0.0783) 
      
FPI 0.00743* -0.00736 0.00743* -0.149* 0.00743* 
 (0.0219) (0.0168) (0.0219) (0.0862) (0.0231) 
      
INSTDEX 0.0375* -0.0306 0.0375 0.636* 0.0375* 
 (0.0587) (0.0802) (0.0587) (0.211) (0.0557) 
      
SMC -0.00155* -0.000729 -0.00155* 0.00361 -0.00155* 
 (0.000649) (0.000866) (0.000649) (0.00316) (0.000724) 
      
CRED 0.00371* 0.00575 0.00371* -0.0208* 0.00371* 
 (0.00179) (0.00330) (0.00179) (0.0101) (0.00165) 
      
HUMC 0.00650 0.336 0.00650 -2.291 0.00650 
 (0.482) (1.148) (0.482) (5.120) (0.374) 
      
NATR 0.00370 0.0110 0.00370 -0.0643* 0.00370 
 (0.00957) (0.0162) (0.00957) (0.0288) (0.00874) 
      
EXCH -0.00114 0.00271 -0.00114 -0.0275 -0.00114 
 (0.00270) (0.00236) (0.00270) (0.0179) (0.00309) 
      
GDP 0.0231** 0.0240 0.0231** 0.0531* 0.0231* 
 (0.00821) (0.0135) (0.00821) (0.0208) (0.0104) 
      
_CONS 3.751** 8.377*** 3.751**  3.751*** 
 (1.356) (1.269) (1.356)  (0.938) 
N 120 120 120 108 120 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% 
respectively.  
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Diagnostic statistics: FDI determinants estimation 
  
Pooled 
Effects  
Fixed Effects   
Random 
Effects   
System 
GMM  
GLS 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
            
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
            
F-stas/Wald chi2 232.25 1.40 6932.94 4.48 253.36 
Prob>F/Prob>Wald 
chi2 
0.0000 0.1967 0.0000 0.011 0.0000 
            
Hausman Test   72.32 72.32     
Prob>chi2   0.0000 0.0000     
R-SQUARED            
Within   0.1132 0.0459     
Between   0.6015 0.9505     
Overall 0.6786 0.4778 0.6786     
            
rho    0.61226162 0.0000     
            
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -0.88   
Prob>z       0.380   
            
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -0.21   
Prob>z       0.831   
            
Sargan test of overid     0.74   
Prob>chi2       0.863   
            
Hansen test of overid      0.48   
Prob>chi2       0.922   
           
Instruments        12   
Cross sectional dependence         
Perasan’s test    -1.630 -1.264     
Frees' test   0.112 0.117     
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Appendix 3: FPI determinants and diagnostic statistics 
FPI determinants estimation results 
 Pooled Effects Fixed Effects  Random 
Effects 
System 
GMM 
GLS 
 FPI FPI FPI FPI FPI 
L.FPI 0.178 0.0491 0.178 -0.247* 0.178* 
 (0.188) (0.136) (0.188) (0.102) (0.0844) 
      
FDI -0.00728 0.00549* -0.00728 -0.000130 -0.00728 
 (0.00946) (0.00372) (0.00946) (0.00610) (0.0177) 
      
INSTDEX -0.351 1.274* -0.351 2.609 -0.351 
 (0.226) (0.950) (0.226) (3.324) (0.213) 
      
GINTR -0.320 -0.514** -0.320 -0.853** -0.320 
 (0.199) (0.164) (0.199) (0.259) (0.196) 
      
SMC 0.0129*** 0.0325*** 0.0129*** 0.0264** 0.0129*** 
 (0.00242) (0.00536) (0.00242) (0.00772) (0.00231) 
      
CRED -0.0110 -0.0510* -0.0110 -0.113** -0.0110* 
 (0.00641) (0.0219) (0.00641) (0.0319) (0.00476) 
      
CAOP 0.186 0.117 0.186 0.858 0.186 
 (0.176) (0.210) (0.176) (0.923) (0.131) 
      
NATR -0.124* -0.112 -0.124* -0.136* -0.124*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0617) (0.0514) (0.0531) (0.0356) 
      
GDP 0.0166 -0.0315 0.0166 0.00740 0.0166 
 (0.0403) (0.0558) (0.0403) (0.0281) (0.0371) 
      
_CONS 1.967** 3.368* 1.967**  1.967*** 
 (0.683) (1.492) (0.683)  (0.486) 
N 120 120 120 108 120 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.001, ** P < 0.01,* P < 0.05 are levels of statistical significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5% 
respectively.  
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Diagnostic statistics: FPI determinants 
  
Pooled 
Effects  
Fixed Effects   
Random 
Effects   
System 
GMM  
GLS 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
            
Groups 12 12 12 12 12 
            
F-stas/Wald chi2 56.29 7.33 1234.12 6.98 61.41 
Prob>F/Prob>Wald 
chi2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.002 0.0000 
            
Hausman Test   2.15 72.32     
Prob>chi2   0.9889 0.9889     
R-SQUARED            
Within   0.3998 0.2325     
Between   0.3875 0.6324     
Overall 0.3385 0.2307 0.3385     
            
rho    0.81017232 0.0000     
            
Arellano-Bond AR(1)     -1.23   
Prob>z       0.219   
            
Arellano-Bond AR(2)     -1.12   
Prob>z       0.262   
            
Sargan test of overid     1.17   
Prob>chi2       0.556   
            
Hansen test of overid      3.12   
Prob>chi2       0.210   
           
Instruments        11   
Cross sectional dependence         
Perasan’s test    0.426 1.632     
Frees' test   0.253 -0.307     
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